

SEVERAL
ORATIONS
OF

DEMOSTHENES,

K

EXCITING THE

ATHENIANS to oppose the *Exorbitant*
Power of PHILIP King of *Macedon*.

Translated, in the Years 1702 and 1744, from the
Original *Greek*, by the Earl of *Peterborough*,
Lord *Lansdowne*, Dr. *Garth*, Colonel *Stanhope*,
Mr. *Topham*, and other Hands.

To which is prefix'd

A PREFACE, taken from the *French* of Monsieur
TOURREIL, containing a short View of the
History of Greece, and the *Life of Demosthenes*.

The whole carefully Revised and Corrected, with
Libanius's Arguments, and some *Notes* from
Ulpian, now first added.

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. and R. TONSON and S. DRAPER
in the *Strand*.

MDCCXLIV.

SEVERAL
ORATIONS
OF
DEMOSTHENES



A FINE FACSIMILE OF THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS
OF DEMOSTHENES
THE WHOLE IN TWO VOLUMES
WITH INTRODUCTION AND
EXPLANATORY NOTES

LONDON
Printed for J. and R. Smith and B. P. Smith
in the Strand
MDCCCXXXVII



Advertisement to the R E A D E R.

 HIS Work was first undertaken in the Year 1702, when the last War against *France* was proclaim'd.

The Danger, to which our Country was then expos'd, from the growing Power, and ambitious Designs, of *Lewis* the *Fourteenth* of *France*, was thought to bear a near Resemblance to That, which threatned the State of *Athens*, from the like Power and Designs of *Philip* King of *Macedon*.

For this Reason, it was judg'd seasonable, at that time, to publish an *English* Translation of those celebrated Orations of *Demosthenes*, in which that great Orator declaims with such Vehemence against the Ambition, the Perfidy, and the encreasing Greatness of the *Macedonian* Monarch, and so powerfully excites the *Athenians* to take up Arms in defence of their own, and the common Liberties of *Greece*.

A Return of the like Conjunction of Time, when the same Causes have again involved this Nation in a War with *France*, has occasion'd the present Republication of this Work, with the Addition of some other *Philippic* Orations, now first translated, to complete the Subject.



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THE



T H E
P R E F A C E.

AN Interpreter's chief Duty consists in making his Author understood; of which, I think, I can't better acquit myself, than by setting before the Reader's Eyes a *Plan* of Old *Greece*, with an Abridgment of her History: Without which, *Demosthenes*, though translated, will still be mere *Greek* to those, who are unacquainted with the Country; or who at best have but a slight confused Idea of it. They will be apt to stumble every Step they take, like those, who are travelling in the Dark, through unknown Places; and if by Intervals some Rays of Eloquence should strike upon 'em, they will be to them like Flashes of Lightning, which serve only to augment the Horrors of the Night in which they leave 'em. I must therefore, the best I can, unravel those Interests, and explain the Occurrences that bear any Relation to this Subject. To this, perhaps, I ought to confine myself, and enter

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at first step into the Business. But to those, who are more curious, an Enquiry into the very Birth of a Nation, so famous as that of *Greece*, and a Summary of what has been deliver'd thereupon, may not be unacceptable: 'Tis a Digression will not draw me far out of the way. I shall insist chiefly upon what is most material to my present Design, and glance only upon the rest.

'The *Grecians* were so called, either from a Petty Borough, or a very obscure King: * But it was a Name they quickly quitted for that of *Hellenes*, or *Achaians*: † By which two last they chose to pass in their own Works. The extream Rusticity of these first *Grecians* wou'd appear almost incredible, if their own Historians were not to be rely'd upon in that Point. Who wou'd think a People, so proud of their Original, as to have recourse to some Fables to make it more Illustrious, shou'd be at the Pains of inventing others for the debasing it? or that a Nation, to whom we stand indebted for whatever we have of Letters, and the *Sciences*, shou'd be descended from Savages, who knew no other Law but Force, who had no Knowledge of Husbandry, but fed like Beasts on Grass? Witness the Divine Honours they decreed him, ‡ who first taught 'em to feed on Acorns as a more

* Plin. *Hist. Nat.* l. 4. c. 7. *Ibid.* l. 14. c. 4. *Thucyd.* l. 1.

† Aristot. *at the end of the first Book of Meteors.* Plin. *ibid.*

‡ Pausan. l. 8.

wholsome Nourishment than that of Herbs. Notwithstanding this Change of Food, still did they continue rough and unpolish'd, and that for a long time after. The weakest were not the last who grew sensible of the Necessity there was for Civil Society, as a means to secure 'em from Violence and Oppression. By this they were put upon building of Houses; whose Numbers increasing insensibly, grew into Boroughs and Cities. Nor cou'd this Advantage of Cohabitation tame or soften their Tempers; an Honour reserved for *Ægypt* and *Phœnicia*; by Colonies from whence they became instructed and civiliz'd. The *Phœnicians* taught 'em * Navigation, Trade, and the Use of Letters: *Ægypt* polish'd 'em by her Laws; gave 'em a Taste of the Arts and Sciences; initiated 'em in her Mysteries; and, to speak all in a word, gave 'em Kings and Gods. Thus this Nation, that in the Splendour of her Fortune grew so presumptuous, as to look on the rest of the World as no other than *Barbarians*, was forc'd to borrow from other Nations the very Means, by which she rais'd herself up to that Pride and Contempt of those same Nations.

A famous Author has compar'd the Duration of a People to the Life of Man; according to which Notion, we may assign to *Greece* four different Ages, distinguish'd by as many remarkable *Epoches*. The first includes near 700 Years, from the Foundation

* Herodot. l. 5. c. 58, 59, & 60. Joseph. contr. App. Plin. l. 5. c. 12. & l. 7. c. 56. Tacit. l. 2.

of her Petty Royalties, to the Siege of *Troy**: The Second about 800 more, from the *Trojan War* to the Battle of *Marathon*. The Third something less than 200, from that Battle to the Death of *Alexander*: And the Last, an equal Portion of Years, from the Death of that Conqueror (after which she began to decline) 'till at last she sunk under the Power of the *Romans*. The Three first of these are what my present Design obliges me to consider; the last being of no use to it.

To her Infancy I refer the Foundation of *Athens*, *Sparta*, *Thebes*, *Argos*, *Corinth*, and *Sicyon*; the Attempt of the *Danaïdes*; the Labours of *Hercules*, from whom the *Macedonians* pretended to descend by *Caranus* †; the Tragical Adventures of *OEdipus*; the Expedition of the *Argonauts*; that of the Seven Captains against *Thebes*; *Minos* his War with *Theseus*: And generally speaking, all the Exploits of her first Heroes, who have still a Place in the List of Fame, and that for a lasting and very weighty Reason. That Preeminence of Glory,

* An. Mund. 2820. Ante Christ. 1184. Diodorus Siculus, following therein Apollodorus, assigns this famous Epoche as the very Compass by which Chronology ought to steer: Behind which, says he, our Eyes can't penetrate; nor can we determine any certain Calculation.

† Plutarch. in Alex. Just. l. 7. c. 2. Liv. Vell. Paus. Suid. Herodotus contradicts this Opinion (l. 8. c. 139.) Solinus, (c. 15.) The old Historians reckoned Perdiccas, the more modern Caranus, for the first King of Macedon. However it be, all agree in this; That this Monarchy began about the 22d Olympiad.

in which through so long a Succession of Ages they have been continued down to our Days, is not so much the effect of a Blind Zeal for Antiquity, as the Respect Men naturally have for a Generous Valour, which protects the Weak instead of insulting 'em; and which is so far from committing Violence, that it is always best pleased and employed in repressing it.

Greece, being past her Infancy, tried her united Forces in this Siege; where her *Achilles*, *Ajax*, *Nestor*, and *Ulysses* forewarned *Asia*, that one Day She would be taught to obey their Posterity. All the World know the Cause of this famous War, tho' perhaps every one is not informed, that there was an hereditary Quarrel between the Families of *Priam*, and *Agamemnon*. *Tantalus* King of *Phrygia*, Father of *Pelops*, and, by consequence, Great Grandfather * to *Agamemnon* and *Menalaus*, stole away *Ganymede* Brother to *Ilus*, who, being *Priam's* Grandfather, highly resented an Injury that touch'd him so nearly. He drove *Tantalus* out of his Territories, and obliged him to fly for Refuge into *Greece*, where he laid the Foundation of the *Pelopides*. We may add, that *Paris*, *Ilus* his Great Grandson, by way of Reprisal, stole away *Hellen* from *Menelaus*, who was Great Grandson to *Tantalus*: besides, whatever the *Greeks* say, who would fain have their *Trojan* Expedition considered as a Preludium of their former Victories over the

* Some say Great Great-Grandfather, and place *Plisthenes* between *Atreus* and *Agamemnon*. *Diod. l. 4.*
Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1.

Barbarians, we learn from History, that the *Trojans* were originally of *Greek* Extraction; for not only *Dardanus*, their first King, was by Birth an *Arcadian*, * and their very Names, for the most part, such as *Priamus*, *Anchises*, *Hector*, *Andromache*, and *Astyanax*, were purely *Greek*; but furthermore, it appears from *Homer*, that, as they worshipp'd the same Divinities, so he has left room to conjecture, that they spoke one and the same Language; otherwise it is hard to conceive how a Poet who used to be particular in the minutest Circumstances, and that with an Exactness imitated since by no Man, should describe such frequent Conferences, without ever employing an Interpreter between 'em. † Four-score Years after the Destruction of this City, the *Heraclides*, *Hercules's* Descendants, returned, and recover'd the Possession of the *Peloponnesus*, from whence *Euristheus*, that implacable Enemy to *Hercules* and all his Race, had expelled them about an Age before. They had an unquestionable Right to the Kingdoms of *Argos* and *Mycenæ*. *Amphytrion*, *Hercules's* Father, and Grandson to *Perseus*, King of *Argos* and *Mycenæ*, having through Inadvertency slain *Electryon* his Uncle, and his Wife *Alcmena's* Father, was forc'd to fly to *Thebes*. *Sthenelus* immediately seized upon his fugitive Nephew's Possessions, and transmitted 'em down to his Son *Euristheus*; who, having no Children, appointed his

* Varro, and all the Greek Authors in Servius, Æn. 3.

† Diodor. Sic. Præf.

maternal Uncle *Atræus*, * *Pelop's* Son, and *Agamemnon's* Father, for his Heir. By this means the Crown pass'd into the Family of the *Pelopides*, who impos'd their own Name on *Peloponnesus*, which before that was call'd *Appia*. Twice had the *Heraclidæ* fruitlessly attempted to re-establish themselves before the *Trojan* Expedition; but at last Fortune made 'em amends; they defeated the *Pelopides*, viz. *Tisamenes* and *Penthilus*, *Orestes's* Sons, together with the *Neleides*, or Descendants from *Nestor*, and divided the Kingdoms of *Mycene*, *Argos*, *Messenia*, and *Lacedæmon* among themselves. This so extraordinary a Revolution chang'd almost the whole Face of *Greece*. Till then the Inhabitants of *Peloponnesus* were divided properly into *Achaïans* and *Ionians*. The first were possess'd of those Parts, which the *Heraclidæ* conferr'd on the *Dorians*, and others that accompanied 'em in the War. The last inhabited that Part of *Peloponnesus* call'd since *Achaïa*. Those of the *Achaïans*, who were descend'd from *Ætolus* †, and were chac'd out of *Lacedæmon*, retir'd at first into *Thrace* under the Conduct of *Penthilus*; after whose Death, they went and establish'd themselves

* *Pelops*, *Tantalus* his Son, who reign'd at *Sipulus*, a City of *Phrygia*: and who, according to *Pindar* (*Olympiad.*) cou'd not digest his mighty Fortune; καταπέψαι μεγάλην ὄλβον ἐκ ἐδωκάδην. *Thucyd.* l. 1. *Plut. in Thef.* *Diod. Sic.* l. 4. *Strab.* l. 8. *Pausan.* l. 5. *Apolod.* l. 2. *Herod.* l. 9. c. 26. *Diod. Sic. lib.* 4. *Strab. lib.* 9. *Pausan.* l. 2. & 4. *Id.* *Arcad.*

† Son of *Hellen*, and Grandson to *Deucalion*. *Strab.* l. 4. *Pausan.* l. 8.

in that Part of *Asia Minor* which they call *Æolis*, * where they founded *Smyrna*, and eleven other Colonies: As for the *Achaïans* of *Mycene* and *Argos*, seeing themselves constrained † to abandon their own Country, they immediately seized on that of the *Ionians*, who at first fled for Refuge to *Athens*, from whence they retired some Years after, under the Command of *Neleus* and *Androcles*, both ‡ the Sons of *Codrus*, to possess themselves of that Tract in *Asia Minor*, which from them was called *Ionia*. There they built *Ephesus*, *Clazomene*, *Samos*, and several other Cities, Three hundred and twenty eight Years after the Return of the *Heraclidæ*. || *Iphitus* King of *Elis*, and *Lycurgus* King of *Lacedæmon*, restored the *Olympick Games*, instituted by *Hercules* in Honour of *Jupiter*, which till then were of no settled Date, but celebrated only upon some extraordinary Occasions. These two Princes fix'd the Time of their Celebration for every fourth Year, to be near the City of *Pisa*, called otherwise *Olympia*. § Hence the Revolution of every four Years, at the End of which these Games were exercised, was called an *Olympiad*. This Interval instituted, and confirmed by the Authority of Religion, was thought the readiest, and safest Way to calculate their Time, tho' it

* Herod. l. 1. c. 149.

† By the same *Heraclidæ*. Pausan. Achaic.

‡ Herod. l. 1. Pausan. l. 7.

|| Plutarch. in *Lyc. Phlegon*. Fragm. Pausan. in *Eliac*. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1.

§ Steph. *de urb.* Strab. l. 8.

does not appear that their Chronologers were presently acquainted with the Use of it. * The first that practised it was *Timæus*, under *Ptolomy Philadelphus*; till whose Time their publick Occurrences were dated from the Reign of the *Athenian Archons*, and *Kings of Sparta*. † In *Ptolomy Euergetes* or the *Benefactor's Days*, *Eratosthenes* imitated *Timæus*; tho' *Polybius* was the first of all the *Greek Historians*, that are now remaining, who made use of this Computation. By the way we must observe, that this vulgar *Æra* of the *Olympiads* is of a fresher Date than *Iphilus*; it commenced not till the first Year of the 28th *Olympiad*, at which time *Chorebus* gained the Prize in the Race. The Spirit of Religion, and Curiosity for Publick Shews, were not the only Motives that influenced the Institution of these Games; Policy had her share in the Contrivance. 'Twas thought convenient to Re-assemble from time to time, and Re-unite, if possible, by common Sacrifices, different Commonalties, independent one of the other, and for the most part separated less by the Distance of their Habitations, than the Diversity of their Interests. Upon the same Consideration some other

* Diod. l. 5. Suid. in Tim. Polyb.

† Dion. Hal. l. 1. Plin. l. 4. c. 5. Phleg. Trall. *ibid.* Syncellus. Varro makes the first Olympiad the Boundary between the Fabulous and Historical Times. Censorin. *de die Natal.* c. 21. Ann. Mund. 3228. Ante Christ. 776.

Games * were afterwards instituted; such as the *Pythian*, celebrated likewise every fourth Year in honour of *Apollo* near the City of *Delphos*, in which the *Amphyetyons*, Men chosen out of the prime Cities of all *Greece*, with Power to appoint whatsoever was thought convenient for the publick Peace and Reputation, presided. From these sort of Sports, in which Envy or Malice had no share, sprung up a Noble and Generous Emulation: Every one contended passionately for the Prize, and the Vanquish'd were the readiest to crown the Victor, and to congratulate his good Fortune. A free People, like them, thought with good reason they cou'd not in time of Peace addict themselves to Exercises more Honourable or Useful; for, besides that by this means they made their Limbs strong, active, and supple, they moreover accustomed their Thoughts to the Desire of Conquest; 'twas a kind of School or Military Apprenticeship, in which their Courage found a constant Employment; nor were they suffered, through Ease, to let that Profession decline, in which lay the Security of all the rest. Their Minds therefore must be quickened with Good and Glorious Prospects, when in this Image of War they arrived at a pitch of Glory, approaching, in some respects, to that of a Conqueror's. It must therefore be for want of rightly weighing the Advantage of such-like Exercises, or from an ill Custom of judging all things by the

* In the 28th Olymp. according to Pausan. (*Phocic.*) followed therein by Scaliger; but in the 29th according to Eusebius's *Chron.* Pausan. *ibid.* Strab. l. 8.

Standard of our own Manners, that we cannot easily comprehend why an Excellence so little in use among us should be attended with extraordinary Applause and magnificent Rewards; in which we are the more inexcusable, because the Remembrance of our own Jufts and Tournaments, which held a middle place between a Diverfion and a Combat, is not fo entirely loft as not to paint out to us an Image of the Ancient Games of *Greece*. Whilst they were thus exercifing their Bodies, at the fame time were they cultivating their Minds. Poefie had her Heroes too *, who took care to give Immortality to the reft, and consecrate their Labours to the Honour of their Country. Nay, not content to transform their Champions into Demi-gods, they attempted, in Imitation of the *Phenicians* and *Ægyptians*, to lay claim, as I may fay, to the Gods themselves, and make *Greece*, either the Place of their Birth, or, at leaft, the Theatre of their moft famous Exploits. The Tranquillity, in which ſhe then lived, met with no Interruption, but from the long War of the *Lacedæmonians* with *Meffene*. The *Meffenians* at laſt, driven out of their Country, Transplanted themſelves into *Sicily*, and made themſelves Maſters of *Zancle*, which from her new Inhabitants was called *Meffina*. The Number of the *Grecians* in the mean time increaſed to that degree, that they were forced to ſeek out for new Habitations in foreign

* Homer was cotemporary with Lycurgus, who was the firſt that publiſh'd his Poems. Cic. Tuſc. l. 5. Strab. l. 10. Plut. in Lycurg. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1.

Parts: * They had their Colonies every where; at *Chalcedon*, *Byzantium*, *Syracuse*, *Marseilles*, *Antibes*, *Agde*, &c. but more especially in *Italy*, at *Tarentum*, *Brundisium*, *Naples*, *Rhegium*, *Crotone*, *Sybaris*, and other Places in so great a number, that all the Tract of Land, that extends from the farthermost part of *Calabria* up to *Campania*, went by the Name of *Magna Græcia*. The Genius of this People, accustomed by their Poets to Truths mixt with Fables, had not presently the Taste of right Reason; the Power she at length gain'd over 'em was owing to Philosophy. Seven Philosophers † who were deservedly surnamed the Seven Wise Men, spread their Doctrines through *Greece*, and sowed a Moral in her that grew fruitful in an Instant, and in a small Corner of the World produced an extraordinary Plenty, sufficient to furnish the rest of it.

The third Age of the *Grecians*, very short, but withal very active, contained not above an hundred fifty and eight Years, from the Battle of *Ma-*

* Solin. Strab. l. 12. Dion. Halic. l. 2. Strab. l. 6. Fest. Pomp. Senec. Consol. ad Helvid.

† Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Solon, Cleobulus, Myso, and Chilon. Plat. in Protag. Some reckon Periander among 'em instead of Myso. Diog. Laert. in Mys. Every one of 'em, except Thales, commanded in their own Country. Cicer. Orat. l. 3. They consecrated the first Fruits of their Wisdom in the Temple of Apollo at Delphos; where the Inscription of two of their Sentences was to be seen, viz. Know thy self. And, Too much of one thing is good for nothing. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1.

rather

rathon to the Death of *Alexander*: Never in so short a Space was there seen such a Number of Philosophers, Orators, and great Captains flourishing together; never was an Age crowded with so many extraordinary Occurrences, immediately succeeding each other. *Darius Hystaspis*, and after him his Son *Xerxes*, came pouring into *Greece* with most formidable Forces; but She, unconcern'd at their Numbers, march'd resolutely out to meet the Enemy. One might then say, Virtue was going to give Laws to Effeminacy, the Soul to the Body, and Reason to Instinct. Her Success was answerable to her Resolution. The *Persians* were taught at *Marathon*, *Salamine*, and *Platea*, how much a disciplined Valour is superior to an inconsiderate Fury. One while would a Handful of *Grecians* rout Armies, that for their Number might be said to overflow the Earth, and whose Darts darkened the very Sun*: another while wou'd they beat and disperse Fleets that cover'd the Ocean, and threatned to bind the Waves and Winds in Shackles†. Nay more, three hundred *Lacedemonians*, being animated by their King's Example, dared boldly face a certain Death at the Streights of *Thermopyle*, sell their Lives at a high rate, and die satisfied with having left behind 'em

* *Leonidas, to whom this Observation was made, answer'd, So much the better, we shall then fight in the Shade.*

† *Gravem illum & Mari & terræ Xerxem non hominibus tantum terribilem sed Neptuno quoque compedes, & Cælo tenebras minitantem.* Val. Max. l. 3. c. 2.

the Example of an Intrepidity never known before. When *Persia*, so often vanquished by the *Grecians*, despaired of subduing them, her last shift was to divide 'em; to which their Prosperity opened her a means. Their Security dissolv'd that Union their Fears had form'd *. Spirits naturally quick, and too licentious, blown up with their frequent Victories, could not contain themselves, or govern their good Fortune; they abandoned themselves to Jealousies, and to Ambition. The Strongest were for governing the whole, and the Weak were for no Government at all; insomuch that, while they were endeavouring to shun the Misfortune of Subjection, they fell into that of too much Freedom, or rather of an unbounded Licentiousness. These Divisions, that ended at last in a general Slavery, were on foot in *Demosthenes's* Days. We ought to be acquainted with all the Particulars of these Divisions, if we would rightly understand *Demosthenes's* Orations, especially his *Philippicks*; and the Account of these Particulars require an Insight into the Customs, Forces, and Interests of the three principal Republicks of *Greece*; I mean *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Thebes*. For, as for *Corinth*, tho' to be respected for the Number of her Inhabitants, her Commerce, Riches, and, above all, for the Advantage of her Situation, which made her Mistress of the *Ægean* and *Ionian* Seas, yet was she never predominant, but among the Republicks of the second Rank. Not but that she might have risen higher, had she been seconded

* *Plat. de Leg. 3.*

by her Colonies. But the *Corcyreans*, who were descended from her, and whose Fleet, joined with hers, might have made her Empress at Sea, exclusive of *Athens* herself, took up Arms against their Metropolis; which gave a Beginning to the *Peloponnesian* War. In the mean time, *Syracuse*, another of her Colonies, and which was strong enough, both by Sea and Land, to be a Match for *Carthage*, never found herself in a condition to contribute to the Glory or Advancement of her first Founders. Sometimes assaulted by Forces from abroad, and sometimes oppressed by Tyrants at home, she was so far from sending Succour to the *Corinthians*, that she was forc'd more than once to demand Assistance from them. They saved her from falling into the Hands of the *Athenians*, and at last sent her the famous *Timoleon*, who released her from the Tyranny of *Dionysius* the younger. I begin then with *Lacedemon*.

* *Lacedemon*, famous for her ancient Kings, had acquired a new Splendor under the Reign of *Lycurgus*, † a Man born to govern and instruct others; a good King, and at least as good a Legislator. This Man undertook a Reformation of the State, and began with that of Manners, as the most

* *Lacedemon*, called originally *Lelia*, from *Lelex* her Founder and first King, (A. M. 2570.) was afterwards called sometimes *Lacedemon*, and sometimes *Sparta*, from *Lacedemon* *Lelex* his Successor, and *Sparta*, *Lacedemon's* Daughter, *Pausan.* l. 3. *init.* An. Mund. 3120. Ante Christ. 884.

† *Plut. in Lycurg.*

likely to maintain the Order that was to be established. He executed his Designs, and after having drawn an Oath from his Subjects, that they would observe his Laws till his Return, he went into perpetual Banishment. He had before this, in order to make 'em the more authentick, made use of another Artifice, and persuaded the People that they had been dictated to him by *Apollo*. 'Tis not to be imagined how a Pagan, who indeed was too indulgent to Adultery and Theft, which in some cases he pardoned, should in the rest approach so near to Christian Morality, as sometimes to overtake it. There was no Splendor, no Magnificence in *Sparta* *. To go differently clothed according to the different Seasons of the Year, was look'd on there as a criminal Effeminacy. Even the Sex, that is most curious in their Apparel, studied there only that of the Mind. They were possess'd of two inexhaustible Treasures, Modesty and Frugality: At which rate *Sparta* alone abounded as much or more in Wealth than all the rest of *Greece* together. Before *Lyfander's* Days, not only Private Persons, but the State itself made no account of Money. After *Lyfander*, who first introduc'd the Use of it, the good Constitution of the State so provided, that Private Men still preserv'd themselves a long time Proof against Avarice, and the Publick only was suffer'd to be rich. Wealth rolled in thither from all Parts, and there was it detain'd; for Luxury and Intemperance forc'd nothing from thence into other Parts: Which made

* Xenoph. Rep. Lacedem.

Plato say † very properly, in allusion to the Fable of the Sick Lion; *One may discern a great many Foot-steps of the Money that goes into Sparta; but not the least Print of any that comes out.* Of all their Wealth, nothing was esteem'd more precious than their Time; that was regarded as a thing Sacred: And 'twas esteem'd a piece of Sacrilege, to let the least Particle of it slip by unemployed: He, who without scruple could squander that away, was look'd on as the most dissolute of Prodigals. The Citizens had all their Employments, which took up the Day, and were agreeable to their Ages, and their Capacities. Instead of considering Labour as a base and servile Business, they embrac'd it as the Occupation of a Man sincerely free. This love of it interdicted all Plays, even to Children. The Soldier was not suffer'd so much as to walk at his leisure Hours *. They were good Husbands of their very Words. Frequently a single Syllable serv'd for an Answer to the most important Dispatches †: *Because nothing,*
say

† 1 Alcib.

* Æl. Var. Hist. 1. 2. c. 5. tells us, *That some Spartan Soldiers, garrison'd in a conquer'd Town, were reprov'd for such a Licence, as a thing unworthy Lacedemonians, who owed all their Moments to Virtue.*

† *Some of their Neighbours having sent 'em a threatening Message; If we get into your Country, we will put all to Fire and Sword; they return'd Answer, If. As much as to say, We'll take care you shall never come there. To several of Philip's Proposals they answered only, No. Another time when Philip had writ to 'em a very haughty menacing Letter, they only return'd him for Answer, Dio-nysius*

say they, *approached nearer to that Silence so highly recommended to 'em by Lycurgus, upon this Principle; That few Laws wou'd serve those who made use of but few Words.* This concise manner of expressing themselves detracted nothing from the strength of their Thoughts, but rather gave 'em a greater Energy; 'twas an instructive Brevity: The more they left their Hearers to Understand, the more were they Understood. On the other hand, Temperance had banish'd the wantonness of the Table: Wine was seldom used among 'em, § and their usual Food was Barley-bread; a Wheaten-loaf being reckoned among their dainty Dishes. The Diversions of the Theatre were not priviledged; but on the contrary, a prevailing Reason had more rigorously proscribed 'em. They suffer'd no Tragedies or Comedies to be Acted, lest they should accustom their Eyes to behold the Representation of what was condemned by their Law, or their Ears to be polluted with the Apology of guilty Passions. This Austerity, to which Nature is so averse, however, by degrees became habitual. This People, what by the force of Education, and influence of Custom, conceived as great an Aversion to Sloth and Voluptuousness as we naturally have to Pain and Grief. They did not think it much to sacrifice their Pleasures to the Liberty of the Mind,

nyfius at Corinth: Meaning, remember thou that Dionysius, heretofore as great a Tyrant as thyself, leads at present a private Life, and teaches School at Corinth.
 Demet. Phaler. de Elec. l. 8.

§ Heraclid. de Polit.

which

which they enjoyed in a frugal, laborious Life; but so frugal, and so laborious as made *Alcibiades* say, * *I do not wonder to see 'em so readily expose and precipitate themselves into Dangers, that seem not so much to rob them of Life, as to make them a Present of Death.* They were all born with a love for Order and Discipline. The Law ruled with an equal Authority over the Rich and the Poor, over the Magistrate and the private Person. Their Kings valued themselves upon their Subjection to it, and distinguished themselves only in an exacter Obedience †. *Agefilas* astonish'd the *Persians* with his Modesty in a Conference, as much as he had terrified them before with his Valour in the Field. § This King, truly Master of himself, rejected the most alluring Offers of Fortune, and deaf to the Applause of Nations he had set at Liberty, insensible to the Tears they shed to retain him in the midst of his Conquests, with which he had already made the *Grand Monarch* to Tremble, stopt in his full Career, and returned home directly; and all this out of a Deference to the *Ephori* ††, who had recalled him. So charming was Moderation in his Eyes, and appeared to him more glorious than his Conquests: Or, to make use of his own Thoughts, so well was he persuaded a King was as much obliged to obey the Laws, as

* *Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. 14. c. 35.*

† *Somebody asking Demaratus, What made him fly from Sparta, the Capital of his Realm? he answer'd, Because the Laws are more Absolute there than the King. Polyb. l. 3. c. 6.*

§ *Corn. Nep. & Plut. in Agefilao.*

†† *Magistrates of Lacedemon.*

to command the People. Princes nourish'd like these in Maxims so just, so pure, and, as it were, hereditary, made use of their Power with so much gentleness, that it scarce was felt: They governed like Fathers rather than Masters. * *Lycurgus* knew very well, that a right Understanding between the People and the Sovereign is the surest Foundation of their reciprocal Felicity; for the maintaining of which Understanding, he establish'd the *Ephori*, or Inquisitors †; whose Duty it was to enquire into the Conduct of the Kings, as well as that of the People, and to hold the Balance so equal between 'em both, as that the Royal Authority should never degenerate into Fierceness and Tyranny, nor Popular Liberty start out into Licentiousness and Rebellion. This Medium betwixt an excessive Subjection, and an excessive Freedom, preserved *Sparta* from those domestick Dissentions that harrafs'd her Neighbours. The *Ephori* in all pressing Conjunctions brought the People to agree to what had been before resolv'd upon. These Resolutions, so una-

* *Lycurgus made answer to a Man who was highly commending Democracy, Go set it up first in your own House: Intimating to him, That then there must be as many Masters in his Family as there were Servants.*

† Herod. l. i. c. 65. *On the other side Plut. (in Lycurg.) pretends, that Theopompus, in order to curb the Citizens, who begun to grow too imperious, instituted the Ephori, about 130 Years after Lycurgus; and when his Wife reproach'd him for leaving to his Children the Royal Authority more infirm than he receiv'd it; I shall leave it, said he, more lasting, and by consequence more solid.*

nimously

nimously concerted, were executed in due time; and every one concurred in the Execution as cheerfully as if he himself had been the Proposer of 'em. The Government therefore of *Lacedemon* was not purely Monarchical; the Grandees had a considerable Share in it; nor were the People excluded from it. All these Members of the Body Politick, according as they conspired to the general good, found their own in it: So that in spite of that restlessness and inconstancy of Mankind, which is daily gaping after Change, never to be cur'd of its distaste to Uniformity, *Lacedemon* preserved herself in an entire conformity to her own Laws, for the space of more than 700 Years. Beside this, Merit appear'd in every Sex, and every Age. Youth had no need to wait for the Lessons of Experience, which were supply'd by Institution and Example; whereby Women became capable of the most Elevated Virtues. The love of their Country silenc'd all Maternal Softness, and made the Mother, when acquainted with the death of her Son, slain in the Service of the Publick, repair and visit the Corps upon the place of Battle, and regulate her Grief according as the Wounds, with which she saw him covered, were shameful, or honourable. This Greatness of Mind, so universally profess'd throughout *Lacedemon*, made 'em very considerable *. The Reputation of so extraordinary a Merit prevail'd with the Kings of *Egypt* and *Phœnicia*, struck with Esteem and Admiration for 'em, to become

* Herod. l. 1 & 3.

in some respect Homagers to 'em, and to testify their Submission in most Solemn Embassies. The *Grecians* themselves were more nearly touch'd with it, and possess'd with a just Reverence for 'em. † By these Means *Sparta* for a long time exercis'd that Empire over 'em, which Virtue had given 'em. Every one was perswaded that to attend her was to follow Justice and Reason, to pursue their own Interest, Honour, and Reputation. Tyranny met in *Lacedæmon* with most terrible and implacable Enemies; Liberty, faithful and indefatigable Protectors. This Zeal was not pent up within the Confines of *Greece*. The *Asiatick Greeks*, seeing themselves upon the point of being swallow'd up by *Cyrus*, turn'd their Eyes to *Sparta*, and conjur'd her not to suffer any *Grecians* to become a prey to *Barbarians*. *Sparta* gave their Ambassadors a favourable Reception. || These resolute Republicans had the Courage to declare by an *Herald at Arms* to this Conqueror, who came to subdue *Asia*, that they would never suffer him to touch any of the *Grecian Colonies*: That nothing that bore the Name of *Greek* was born for Servitude; and that if his Design was to subdue 'em, they could readily pass the Seas to vindicate their Liberty. Thus was *Sparta*, whilst she commanded only by her Virtues, reverenc'd as the Mother of the Nations; Protectress of the Common Cause, and Supreme Judge of all Differences. She neither receiv'd nor exacted any other Tribute than that of Esteem, of Love, Trust,

† Herod. l. 4.

|| Id. l. 1.

and Admiration. Her Constitution however was not without Faults. † Her Government favour'd of the Humour of her Inhabitants, who extended the same harsh Severity to their Allies, which they us'd towards one another. Besides that there was no Peace nor Truce observ'd in a Commonwealth devoted to Arms, and whose Constitution required continual Wars for the Preservation of it. This, by degrees, made her Government distastful, and favour'd the Ambition of the *Athenians*, her Rivals: * Who, though a more Ancient State, had for many Years, either through the Weakness of their Forces, or rather the Disorders of their Divisions, lived without any Thoughts of Command; but who now were not content to draw their own Necks out of the Collar, but did as much for the rest of *Greece*.

§ *Athens*, from her Birth, was Governed by Kings, but who then had little more than the Name. || Their Power, for the most part restrained to the Command of her Armies, vanish'd into nothing in

† Plat. *de Rep.* l. 8. & *de leg.* l. 1. Arist. *polit.* l. 7. c. 14. Xenoph. *de Rep. Lac.*

* *The Athenians, by Nature more soft and delicate, were too much in love with an effeminate Life. Diogenes returning from Sparta to Athens, said, He was come out of the Apartment of Men into that of Women. So that in Greece they had their separate Apartments.*

§ *This City was at first call'd Cecropia from Cecrops, her first King; after that She was call'd Athens, having been consecrated to Minerva, called in Greek, Athene.*

|| Thucid. l. 1. Plut. in Thes.

times of Peace. Every one lived Master of his own Family, in an absolute Independance. Originally, and that till *Theseus's* Days, the Burroughs of *Attica* had each their Magistrate, who, with the Chief of the Place, regulated all Differences and Disputes, without any Appeal to their * Kings; whose Number, according to common Computation, was seventeen; ten from *Cecrops* down to *Theseus*, and seven from *Theseus* to *Codrus* †. This last, in the War with the *Heraclidæ*, sacrificed himself for the good of his Subjects: For the Oracle having answer'd, that the Army which lost its General should remain Victorious, he sought Death with as much Care and Eagerness, as the most Cowardly fly from it ‖. His two Sons, *Medon* and *Nileus*, disputed the Succession.

‡ Hereupon the *Athenians* took an Occasion to abolish the Royalty, tho' they had been no ways incommoded by it, and declared they would have no King but § *Jupiter*; at which time the *Jews*, grown weary of the *Theocracy*, that is, the Benefit of having the only true God for their King, submitted themselves to the Command of a Man. *Plutarch* observes, that *Homer*, when he mustered up

* They reign'd 487 Years.

† *Cecrops* Contemporary with *Moses*, and *Codrus* with *Saul*.

‖ *Vell. Pater. l. 1.*

‡ *Pauf. l. 7.*

§ *Aristoph. his Scholiast, in the Comedy of the Clouds.*

their

their Ships, called those of the *Athenians* only by the Name of *People*, which proves not, as that Historian pretends, that *Theseus* had divested himself of the Sovereignty, but that the *Athenians* had even then an Inclination to *Democracy*, and that the Principal Authority was already placed in the Hands of the People. In the Room of their Kings they constituted perpetual Governors, called by them § *Archontes*. *Medon*, *Codrus's* Son, was the first who executed this Charge, which was continued to his Descendants for many Years after. This Office for Life appeared to the *Athenians* too near a Resemblance of the Royalty, the very Shadow of which they were resolved to destroy. Wherefore, from a Perpetual, they reduced it at first to a Decennial, † and after that to an Annual Administration *; that they might more frequently recall the Authority, they had never without Regret conferred upon the Magistrate. A Power, so limited as this was, found itself too weak to bridle such captious, un-

§ There were thirteen of these perpetual Archons in 316 Years from *Medon* to *Alcmeon*. Vell. Pat. l. 1. Euseb. Chron.

† Of these were ten; the first was called *Charobs*, the last, *Eryx*. Dion. Hal. l. 1. ἀρχαιολογίας.

* *Creon*, the first of these annual Magistrates, was elected the second or third Year of the 24th Olymp. Dionys. Halicar. Antiq. Rom. l. 1. Euseb. Chron. & Pausan. cannot agree upon this Point. Poll. l. 8. Harpoc. Sigon. l. 4. de Rep. Athen. Cicer. l. 1. de finibus, render the Word *Archon* by that of *Prætor*. Plin. l. 33. c. 7. Translates it *Magistratus*.

settled Tempers. Quarrells and Factions sprung up every Day; they could come to no Agreement, either as to Religion or the Administration: Every Thing alarm'd the Ignorant, and arm'd the Furious. By this Means *Athens* continued a long time at a Stand, happy in this only, that she stood notwithstanding those long and frequent Dissentions with which she was shaken. † At length her Calamities made her wise; She found by degrees, that true Liberty consists in a Dependance on Justice, and Reason, and that this Dependance or Subjection was not to be establish'd but by the Authority of a Legislator. To this purpose, she pitch'd upon *Draco*, a Man of approved Virtues and Abilities. ‡ It doth not appear that *Greece* had any written Laws before § his time. His were Publish'd, by whose extreme Rigour (therein preparing the way for the Doctrine of the Stoicks) the slightest Faults met with a capital Punishment equal to the most enormous Transgressions *. These Laws of *Draco*, written not with Ink, but Blood, according to *Demades*, met with the fate of all violent Things;

† 39 *Olymp.* Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1. Euseb. Chron. Suid.

‡ Aul. Gell. l. 11. c. 18.

§ Joseph. Cont. Ap. Suid.

* When *Draco* was asked why he punished a slight Fault with Death, which was the greatest Punishment could be inflicted on the highest Crimes, He made answer, Because those Faults appear'd to him worthy of Death, and for the Expiation of the highest Crimes he could invent no greater Punishment. *Plut. ibid.*

for in a short time the difuse of 'em caused their Abrogation. The fear of relapsing into their first Disorders made 'em have Recourse to fresh Precautions; they were willing to slacken, but not absolutely quit the Reins. In order therefore to find out such Mediums, as were able to recompence the Law for whatever they took from it, * they cast their Eyes on one of the most virtuous and wisest Men of his Age, I mean *Solon*, whose extraordinary Qualities, especially his great Meekness, had acquired him an universal Love, and Veneration. † He was authorized by a General Voice, to regulate, as he thought fit, their Assemblies, Assessments, Decrees, Tribunals, and whatever else appeared to him the most proper and convenient, for the better modelling of the State. *Solon's* profound Judgment had quickly found a Cure for this Complication of Distempers, if the Weakness of those he had to do withal would have permitted him to make use of suitable Remedies. When one ask'd him, if he had prescrib'd good Laws to the *Athenians*; Yes, says he, *as good as they are capable of receiving*. Equality is the Soul of all publick Bodies. He was afraid to propose that of Riches, (by which means *Attica*, as well as *Laconia*, would have resembled a publick Inheritance divided among several Brethren,) for fear of disobliging the wealthier Sort: However, he delivered almost all his Citizens out of Bondage, who,

* *Twenty six Years after, Plut. ibid.*

† *The first Year of the 45th Olymp. Plut. ibid.*

through their excessive Debts and accumulated Ar-rears, were forced to sell themselves to the highest Bidder. By an exprefs Law he releas'd all the Debtors, and at the same time, to make some amends to the Rich, he assigned to 'em, exclusive of the People, all publick Offices, Honours, and Employments; though at the same he took care to allay their Power; and that he might keep the People in good Heart, he continued to them the right of Decifion. This Method referr'd indeed to the Council of 400 * the care of inquiring into, and propofing what was thought of ufe to the common Interest; but then their Consultations were to be Ratify'd by the People's Voice, who did not always go on the righteft fide. For this Reason, *Anacharfis*, drawn from the Extremity of *Scythia*, by the Reputation of the *Grecian* Sages, faid to *Solon* one Day, *I admire to fee your wife Men assigned to the Deliberation on your publick Affairs, whilst the Honour of the Decifion is referved for Fools.* As for the Court of the *Areopagus*, † erected in *Cecrops's* Days,

* *Of which there were 100 in every Court.* Arist. Polit. l. 2. c. ult. Plut. *ibid.*

† *Euseb. Chron.* Demosthenes in his Orat. Con. Aristocrat. says, he had no clear Infight into the Original of the *Areopagus*, and saith, The Erectors of this Tribunal, whether Gods or Heroes. They are as little agreed upon the Etymology of the Name; some pretend, that the *Areopagus*, that is to say, Mars's Hill, was so called, because the Court was kept upon the top of that Hill, and that there they condemned Mars himself for an Adulterer.

Days, and of a renowned Integrity, of which both Gods and Men, *Mars* and *Neptune*, *Orestes* and *Cephalus*, are famous Proofs; Though this August Tribunal, composed of Nine of the *Archons*, discharged from that Office, had a more extensive Jurisdiction than heretofore, and took Cognisance of more Matters than what were merely Criminal, yet their Duty properly was to examine into, and prepare the Matters of State. *Solon*, who knew better than any other the Inconveniences that attended a Democracy, cautiously withheld himself from removing 'em. After having diligently examined into the Genius of his Citizens, he concluded it in vain to attempt the depriving the Multitude of the Sovereignty, who, if they quitted their hold for a Moment, would instantly retake it by main Force. This ingenious Lawgiver did moreover restore the love of Labour and Husbandry, made way for Commerce, put the *Athenians* into a

The Author of the Etymologies, because the Amazons, Mars's Daughters, encamp'd there. Æschilus, (Eumenides v. 690.) Because the Amazons, posted upon that Hill, sacrificed a great Number of Victims to Mars. This Poet seems to be ignorant of, or not to credit what Pausanias l. 1. Libanius (Orat 22. & 23.) Servius (in Virg. Georg. l. 1. v. 18.) relate of the Process of Mars and Neptune; he reckons that the first Decree of the Areopagus was pronounced against Orestes, after the Trojan War. But Apollodorus goes up higher (l. 3.) and is of Opinion, that that illustrious Senate condemned Cephalus to a perpetual Banishment, for that he had unfortunately kill'd his Wife with an Arrow.

Condition of enriching themselves, and found out a means insensibly to tame, with the Rules of Justice, Order, and Discipline, a People bred up in Liberty, and persuaded that Force and Violence were the only Preservatives against Oppression. *Athens*, thus Reformed, was now in a fair way of growing Great and Illustrious, had not a Tyrant interposed, and reapt all the Fruit of the Reformer's Travels. *Pisistratus*, in spite of the horrible Aver- sion the *Athenians* had conceived for the Royalty, and the Traverses of two puissant Factions *, in spite of the bitter Remonstrances and repeated Efforts of *Solon* to prevent it, who, tho' a Relation of the Usurper's †, omitted nothing in the Infir- mities of old Age, that could help to preserve the Liberty of his Country, prevailed so far at last, as

* *There were at that time three Factions in Athens; the Pedians favoured Oligarchy; the Diacrians, or Hyperacrians, Democracy; whilst the Paralians, averse to Democracy, and Oligarchy, stood up for a form of Government that should be a Medium to the other two. By the First and Third Pisistratus found himself violently opposed; for which Reason, he placed himself at the Head of the Second. Herod. l. 1. c. 59.*

† *On his Mother's side. Plut. in Solon. When Pisistratus sent to know of Solon, What made him thwart him at that rate? My Age, reply'd Solon, having now nothing more to fear. When the Tyrant had prevailed, Solon retired, saying; I retire at least with the Satisfaction of having been wise enough to foresee this Tempest; and courageous enough to foretel it. Pisistratus began his Reign the fourth Year of the 54th Olympiad. Marm. Arund.*

to be declared King: However, he was twice de-throned, and soon got himself to be restored. * He gained the Crown by his Artifices, and maintained it by his Moderation. He distinguish'd himself by an exact Submission to the Laws; and the Gentleness of his Reign was such as might put that of lawful Sovereigns to the blush. Upon this Account has he been worthily opposed to other Tyrants. *Cicero*, uncertain how *Cæsar* would make use of his Good-fortune after the Battle at *Pharsalia*, writ thus to his beloved *Atticus*: *We are as yet uncertain whether the Fate of Rome will have it, that we groan under a Phalaris, or enjoy our selves under a Pisistratus* †. This last bequeath'd the Sovereignty he had usurp'd to his Children, which they peaceably enjoy'd for a long time. One may say, they had the Art of suppressing that innate and earnest Desire the *Athenians* had for Liberty. However, roused at last by the Importunities and Succours they receiv'd from *Sparta*, they threw off the Yoke, and resolved to suffer the last Extremities, rather than open their Gates to the Tyrant *Hyppias*, who was returning supported with all the Forces of the King of *Persia* §, much about the time the *Tarquins*, banish'd *Rome*, endeavour'd to be restored by the means of *Por-*

* *Aristot. Pol. l. 5. c. 12.*

† *Incertum est Phalarimne, an Pisistratum sit imitatus. Epist. ad Att. l. 7.*

‡ *Darius Nothus.*

*sen*a, King of *Hetruria*. The *Athenians* were no way mov'd by the *Persian*, or his Menaces: At first they had recourse to Treaties; but finding them ineffectual, they adventur'd to pass over into *Asia*, and fall upon that Monarch's Frontiers ||. He quickly brought the War home to their own Doors by *Datis* his General. They, instead of waiting for the Enemy within their Walls, went out to meet him at *Marathon*, where they gain'd a Victory * over him, that had more of Truth in it than Probability. This unexpected Success redoubled their Vigour. In the mean time, they ventur'd not as yet to contend with *Sparta* for the Superiority. For though at the Battle of *Salamine*, ten Years after that at *Marathon*, the Ships equip'd by the *Athenians*, and built out of the Ruins of their Houses, compos'd the greatest part of the *Grecian* Fleet, under the Conduct of *Themistocles*; and on the contrary the *Lacedemonians* had fitted out but a small Number of Ships; yet the Command of the Fleet was conferr'd upon them. Nay, some time after this, at the Battle of *Platea*, where the *Persians* were disheartned too much to engage with the *Grecians* ever after, 'tis well known,

|| They burnt *Sardis*, Capital of *Lydia*.

* The *Persians* had in the Field 100000 Foot, and 10000 Horse. The *Athenians* in all no more than 10000 Men, commanded by *Miltiades*. *Hippias* fell in the Battle; and his Sons, who fled for Refuge to *Xerxes* his Court, whom they perswaded to revenge his Father's Disgrace, met with no better Fortune.

Aristides

Aristides, at the head of the *Athenian* Troops, received his Orders from *Pausanias* King of *Sparta*. That Day, so glorious to *Greece*, became fatal to her; for it dissolv'd that Subordination *Athens* bore to *Sparta*, and raised eternal Jealousies between the two States. *Athens*, fir'd with the Success of these Battles, the chief Honour of which she took to herself, stood upon Equality with *Lacedæmon*, and carry'd her Pretensions a great deal higher. She affected a Precedency; drew over to her side the greatest Part of the Allies; debated, and decided whatever concern'd the General Welfare; assum'd to herself the Prerogative of Rewards and Punishments; or rather set up for the Sovereign Umpire of *Greece*.

Sparta was willing to resign to 'em the Command of the Sea: but they would be absolute in all. They thought, since they had delivered *Greece* from the Oppression of the *Barbarians*, they had a Right to oppress her in their turn. They roughly treated the *Grecian* Cities; of which they called themselves the Protectors. If a Neighbour offend'd them never so little, he soon felt all the weight of their Anger; whence grew that Proverb recited by *Aristotle*, an *Athenian Neighbourhood* *. They rendred themselves odious, not only to their Neighbours; but part of *Thrace*, and the Isles of the *Egean* Sea, subject to their Laws, bore impatiently that Yoke, which grew every Day more insupportable. Thus did *Athens* manage herself for near

* *Arist. Rhet. l. 2. c. 21.*

fifty Years after the Battel of *Platea* †. All this while *Sparta* made but weak Attempts, and faintly endeavoured to humble, or repress her Rival; but at last, moved by the repeated Complaints of several of the Cities against the Oppression of the *Athenians*, she began that famous *Peloponnesian* War. *Sparta* on one side, supported by such Allies, as Justice and the love of Liberty had brought to her Party; *Athens* on the other side, followed by those whom Fear detained in her Alliance; try'd their Fortunes for the space of twenty-seven Years, with a Bravery that might have been more profitably employed elsewhere. Victory seem'd irresolute in the course of this long and bloody War, and to hover between both Parties. The *Athenians*, always Masters at Sea, repay'd themselves there what they lost by Land. Every thing seemed to promise them an happy Conclusion. The Islands of the *Egean* Sea regularly paid the Taxes they had charged 'em with; and they might have secured themselves an advantageous Peace, if, in the 21st Year of the War, when they had so many Enemies upon their hands, they had not very unseasonably undertaken the Siege of *Syracuse* *, and that with so much heat, that *Æsion* reproach'd 'em for having poured all *Athens* into *Sicily*. This Expedition drain'd them of Men and Money; the Event of which punished the Rashness of the Undertaking. Their whole Army was lost, and their

† The Second Year of the 75th Olympiad.

* Arist. Rhet. l. 3. c. 10.

Fleet either taken, or burnt; and the two Generals †, together with the Flower of the *Athenian* Youth, (whose Loss, in regard of the State, *Pericles* compared to what the Year would suffer, if deprived of the Spring) were left at the Mercy of those very People they had undertaken to subdue. The News of this Disgrace was scarce known in *Greece* before *Athens* saw herself almost totally abandon'd. Her Allies, who serv'd her with an Ill-will, immediately joined with the *Lacedemonians*. *Athens*, in the mean time; notwithstanding this terrible Shock and general Desertion, which threatned her with an approaching, and her almost inevitable Ruin, still held up her Head; till the *Lacedemonians*, supported by their Alliance with the *Persian*, who opened his Treasury, and re-inforc'd 'em with a numerous Fleet, prevail'd so far at last, that, after having taken 180 of their Vessels, and besieged them in their City, they were forc'd to surrender at Discretion. Now, Masters of the Fate of *Athens*, they summon'd their Allies to consult with 'em, and determine what was to be done. The greatest part (so far had she lost their Hearts, and incens'd them against her) were for her utter Destruction. The *Thebans* strongly supported this Opinion *: But the *Lacedemonians*, more temperate than the rest, prudently concluded, they could not with any Safety ruin one of the principal Bulwarks of *Greece*; nor,

† *Nicias* & *Demost.* *Arist. Ibid.*

* *Xenoph.* de gest. *Græc.* l. 1.

without Ingratitude, exterminate a People, to whom they ow'd their Safety and Glory. They thought it enough to oblige the *Athenians* to demolish their Walls; to raze the Fortifications made by *Themistocles* at the famous Port of *Pireus*; never to arm above Twelve Vessels, and to yield the Precedency to the *Lacedemonians* both by Sea and Land. Upon these Terms a Peace was granted 'em. Thus fell the *Athenian* Empire †, which began some time after the Defeat of the *Persians*, and continued Seventy Three Years. Greece by this did but change her Masters: ‡ *Sparta* resum'd the Superiority, though her new Reign exceeded not Thirty Years. It had held longer, if the *Lacedemonians*, according to their old Principles, could have been contented to suffer every Commonalty to have liv'd under the Government of their own Laws. But, too fond of their own sort of Government, they were resolv'd to abolish *Democracy* every where §, and to institute a Government of Ten, who should have the sole Management of Affairs; and to appoint such as they knew firm to their Interest, and most averse to a Popular Government. By this means *Sparta* became more absolute, and at the same time more odious. They, who were forc'd to submit, murmur'd; and they, who were not, grew jealous of

† Isoc. in Paneg. & Pantheon. Demosth. 3. Phil.

‡ Isoc. *ibid.* Demosth. *ibid.*

§ Arist. de Repub. l. 5. c. 7. Isoc. in his Oration to Philip.

her. Nothing hasten'd her Fall more than Prosperity, which made her too much presume upon her own Strength. She thought herself able to keep *Greece* in Subjection, and destroy the *Persian* Empire at the same time; or, at least, to confine it to narrower Bounds. *Agésilas*, who commanded the Expedition, pass'd into *Asia*; and his first Exploit * gave him hopes of entire Success: when the *Persian* King †, whose numerous Armies could not put a stop to this Conqueror, found the Secret to send him back by more certain means. He brib'd *Greece* with his Treasures, and by that means rais'd Enemies against *Sparta*. For the *Grecians* readily hearken'd to his Proposition, and were glad to sell, at a high rate, a Revolt, with which the Love of Liberty had already inspir'd 'em. All with a general Consent join'd in an Insurrection against the *Lacedemonians*; who were so far from being able to defend themselves with the Forces they had at home, that they were oblig'd immediately to recal the King and his Arms. The *Athenians*, at the head of the Malecontents, resolv'd to hazard all for the Liberty of *Greece*; and, without reflecting on the miserable Condition they were lately in, presum'd to affront that powerful State that had reduc'd 'em to it. *Demosthenes* extols that Fortunate Magnanimity more than once; and infers from it ‡, That *Philip*

* First Year of the 96th Olymp. Corn. Nep. in Agefil.

† Artaxerxes Mnemon.

‡ The first Philip. and first Olynth.

could not stand against 'em whenever they should attack him with the same Resolution. The *Athenians* knew so well how to manage the present Conjunction, and to make a right Use of the Oversight the *Spartans* had committed in provoking the Great King†; that, joining their Fleet to the *Persians*, they defeated the *Lacedemonians*, rebuilt their Walls and Fortifications, and saw themselves in a condition of disputing the Command of the Sea with *Sparta*. So that as *Sparta* had, by the Assistance of the *Persian* §, formerly subdued *Athens*, now *Athens* in her turn deliver'd herself from the Obedience of *Sparta* by the Assistance likewise of the *Persian* *. This remarkable Instance is cited by *Demosthenes*, whilst he was persuading the *Athenians* to conclude an Alliance instantly with the *Persian* King: *Greece* (says he) *is not now to learn of what consequence the Assistance of such a Monarch will be. We all know, that, in the Wars between Athens and Sparta, that Republick infallibly prevail'd that knew how to make the King of Persia her Friend †. The Athenians thought not fit to reap all the Benefit of the Victory themselves, and therefore laid not down*

† The King of Persia was called emphatically the King, or the Great King. Xenoph. l. 5. de gest. Gr.

§ Darius Nothus sent his Naval Forces to Lysander. Diod. l. 11. Corn. Nep. in Lysand. & Conon. the 4th Year of the 93d Olymp.

* Artaxerxes Mnemon made Conon his Admiral the 3d Year of the 96th Olymp. Corn. Nep. in Con.

† Answer to Philip's Letter.

their Arms, till by a solemn Treaty the *Lacedæmonians* were oblig'd to restore the *Grecian* Cities to their Liberty. For though the *Lacedæmonians* pretended in this Affair a Voluntary Generosity, yet it appear'd by the consequence, that Fear only oblig'd 'em to it; taking an opportunity some time after to oppress *Thebes*, though expressly comprehended in the Treaty. This Infraction re-kindled the Zeal of the *Athenians*: They animated the rest of *Greece* to unite with them against *Sparta*; fell upon her afresh; beat her several times by Sea and Land, at *Corinth*, *Naxos*, *Ceræyra*, and *Leucade* †. And notwithstanding they had no greater Interest in this War than the rest, yet were they at almost all the Charges of it. This is what *Demosthenes* would observe, when he says §; *I wonder People, who heretofore were so liberal of their Blood and their Treasure for the sake of others, should be at present sparing of both for their own.* The Expence and Labour the *Athenians* were at for the Liberty of *Greece* had the desired Effect. *Sparta* was oblig'd to renew the Treaty concluded some Years before, and all the *Grecian* Cities restor'd to an entire Independency. One would think *Greece* now likely to enjoy a profound Tranquillity; but to her great Misfortune, the Equality of the two Powers, who had till then so much disturb'd her, had scarcely finish'd the

† Xenoph. l. 6. de gest. Grec.

§ First Olynth. Xenoph. *ibid.*

Peace, when *Thebes* started up, and pretended to the Command of all.

Thebes, * famous for her Greatness and Antiquity, was yet more illustrious by the Misfortunes and Adventures of her *Heroes*. The Tragical End of *Cadmus* her Founder, and of *Oedipus* one of her Kings, who transmitted their Ill-fortune down to their Posterity; the Birth of *Bacchus* and *Hercules*; and a Siege maintain'd before that of *Troy*; together with several other Events, Historical or Fabulous, rank'd her among the most remarkable Cities. Notwithstanding which, the *Thebans*, out of Stupidity †, rather than Moderation, never aimed at the Pre-eminence; but they had the Baseness to betray *Greece*, and join with the King of *Persia*. An Action, for which they were the more decry'd, because not justified in the Success; and that, contrary to their Expectations, founded upon all the Rules of Probability, the Army of the *Barbarians* met with a Defeat ‡.

* *A City in Bæotia, so called from Thebe, Daughter to Prometheus. Pausan. in Bæot. Steph. de Urb.*

† *A Bæotian Head-piece was a Proverb among 'em. Pindar and Plutarch both Bæotians, but an Exception to the Proverb, confess the Stupidity of their Countrymen. Horace, in his Art of Poetry, advises the Poet to take care he does not make an Argive speak like a Theban. The subtil Air of Athens, (saith Cicero, de fato) produces subtil Wits, whilst the gross Air of Thebes forms gross Head-pieces.*

‡ Herodot. l. 7, 8, 9. Xenoph. de gest. Grec. l. 7.

This Accident threw 'em into a great Confusion. They were afraid, lest the *Athenians*, their Neighbours, whose Power increased every Day, under a pretence of punishing so base a Treachery, would attempt their Subjection. To prevent which, they resolved to enter into an Alliance with *Sparta*, whom they had no need so much to fear, if it was only that they were farther off from 'em. *Sparta*, on this occasion, wav'd her usual Severity: She chose rather to forgive the Associates of the *Barbarians*, than suffer the Enemies of *Athens* to perish. The *Thebans*, by way of Acknowledgment, stuck firm to the Interest of their Protectors; for, during the *Peloponnesian War*, the *Spartans* had no better, nor more hearty Allies. *Thebes*, however, could not forbear shifting sides, as occasion required. The *Spartans*, always averse to Popular Faction, would needs undertake to change the Form of the *Theban* Government, * and after having surpriz'd the Citadel †, and remov'd, or dispers'd all who were able to resist 'em, they plac'd the Authority in the Hands of the principal Citizens, who, for the most part, acted by their Directions. *Pelopidas*, at the head of the Exiles, and some Succours he had receiv'd from *Athens*, entred secretly into the City by Night, about four Years after, cut off the Ty-

* *The third Year of the 99th Olympiad.*

† *Built by Cadmus, commanded by Phæbidas. Di-
odor. l. 15. Arist. Orat. Leuct. 18. & 2. Isoc. in Pa-
negyr. Polyb. l. 4.*

rants, drove out the *Spartan* Garrison, and restor'd his Country to her Liberty. Till then *Thebes*, joined sometimes with *Sparta*, and another while with *Athens*, held her Place only in the second Rank, without ever being suspected of rising one Day up to the first.

But the *Thebans*, being naturally a hardy, robust People, and grown withal very experienc'd since the *Peloponnesian* War, from which time their Arms had been seldom, or never out of their Hands, and full of Ambition, which increas'd in proportion to their Forces, and their Courage, began to think themselves too much penn'd up in their ancient Limits. They refused to sign the Peace negotiated, as we observed before, by the *Athenians*, unless they were acknowledged Chief of *Bæotia*. This Refusal did not only expose 'em to the Indignation of the *Persian* King, who, that he might with more Security follow his Wars with *Egypt*, which had revolted from him, ordered the *Grecians* to lay down their Arms; but rais'd *Athens*, *Sparta*, and, indeed, all *Greece*, who now desired nothing so much as Peace. These Considerations could no way restrain 'em: They broke with *Athens*, attack'd *Platea* †, a Place the *Athe-*

† After the Battel of Marathon, where the Plateans, posted by Miltiades in the left Wing, signalized their Zeal and their Courage, the Athenians never celebrated any Festival wherein the Herald did not offer an united Vow for the Prosperity of Athens and Platea. Herodot. l. 6.

nians had long before taken into their Protection, and rased it. The *Lacedemonians* imagin'd, that the *Thebans*, being forsaken by their Allies, were not in a condition to make head against 'em. They march'd therefore as to a certain Victory, penetrated with their Army a great way into the Enemy's Country, whilst the rest of *Greece* look'd on *Thebes* as certainly lost, little thinking, that in one Man she had more than an Army. This Man was *Epaminondas* *. There was no better School in the Universe than his Father *Polymnus's* House, open to all the Learned World. From this School sprung *Philip* of *Macedon*; who, during the nine Years he resided as an Hostage in *Thebes*, had the good Fortune to be brought up by *Epaminondas* his Master †, or, rather to study *Epaminondas* himself, who knew so well to reduce Precepts into Practice. The Talents of this latter, either in Politicks or the Art of War, together with several others which he possess'd in a very eminent degree, were notwithstanding inferior to his Virtues.

* Corn. Nep. in *Epam.* I take *Epaminondas* to be the top Man of all *Greece*, said Tully, *Tuscul.* l. 1, *Epaminondas*, Princeps meo judicio Græciæ.

† *Lyfides* of *Tarentum*, *Diod.* l. 15. & 16. *Paulan.* in *Bæot.* *Ælian.* l. 3. *Var. Hist.* c. 17. *Dion. Chrysoft.* Orat. *Inscript. recusatio Magistratus.* *Laert.* in *Pythag.* Corn. Nep. in *Epam.* *Cicero* in lib. 3. de Orat. & 1. de Off. calls him *Lyfias*; but this must be a visible Error of the Transcriber. *Clem.* l. 1. *Pedag.* c. 8. makes *Philip* have another Master, called *Naufichous*.

A Philosopher in Reality, and poor upon Choice, he despis'd Riches without any design of being applauded for it, and cultivated Virtue without any regard to her sweetest Fruit, I mean, Reputation: Covetous of his Time, which he diligently devoted to the Search after Truth, he avoided all publick Employments, and never appear'd, but in order to get excluded from 'em. His Moderation hid him so effectually, that he liv'd obscure, and almost unknown; till his Merit at last discover'd him. He was drawn out of his Solitude, and plac'd at the Head of Armies. Immediately upon his Appearance, he convinc'd the World, that Philosophy was sufficient to make a Hero, and that the readiest way to conquer our Enemies is to learn first to conquer Ourselves. Scarce had *Epaminondas* quitted his private solitary Life before he beat the *Lacedæmonians* at *Leuctra* †, and gave 'em such a mortal Blow, that they never after were able to recover it. They lost 4000 of their Men, together with *Cleombrotus* their King, besides the Wounded, and the Prisoners. § This was the first Action, in which the *Greek* Nation began to weaken themselves. The bloodiest Defeat hitherto cost little more than four or five hundred Men. *Sparta*, at another time, animated as she was, or rather mortally incens'd against *Athens*, could redeem, by a Truce of thirty Years, eight hundred of her Citi-

† *A City of Bæotia*, Xen. l. 2. Paus. in Attic. Arcad. Polyæn. l. 2. Strateg. Aristid. in Panathen.

§ Olymp. 102. Ann. 2.

zens, that had suffer'd themselves to be surrounded. We may easily imagine what Consternation, or, rather, what Despair the *Lacedemonians* were in, when they found themselves, in an instant, without Men, without Allies, and almost at the Mercy of the Conqueror. || The *Thebans*, imagining themselves Invincible under their new General, harra's'd *Attica*, entred *Peloponnesus*, pass'd the River *Eurotas*, and went to besiege *Sparta*. All the Prudence and Courage *Agefilaus* had was scarce able to save her, by *Xenophon's* own Confession, who, to place the King his Scholar's Picture in the best light he could, craftily drew that of *Epaminondas*, delineating his most exalted Virtues but by halves, and putting his slight Mistakes in a full and open Prospect.

'Tis certain, the *Lacedemonians*, defeated as they were, without any Defence, in an unwall'd Town, could not long withstand the victorious Army: but their sagacious Commander was afraid of drawing upon his Back the united Forces of *Peloponnesus*, and more of raising the Jealousy of the *Grecians* *, who would never forgive him, if at first Attempt he should destroy so powerful a State, and pluck out, as *Leptine* used to say, one of the Eyes of Greece †. He satisfy'd himself therefore with the Honour of having humbled the

|| Plut. in Pelop. & in Præcept. Polit. Isoc. Orat. in Phil. Strab. l. 9. Polyb. l. 2.

* Plut. in Pelop. & Præcept. Polit.

† Arist. Rhet. l. 3. c. 13.

Haughty, in whom the *Laconick* Language redoubled the fierceness of Command, and of having, as he himself vaunted, reduc'd 'em to the Necessity of lengthning their Monosyllables. † However, he perpetuated the Memory of his Victory by a Monument of Justice and Humanity, in the Re-establishment of *Messene*, whose Inhabitants the *Lacedemonians* had, about three hundred Years before, expelled, or enslaved. He recalled from all Parts the dispersed *Messenians*, restor'd 'em to the Possession of their Country, to which a long Exile had made them, as it were, Strangers; form'd 'em into a Republick, which ever after honour'd him as her second Founder. He rested not long there. This Great Man, so reserv'd, so moderate in regard to himself, had a boundless Ambition for the Interest and Honour of his Country. Not content with having made her Mistress at Land, he had a mind to gain her the Superiority at Sea. This Project, which no Hands but his own could execute, was defeated by his Death. He died in the Arms of Victory at the Battle of *Mantineæ* §, and, as some will have it, by the Hands of *Grillus*, *Xenophon's* Son ||. The *Thebans*, notwithstanding the Loss of their Hero, the Soul of their Counsels, and all their Undertakings, were not wanting to

† *Æl. Var. Hist.* l. 13. c. 42. *Isocr. in Archid. Diodor.*

§ *A Town of Arcadia.*

|| *The second Year of the 104th Olympiad. Laert. in Xenoph. Diod.* l. 15.

maintain the Station in which he left 'em. *Greece*, at this time, was divided by three principal Factions. *Thebes* endeavoured to raise herself upon the Ruins of *Sparta*; *Sparta*, to recover her Losses; and tho' *Athens* openly embrac'd the *Spartan* Cause, especially since the *Lacedemonians* * had, by a solemn Treaty, resign'd to her the Sovereignty of the Sea, which so transported her with Joy, that then she first rais'd Altars to Peace†; *Athens*, I say, was very well-pleased to see these two Powers harassing each other, not doubting but to turn the Scale upon some Opportunity taken to oppress them both. While the States of *Greece* contended with so much Impetuosity for an imaginary Precedency, they did nourish in their very Bowels the most dangerous of their Enemies. This Name belongs to *Philip* of *Macedon*, Son of King *Amyntas* by his Queen *Eurydice*, or, to express him in a more glorious Relation, the Father of *Alexander the Great*. It was not *Theopompus* ‡ his Fault (*Philip's* Cotemporary,) that we have not a complete History of this Prince. The Exactness, or, rather, prolix Style of the Historian had swell'd it up into fifty Volumes, all which met with the same Misfortune. We have but a few Fragments left, dispers'd up and down, serving rather to make us sensible of our Loss, than helping us to repair it. I will try however to collect these Fragments,

* The 4th of the 103d Olympiad.

† Corn. Nep. in *Timol.*

‡ A Native of *Chios*, and *Isocrates* his Disciple.

and patch 'em together with Supplements of my own, that the Reader may at least have a Taste of the Matters they contain. *Philip* was born § at *Pella*, the youngest of several Brothers *; which excluded, or, at least, thrust him very far from the Throne. Nothing, in my Opinion, will serve more to illustrate his Talents, and his Qualities, than to oppose the Condition, in which he found *Macedon*, to that wherein he left it. The News of a new Revolution in *Macedonia* coming to *Thebes* †, he stole from thence, made the best of his way homewards, where he found the People all in a Consternation for the Loss of *Perdiccas* ‡, slain in a great Encounter with the *Illyrians*, and more for to see themselves surrounded with as many Enemies as they had Neighbours. The *Illyrians* were ready to enter into the Kingdom with great Forces: The *Peonians* infested it continually by their daily Incursions. The *Thracians* pretended to place *Pausanias*, a Prince of the Blood-Royal, upon the Throne. The *Athenians* espoused *Argæus*, whom their General *Mantias* had orders to support with a good Fleet, and a considerable Body of their Troops. The *Macedonians* in this Exigency stood in need of a Man, and had nothing

§ The second Year of the 99th Olympiad.

* Alexander, and *Perdiccas*. *Diod. Just. Pausan.*

† The first Year of the 105th Olympiad. *Diod. Liban. Athen. tho' Justin relates the Matter otherwise.*

‡ Philip's elder Brother. *Diod. l. 16. Oros. l. 3. c. 13. Ant. Gen. l. 17. c. 2. Demosth. adv. Arist.*

but an Infant to rely upon, in the Person of *Amyntas*, the lawful Heir to the Crown. But Necessity has Laws of her own that supersede all others. The Nation, justly alarm'd, deposed the Nephew; and, instead of him whom Nature had called to the Crown, they made choice of another their pressing Circumstances required. § *Philip* the new King, without any Hesitation, made haste to answer the Publick Expectations. He inspected every thing, and reform'd what he found amiss; reliev'd the sinking Courage of his People; re-establish'd and disciplin'd his Troops; so that in an instant he behav'd himself not so much like a young King (but twenty-two Years old) as a politic consummated Prince, vers'd in the Art of Diffimulation; and who already, without the help of Experience, had learn'd, that || sometimes to lose was the proper way to gain his Ends. He began with evacuating *Amphipolis*, a Town seated upon the Frontiers of his Kingdom, and consequently of great use to him. He found he could not hold it without weakening his Army, and (which was more) without incensing the *Athenians*, with whom it was his Interest to keep fair, and who challeng'd it as their Colony. On the other side; What reason was there for quitting to his Enemies the very Key of his Dominions? He resolv'd therefore to declare her free, and by that means set her at variance with her old Masters. In the mean time,

§ Justin. l. 7.

|| Polian. Strateg. l. 1.

by the force of Presents and Promises, he disarm'd the *Peonians*. By this Management and Dexterity he fix'd himself upon the Throne, and in a little time got rid of all Competitors. * He shut the Entry into the Realm against *Pausanias*; then march'd against *Argeus*; met with him in the way to *Methone*; defeated him, kill'd many of his Men, and took a great number of Prisoners; negotiated and over-reach'd *Athens* with a Peace; attack'd in the mean time the *Peonians*; reduc'd 'em to Obedience; turn'd his Arms against the *Illyrians*, cut 'em in pieces, and oblig'd 'em to deliver up to him all they held in *Macedonia*. † Encourag'd by his Success, he besieg'd and took *Amphipolis*; but instead of delivering it up, as he had promis'd, to the *Athenians*, he took from 'em *Pydne* and *Potidea*; then he seized on *Crenidi*, built two Years before by the *Thrasians*, and called afterwards *Philippi* ‡. Near this Town, famous afterward for the Defeat of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, he broke up and discover'd some Mines, which every Year afterwards brought him in about 200000*l*. A very considerable Sum for those Times; the Revenues of *Athens*, that pass'd for the richest State in all *Greece*, amounting not to so much by a

* In the 2d Year of his Reign. Demost. *ib.* Diod. *ib.* Oros. l. 3. c. 12. Just. l. 7.

† Polixen. *ib.* Demosth. *ibid.* & fals. leg. Isoc. Orat. ad Phil. Aristid. Orat. 1. de Societ.

‡ The Reader may find the Situation of it describ'd in Dion. Cassius. l. 47.

great deal. By this means *Macedon* abounded more in Money than it had done any time before; and *Philip* first ordered that Piece of Gold to be coin'd, which was call'd by his Name §, and lasted longer than his Monarchy. Mighty Advantages flow from a full Treasury. No Man knew this better than he, or neglected it less. By the Strength of his Funds he maintain'd a great Body of Foreign Troops, and had his Pensioners in almost all the Cities of *Greece*. * The remaining Two and Twenty Years of his Reign may be distinguish'd by as many Victories, or Conquests in *Thessaly*, in *Thrace*, in *Epirus*, in *Scythia*, and in *Eubœa*. I shall not enter into the Particulars of these Victories. His Conduct throughout the *Phocian War*, and at the Battel of *Cheronea*, sufficiently shew, though in little, what sort of Man he was, either in Council, or at the head of his Armies. This bloody War, the beginning of which I shall have occasion to shew hereafter, and touch upon some of the principal Events, lasted ten Years †, with a great deal of Warmth. I shall only observe here,

§ *The Philippei*. Hic sunt numerati (*says Plautus in Pæn.*) aurei trecenti nummi, qui vocantur *Philippei*. Gratus Alexandro Regi magno (*said Horace in his First Epist. ad August.*) fuit ille *Charilus*, incultis qui versibus, & malè natis, rettulit acceptos regale Numisma *Philippos*.

* Maxim. Tyr. Serm. 19.

† From the 2d Year of the 106th Olymp. to the 3d Year of the 108th. according to Diodor. for Pausanias adds a Year more.

that, during the whole course of this War, *Philip* fate Neuter in the midst of all *Greece*, arm'd in favour of the *Phocians* or *Thebans*. For besides that he was pleas'd to see the two contending Parties weaken and consume each other, he thought he might better employ his Time and his Arms elsewhere. The *Thessalians* begg'd his Protection. He march'd to their Assistance; defeated and expell'd the Tyrants †, and by that means secured to himself the Affection of that People; whose excellent Cavalry, join'd to the *Macedonian Phalanx*, had afterwards so great a share in his Victories, and those of his Son. Return'd from this Expedition, he subdued the *Olynthians*, whose Power had hitherto been a Check to that of his Predecessors, and but a little before had like to have utterly ruin'd his Father *Amyntas*. § Here he began to discover himself, though not till he had dissembled to the utmost, and conceal'd his real Designs so artfully, that, being ready to fall upon the *Phocians*, he perswaded 'em his Aim was at *Thebes*, and that he designed to humble her. 'Twas by this profound and impenetrable Secrecy he kept his Enemies asleep; deceiv'd his Allies, and made 'em blind to their own Interest. * Thus, without drawing a Sword, he became Master of *Phocis*;

† Lycophron, and Pitholaus, Tyrants of Phera. Dion. Just. l. 8.

§ Diod. l. 15. Isoc. in Archid. & Panegy.

* Diod. Oros. l. 3. c. 12. Demosth. de fals. leg. & pro coron.

got himself declared Chief *Amphictyon*, General of Greece against the *Persians*, Avenger of the God *Apollo*, and his Temple; and, what was more to him than all the rest, he possess'd himself of the Straits of *Thermopylæ*, that famous Passage, which opened his way into Greece. The Victory of *Cheronæa* † compleated the Subjection of the *Grecians*, gave him his full Revenge upon the *Athenians*, who two Years before had forc'd him to raise the Siege of *Byzantium*, and crown'd his other Exploits. In this he show'd himself a greater Captain than in any other of his Undertakings. At the beginning of the Engagement, in which his Son at Nineteen Years of Age commanded one of the Wings of the Army, the *Macedonians*, being very briskly charged, began to be shaken, and to give ground. Immediately *Stratocles*, one of the *Athenian* Generals, cry'd out, ‡ *Come, Brother Soldiers, let us pursue 'em home to Macedon*. Upon this, *Philip*, who foresaw that the Enemy by their too great Forwardness would break their Ranks, and throw themselves into Disorder, said very coolly, *The Athenians don't know how to conquer*. In the mean time he contracted his Phalanx, and retired in good Order to an Eminence; from whence he thundred down upon 'em, broke, and totally routed 'em. In these two Places § does *Philip's* Life

† *The third Year of the 110th Olymp.* Demosth. de cor. Diod. l. 16. Oros. l. 3. c. 13. Frontin. l. 1. Pausan. l. 7. Arrian. l. 7.

‡ *Poliæn. Stratag.* l. 4.

§ *In the Phocian War, and the Battle of Cheronæa.*

shine with the greatest Lustre; these are the Master-pieces of his Valour, and his Prudence. Thus *Macedonia*, hitherto weak, unregarded, often tributary, and always oblig'd to seek Protection from abroad, became in an Instant the Umpire of *Greece*, and Terror of *Asia*.

Notwithstanding all this, *Philip* is in no Reputation, but with those who are vers'd in History. And even they, who use to judge of Heroes, as the Custom is, by the number of Provinces they have conquered, make him come far short of *Alexander*, whose Actions surprize the Imagination, and satisfy the Curiosity of the most Inquisitive after great and wonderful Things. I own, upon a superficial View of those two Princes, *Alexander*, at first sight, will be preferred, and the Glory of the Son will eclipse that of the Father. The one employ'd about twenty-four Years in subduing some Provinces of *Thrace*, or *Illyria*; and more by Craft, than otherwise, seized on that Authority, which *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Thebes* had successively exercis'd in *Greece*. The other, rais'd to the Throne at an Age that made *Demosthenes* look on him as a giddy-brain'd Boy †, nevertheless undertook to break the Power of the *Persians*, and subdued that vast Empire almost as soon * as a Traveller could well pass over it; and carry'd his Arms from thence with the same Rapidity † as

† Demosth. pro Ctesiph.

* In four Years time.

† In four Years after.

far as the Ocean, and to the remotest Countries. However, if, upon a nearer Scrutiny, when we would determine the Nature of their Actions, we place the Difficulties and Advantages they both met with in an equal Balance, we must readily agree with *Tully*, and own that *the Son indeed was the greater Conqueror, but the Father the greater Man* *. It was indeed easier to subdue *Asia*, when assisted by *Greece*, than to subdue *Greece*, that had so often conquered *Asia*. To dare Fight with the *Asiatics* was enough to Beat 'em; And what was it *Alexander* did not dare to do? These effeminate People have been known to tremble at the Approach of a Handful of *Lacedemonians*. This made the Brother of *Olympias*, King of *Epirus*, say, in his *Italian Expedition*, *Whilst I am fighting here with Men, my Nephew is combating with Women*: Had he said so of his Brother-in-law, he had wrong'd him. 'Tis not easily conceiv'd, how *Philip*, Invested, and almost Besieged in his Dominions by a parcel of warlike Nations, most of 'em able to impose Laws upon *Macedonia*, should get the better of so many Enemies, and by Force of Arms compel *Greece* to own him for their Chief; in which Quality he form'd the Resolution of invading the *Persians*. His advanc'd

* *Philippum quidem, Macedonum Regem, rebus gestis & gloria superatum à filio; facilitate vero, & humanitate superiorem fuisse video. Itaque alter semper Magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus fuit. Cic. de Off. l. 1.*

Guards, commanded by his Lieutenants †, were already in Motion for that Expedition, when Death ‡ robb'd him of the Honour of it, and reserv'd it for his Successor. His Successor's first Care was to secure the Crown, to get rid of those who disputed it with him, and punish his Father's Murderers. He had no sooner settled his own Kingdom, but he began to invade his Neighbours. In less than two Years he reduced the rebellious *Thesalians*; subdued *Thrace*; in one Day's time he pass'd the *Danube*, overthrew the *Getae*, took one of their Sons, re-pass'd the River: After that he received the Homages, and gave Audience to the Embassies of several Nations; in his Return, he chastised the *Illyrians*, brought other Nations into Subjection; flew to *Thebes*, which, upon a false Report of his Death, had revolted against the *Macedonian* Garrison; besieg'd, took, and raz'd the City, in the space of twenty-four Hours. After this, knowing that this Example of his Severity would bridle the rest of *Greece*, who had already proclaim'd him Generalissimo, he found himself in a Condition courageously to execute what his Successor had wisely projected. One of 'em therefore seems design'd to improve a Monarchy, and to extend it over the Universe; the other, to found and establish it. The Son wanted one Quality, which was very eminent in the Father; that

† Attalus & Parmenio. Just. l. 9. c. 5.

‡ He died at forty-seven Years of Age. Just. *ibid*
c. 1. Diod. Ar. Curt.

Moderation, and Complacency, so highly useful in all intricate Conjunctions, and very often acquired with greater Difficulty than other more illustrious Qualities. *Alexander* was for going fiercely on to Glory; he best lik'd the most shining Ways that lead to it; he look'd on others, that were more easy, as a sort of Weakness, and want of Courage. His high, imperious Soul, knew neither how to temporize, or yield to Necessity. Bold, fiery, and impetuous; so far from managing, or dividing his jealous Neighbours, that he would have been for breaking them altogether, which in the end would have made them unite to crush him. Whereas *Philip*, on the other side, made it his Business to sow Divisions among his Enemies; took care to elude, and divert the Blows that threatned him, that he in his turn might strike with more Surety; equally cautious in Good, as well as Bad Fortune, he never mismanaged a Victory, but alike prepared, either to seek, or attend it, he delay'd or made haste as the Posture of his Affairs required; he left nothing to the Fantasticalness of Chance, but what was out of the Reach of Prudence; always unshaken, always fix'd in the just Bounds that separate true Valour from Rashness. 'Tis true this Assembly of extraordinary Qualities was absolutely necessary to a Prince, who, as I observed before, was to make his Fortune, and who could form no great Designs, till he had subjected a Nation the free'st, the most understanding, and warlike of any in the World. On the contrary, to encounter with, and subdue with so much Expedition, so many Mil-

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lions

lions of Barbarians, and that with 30000 well disciplin'd Men bred up in Conquest, there wanted nothing but Assurance, Boldness and Impetuosity. One may say therefore of *Philip* and *Alexander*, that they were precisely born for the Business they accomplish'd; that the Execution of their ambitious Projects absolutely required two sorts of Heroes; and that there is as great a Coherence between the Exploits of each, and his Character, as there is a Difference between the Character and Exploits of the one, and those of the other. This, if I am not mistaken, is the only Conformity that appears between these two Conquerors, in other respects of no Resemblance to each other. I don't think *Alexander* could better have play'd *Philip's* Game, than *Philip* could that of *Alexander*. I believe indeed, *Philip* could not have made so speedy a Conquest of *Persia* as his Successor did; and much less do I believe, that *Alexander*, from a Simple Prince of the Blood, remov'd from the Crown by several degrees, and detained as an Hostage in an Enemy's Country, would have found out the means of making himself King, and, suffering his Enterprizes to ripen by degrees, partly by Presents, and partly by main Force, have rendered himself in the end Master of all *Greece*. What if, in this Comparison, I should venture, without fear of offending that Admiration, which naturally flows from those prodigious Actions, that shine throughout *Alexander's* Life, to affirm, that it was more difficult for a Prince of *Macedon* to become Master of *Greece*, than for the King of *Macedon*, and Master of *Greece*, to make a Conquest

quest of the East. This at least I may boldly affirm, that *Philip* ow'd his Greatness to himself, whereas *Alexander* had never gain'd the Title of *Great* without such a Predecessor as *Philip*. This probably is what *Clitus* * meant, when the Liberties of the Table, and the Heat of the Wine, (Betrayers of our most secret Thoughts) encourag'd him to tell the Son to his Face: *Thou hadst not conquer'd but for thy Father's Soldiers.* *Alexander's* Jealousy, which, in the Fulness of his Pride and Glory, so far transported him as to kill † with his own Hand his Favourite for his too great Sincerity, seems to own he was no less sensible of the Truth than the Indiscretion of the Reproach.

I doubt whether *Alexander* can be well compared to *Cæsar*, notwithstanding that Comparison has been generally received, or universally maintained. Neither the unanimous Agreement of the Ancients and Moderns upon this Subject, nor my own Unwillingness to be singular in an Opinion, can hinder me from thinking that this Comparison is built upon a wrong Principle. I believe there will appear a greater Resemblance between *Philip* and *Cæsar*, at least, if we ground it upon their Manners and Characters, rather than their Successes. *Philip*, perhaps, had no Place among the Lives of *Plutarch*, because that Historian, prepossess'd in favour of his own Nation, wanted the

* Curt. 1. 8.

† Go thou and find out *Philip*, said *Alexander* to him, whilst he was stabbing him.

Conqueror of *Asia* to oppose to him of *Rome*; and foresaw very well, that, in the Eyes of the Multitude, the most Illustrious of the *Romans*, Master of an Empire, that labour'd under its own weight, would be too great a Match for a *Macedonian*, who acted in a narrow Sphere, and whose Conquests had no other Theatre than the adjacent Parts of a petty Kingdom. At first Glance, indeed, there seems a Resemblance in every thing between *Cæsar* and *Alexander*; the Extent of their Conquests, their Valour, Activity, Vigilancy, and that Sublimity of Soul, which made 'em sensible that they deserved to command the rest of Mankind, together with an imperious Passion, that would let 'em endure no Superior, but made 'em look on the World as their Inheritance. But when we come to examine 'em at leisure, trace 'em from their Cradles, study their Inclinations, observe their Proceedings and their Progresses, we shall find this Resemblance to diminish, or fall to nothing. Nothing certainly can be more opposite than the means they made use of to advance their Designs. Nature, perhaps, had not so great a Share in this Diversity, as Education and the Conjunctions that attended 'em. *Cæsar*, born a private Person, and persecuted from his Infancy by the chief of his Country, in discovering himself would have been ruined. He stood in need of an extreme Circumspection, or rather profound Diffimulation, to elude the Jealousy of a Faction, who would otherwise have excluded him from all Honours and Employments. *Alexander*, on the other hand, born the Son of a King, and Presumptive Heir

Heir to a Crown, knew not how to Dissemble; nor would he suffer himself to lie under any Constraint. From his very Infancy he look'd on himself as the Master of the World, and was sorry he had but one to conquer. In a word, a Man so ambitious, who, ready to invade *Asia*, reckoned as nothing whatever the Rights of Succession had acquired him, and therefore distributed his Patrimony among his Courtiers, reserving only Hope to himself; a great Spirit, who forgetting the Extent of his own Dominions, and reduc'd to the continual Necessity of Conquering or Perishing, thought he should lessen himself, and appear like a simple Adventurer, if, in exchange for Peace, he accepted of half the richest and largest Empire in the World *; a daring Soul, who would not endeavour, either to avoid, or remove Obstacles, but surmount 'em; who made no distinction between Prudence and Baseness; and who, either in his Projects or Actions, presum'd he had Fortune at command; so haughty, as to think himself Master of his own Fate, and that of Mankind; in short, a kind of Extravagant, who, weary of being only a Man, declared himself the Son of *Jupiter* †; pretended to be a God, and succeeded so

* *Darius offering him half his Empire, Parmenio said, I would accept of it, if I was Alexander; and I replied Alexander, if I was Parmenio; adding, The Firmament cannot bear two Suns, nor the Earth two Masters.*

† *His Mother Olympias sent to him, to bid him forswear setting her and Juno at variance.*

well,

well, as to make his Exploits lessen the Ridiculousness of his Pretentions to Divinity. This makes *Alexander* a sort of Hero by himself, and forms a Character, which allows no Comparison. But for *Philip* and *Cæsar*, the nearer we approach them, and consider 'em, no matter on whatever side, the greater Resemblance shall we find between 'em. Their Birth call'd neither of 'em to the Supreme Command, but seem'd rather to condemn 'em to a perpetual Subjection. They made their way to Sovereignty, and did that Justice to themselves, which the Condition of their Births had denied them. *Philip* came not to the Crown till he had deposed in the same Person his King, his Nephew, and his Pupil. *Cæsar*, descended from one of the principal Houses of *Rome*, usurp'd the Dominion by turning against his Country the Arms she had entrusted in his Hands. The first, committed by his Brother for an Hostage to the *Illyrians*, and afterwards to the *Thebans*, spent his Youth in foreign Countries. The second, by the Mistrust of *Sylla*, who said, that in a young Man of his Temper many *Marius's* surviv'd, saw himself oblig'd at the Age of Seventeen to flee for Refuge to the King of *Bithynia*. This Resemblance, that appears in the beginning, runs through the course of their Lives. The Ambition, with which they were govern'd, prompted them to the same manner of Proceedings, which they followed with an exact Conformity. But, in my Opinion, that which most effectually justifies this Parallel, and demonstrates to People, who are neither bias'd by Prejudice, nor influenced by common Opinion,

the Agreeableness there is in it, is, that they both were the Founders of their own Greatness; that they both aspired with an equal Success, one to change the whole Face of Affairs in *Greece*, the other in *Rome*: In short, that each, in the Execution of his Design, express'd the same Sense of Things, chose such Measures, and met with Circumstances so nearly resembling those of the other, as if Nature and Fortune had been contending to delineate, in *Cæsar*, the most perfect Image of *Philip*. Both of 'em, too weak and too discreet to aim openly, to shew their Design, had recourse at first to Craft and Dissimulation: They artfully conceal'd their Ambition, and oppress'd the Publick Liberty, under the specious Pretence of defending it. *Philip* courageously protected the *Thes- salians*, delivered 'em out of the hands of their Tyrants, took care to encourage the *Thebans* in their Emulation to *Athens*, and so effectually gain'd the Confidence of those two States, that they suffer'd him to get into his Possession *Phocis* and *Thermopylæ*, which made him able to give Laws to his Enemies and his Allies. *Cæsar*, with the same Artifice, fomented under-hand the Jealousies of the principal Citizens against *Pompey*, oblig'd him to court his Alliance, marry'd his Daughter to him, obtained, together with the Government of the *Gauls*, the Command of a very powerful Army, and never let his Designs appear till he was in a condition to destroy at once his son-in-law, and the Commonwealth. 'Tis not only in these Methods of raising himself, that *Cæsar* resembled *Philip*; their Opposers were of the same

same Temper, and ruin'd themselves by the very same Weakness. *Pompey* lost himself by his too much Confidence *; he had never been conquer'd, could he have been persuaded to think it was not a thing impossible, and if his own Prosperity, and the Respect that *Cæsar* shewed him, had not lull'd him into so great a Security, that, contrary to *Cicero's* Advice, he neglected the Measures and Precautions necessary for his Support. A like Presumption ruined *Athens*. *She* never could be brought to Fear, till she was reduc'd to Despair †. That haughty Republick could not conceive the *Macedonians*, at other times her Tributaries, and whose Kings were wont to sue for the Favour and Protection of her Generals ‡,

would

* *Cæsarem cæpit serò timere.* Cic. Ep. l. 16.

† *Demosth. 2d Olymp.*

‡ *The Athenians had assisted Amyntas, Philip's Father, against the Olynthians, by whom he was threatened with an approaching, and total Ruin. This strict Friendship continued even after the Death of Amyntas, with Euridice, Amyntas's Widow, and Philip's Mother. She implored the Assistance of Iphicrates, against an Usurper of the Macedonian Crown, and to move more effectually the Pity of the Athenian General, this desolate Princess had recourse to a Stratagem worthy her Sex. She took two of her Children, Perdiccas and Philip, held the last upon her own Knee, and threw the other into Iphicrates's Arms, with these Words, Iphicrates, Remember that the Father of these Orphans had always a Friendship for thy Country, and adopted thee; this ties thee under a double Obligation; The Friendship the King*

had

would ever pretend to subject her, and domineer over her. In vain did *Demosthenes* endeavour to undeceive her; she resolv'd not to see, and opened not her Eyes, till a senseless Security, and an invincible Stupidity, had thrown her into the Hands of the Enemy she so much despis'd. Moreover, as vehement a Desire as these Great Men, we are now comparing together, had for Glory, they were however Masters in the Art of Diffimulation, and never used Force till they had found Policy ineffectual *. *Philip* valu'd himself less upon his Success in Battel than in Negotiations; in which he knew very well his Generals nor his Soldiers could lay claim to any Share. *Cæsar's* first Steps towards the Sovereignty, I mean his secret Practices and Intelligence with *Catiline*, *Lentulus*, and the other Conspirators, shew, that, if by them he could have gain'd his Ends, he would not have stuck much at those pompous Titles, which are sometimes the Rewards of most enormous Violences, and most manifest Injustice. Provided our Heroes master their Designs, they are not too delicate in the Choice of the Means that lead to them. The nearest way appears the

had for *Athens* obliges thee to vindicate us publickly, as thy Friends, and the Tenderness the Father had for thee in particular requires from thee a Brotherly Love for these young Princes. *Iphicrates*, touch'd with this Scene, expell'd the Usurper, and restor'd the Lawful Sovereign. Æsch. de fals. Leg.

* Diod. l. 16. Polyæn. Strat. l. 4.

best; they spare for no Cost in the Encouragement of their Spies and Emissaries; prefer Success to Show; choose to Purchase, rather than to Subdue; and to Corrupt, than Conquer. Offers, Promises, Insinuations, all Means are made use of to gain those over to a Neutrality, who are able to do 'em any Mischief. What did not *Philip* promise the *Athenians*, while he saw them in a Condition of traversing his Designs *? What Artifices did *Cæsar* make use of, when it was either his Business to sow Divisions among the *Gauls*; or to win over to his Party the Tribunes, and the chief of the Commonwealth? This last, after he had subdued *Gaul* with *Roman* Iron, subdued *Rome* with *Gallic* Gold †. The other never broke down a Gate he had not tried first to open; and allowed no Place impreg-

* *Polyæn. Strat.* l. 4. *Cic. Epist.* 12. l. 1. ad *Attic. Val. Max.* l. 7. c. 1.

† *Philip preach'd another Lesson to his Son, and reproach'd him for setting a Value upon those mercenary Minds that did not present, but sell themselves. Præclatus in Epistolâ quadam Alexandrum Filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum confectetur. Quæ te, Malum, inquit, ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quas pecuniâ corrupisses? An tu id agis ut Macedones non te Regem suum, sed Ministrum, & præbitorem putent? bene Ministrum, & præbitorem, quia fordidum regi: Melius etiam quod largitionem corruptelam dixit esse, sit enim deterior qui accipit, atque ad idem semper expectandum paratur. Hoc ille filio; sed præceptum putemus omnibus. Cic. de off. l. 2.*

able, but where Money could gain no Entrance. Their Military Designs and Adventures bear as great a Relation as their Politicks. *Cæsar*, who subdued *Gaul*, pass'd the *Rhine*, and defeated the *Germans*, recalls *Philip* to our Memory, who subdued part of *Thrace*, pass'd the *Danube*, and triumph'd more than once over the *Scythians*. Both the one and the other train'd up Men capable to second 'em, and to perfect the Art of War. † One, upon an Idea taken from *Homer*, who compared the Union of the *Grecian* Generals to a Battalion, whose Bucklers, join'd together, make an impenetrable Front, contriv'd that new Military Body, so well known under the Name of the *Macedonian Phalanx*; treated with Distinction his choicest Soldiers; honoured 'em with the Name of *Comerades*; engag'd 'em chearfully to endure the fatigues of the War, and banish'd from his Camp all Licentiousness, and the most innocent Liberties §. The other, in what regards the Science of Encampments, the Order and Expedition of Marches, the building of Bridges, and Dispositions at a Siege, was a compleat Master, and left such lessons behind him, as the most famous Captains before his time knew nothing of, and all that followed him have studied. || Besides, he disciplin'd his Legions, form'd 'em according to his own Model, prepar'd 'em for the readiest and swiftest

† Polyb. Demosth. Olynth. 1. Pollux. l. 1. c. 10.

§ *Ælian. Var. Hist.* l. 14. c. 49.

|| *Polyæn. Strat.* l. 1.

Motions, made himself familiar with the Soldiery *, and commanded more like the Father of a Family, than the General of an Army, when the Discipline of War would allow of it. So that, by an Affability, that deserves so much the more Submission and Respect, by how much it seems to wave and dispense with it, these great Captains gain'd from their Soldiers infinite Services, and a boundless Obedience. Both of 'em were engag'd in Sieges, Conflicts, and Battles; both of 'em indefatigable Warriors, and on Occasion audacious. Presuming discreetly upon their Good-fortune, they dared upon Occasion, undertake Difficulties, but always abstained from attempting Impossibilities; believing their Vigilancy and Attention to lay hold on the lucky Moment was the only way to render 'em Superior. † Nor did they disdain the use of Stratagems, when they thought they would be of service to their Designs. So far from being ashamed of attacking the Enemy by Night, and of stealing the Victory from him, that they set a Value upon the Contrivance. The Disgraces of their Youth had taught 'em the Necessity of Forecast, and the Art of Shifting. Sagacious Diffidence, which served to place Danger in its proper Light, permitted 'em to meet it with Intrepidity, but not with Foolhardiness. *Cæsar*, as much *Cæsar* as he was, ap

* *Nec Milites, sed blandiore nomine commilitones, etia Quirites appellabat, Suet. in Cæs.*

† *Polyæn. Strat. l. 4. & 8. Frontin. Strateg. l. 2. c. & alibi.*

prehended the Caprices of Fortune ; and according to him, all that one might hope, would not recompence what one might fear from her. The uncertainty of the Chance of War rais'd as great Anxieties in *Philip*. His Carriage ‡ after the Battle of *Cheronea* expos'd him in the Sallies and Extravagances of Joy he had conceived for the Victory, and which made *Demades*, one of his Prisoners, reproach him thus: *You are playing the part of Therfites, whilst you have nothing to do but to act that of Agamemnon* §. Besides all this, the course of their Expeditions seems included almost in an equal space of Time ; and Fortune, to have some Share in the Likeness, has plac'd the Scenes of the principal Actions of their Lives in small Distance the one from the other ; and plac'd the fields of Battle *, wherein their mighty Fates were decided, in almost the very same Country. I add to this an equal Clemency and Moderation, in the midst of a most profuse Prosperity. *Philip*, become Arbiter of *Greece*, contented himself with the Title of General ; and *Cæsar*, tho' absolute Master of *Rome*, was satisfy'd with that of Dictator. One may say, that by these Names more

‡ Having drank too excessively, he danc'd upon the place of Battle, went from Rank to Rank, and grossly insulted over the Misfortune of the Prisoners. Diod. Plut.

§ This Reproach was not lost ; *Demades*, with 2000 more Athenians, were releas'd without Ransom ; but when they demanded their Equipage, I believe, said *Philip*, they think in Earnest they were not beaten.

* *Pharfalia*, & *Cheronea*.

loft

soft and agreeable (though at the bottom they took nothing from 'em that was Real and Effectual) they had a mind to sooth the Pride, and soften the Disgrace of the Vanquish'd. One can't but love *Philip's* Generosity at *Cheronea* †, when he releas'd to the *Athenians* 2000 of their Prisoners without Ransom: Nor forbear admiring *Cæsar's* Humanity, who, in his Victory at *Pharsalia*, commanded his Soldiers to spare the Blood of their Fellow Citizens, and received very favourably the most zealous of *Pompey's* Party. The *Macedonian* is said to have known how to swallow Injuries, and the *Roman* ‡ knew how to pass 'em by without Resentment. They had, or at least affected, an extream Insensibility in this Point: Whether they thought Diffimulation was worth more than it cost 'em; or that, in their Opinion, Contempt was a better Revenge than Anger. Some of *Philip's* Friends advising him to banish a Man who had spoken ill of him at Court; *Very well*, said he, *that's the ready way to make him rail at me all the World over*. Another time, being desired to do the same thing by an honest Man for the same Offence; *Let us first see*, said he, *if we have not given him any Occasion*. And understanding that this very Man was Indigent, having received no Gratuity from the Court, he made him a Present. This turn'd Satire into Commendation; and upon

† Polyb. l. 5. Suid. in Φιλίππος. Demad. Orat. ὑπὲρ δοδεκατίας.

‡ Long. c. 25. περὶ ὑψους.

at Philip said, *Kings have it in their power to make themselves either beloved or hated.* As he was the Day assisting at the Sale of some Captives, in sort of indecent Posture, one of 'em whisper'd in the Ear, and advis'd him to pull down the skirt of his Garment; *Here, set this Man at Liberty,* said he, *I did not know he was my Friend.* The Court importuning him to punish the Ingratitude of the *Peloponnesians* for having publicly abus'd at him in the *Olympick Games,* *How will you serve me,* reply'd he, *should I disoblige them, who don't forbear affronting me after so many Obligations?* At the end of an Audience he had been giving the *Athenian Ambassadors,* who were come to complain of some Acts of Hostility, he ask'd 'em, *If you were able to serve 'em in any thing?* *The greatest service thou canst do us,* answered *Demochares,* *is to go hang thyself.* Unmov'd at these Words, though he saw the whole Court justly provok'd at 'em; *tell your Masters,* said he, *that they, who dare be guilty of such Insolences, are more haughty, and inclin'd to Peace, than those that know how to give 'em *.* *Cæsar,* on his Part, shew'd not the least Resentment at *Catullus* his severe Epigrams; as for the rest, he extended his Clemency so far as to be reproachable for no Man's Death but his own †. Let us examine a little into their Judg-

Si quæ alia in Philippo virtus fuit & contumelia-patientia. *Senec. de ira,* l. 3. c. 23.
 † Cæsari proprium, & peculiare sit clementiæ insigne, usque ad pœnitentiam omnes superavit. *Plin. Nat. Hist.* l. 7. c. 26.

ments: Both of 'em were Lovers and Favourers of Learning; both of 'em carefs'd learned Men, and loaded 'em with Favours: Both of 'em had a great Passion for the Theatre; insomuch, that each had for his Favourite the most famous Actor † of his Time. They both understood Wit; and lov'd to hear, and did themselves utter witty Sayings. Philip having received a Wound near his Throat, and his Chirurgeon importuning him every Day for some new Demand; *Take what thou wilt*, said he, *for I know thou hast me by the Throat*. 'Tis said of him, that upon the hearing of two Villains, who accused each other of several notorious Crimes, he banish'd one of 'em, and condemn'd the other to follow him. Cæsar, tired with a Fellow that was reading to him in an effeminate musical Tone, told him; *If thou thinkest thou art Singing thou singest very ill; if thou thinkest thou art Raeding, thou Singest*. Another time being troubled by the importunity of Pompeius, who was continually saying to him, *I have receiv'd a Wound in your Service, I have receiv'd it in my Face: Very well*, reply'd Cæsar, *take care hereafter you don't look back whilst you are running away*.

One may likewise see a great Conformity in the Judgment of the most famous Orators of the Time, in which each of these Captains lived, concerning 'em *. Philip found in Demosthenes, and

† Neoptolemus and Roscius.

* Plut. in vit. Demosth. Æsch. contr. Ctesiph. Sall.

Cæsar in *Cicero*, an Enemy to his Ambition, and an Admirer of his Eloquence. *Demosthenes* was so exasperated against *Philip*, that, in the height of his Sorrow for the loss of his Daughter, he could not forbear, with a Garland of Flowers on his Head, declaring, in behalf of the Gods, to the *Athenians* the Death of that Prince; nor could he at the same time deny him the Commendation of an eloquent Man; contenting himself with this Answer to those, who were commending *Philip* for his Art in speaking; that they were extolling in a Prince the Excellencies of a Declaimer †. *Cicero*, whose Aversion to *Cæsar* carry'd him so far as to make him complain more than once, that he was not invited to the delicious Banquet of the Ides § of March; owned, || That in all sorts of Writing,

† *Plut. in Demosth.*

§ *Cæsar* was kill'd the Ides of March. *Quam vellem ad illas Pulcherrimas epulas me Idibus Martii invitastis, reliquarum nihil haberemus.* Ep. l. 10.

|| *Cæsar autem rationem adhibens, consuetudinem vitio- rum & corruptam purâ & incorruptâ consuetudine emendat. Itaque cum ad hanc elegantiam verborum latinorum adjungit illa Oratoria ornamenta dicendi, tum videtur tanquam tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine. Hanc tum habeat præcipuam laudem in communibus, non viro cui debeat cedere. Tum Brutus, Orationes quidem ejus sibi vehementer probantur, complures autem legi. Antiquos etiam Commentarios quosdam scripsit rerum suarum valde quidem probandos. Nudi enim sunt, recti, & simplici, omni ornatu Orationis tanquam veste de- privata: sed dum voluit alias habere parata undesumerent*

Writing, there is not a better Model than *Cæsar*. They bear as great a coherence in their Follies and Vices, as in their Virtues and Excellencies. Alike in their Irregularities, and their Weaknesses; and equal Propensions † to those infamous Pleasures that are justly detested as the Disgrace, and Horror of Nature. This depravity of Manners encouraged the Attendance of corrupt Courtiers. A Troop of dissolute Debauchees, Buffoons, Pantomimes, and, what is worse, of detestable Flatterers *, whom
Avarice

qui vellent scribere Historiam, ineptis gratum fortasse fecit, qui volunt illa calamistris mœrere: Sanos quidem homines à scribendo deterruit. Cic. in Brut.

† Theopompus (*in Athen. l. 6. & in Demet. Phaler. de Elocut. c. 27.*) *Observes that Philip had Courtiers, who went under the name of his Friends, and yet deserved that of his Mistresses. Suetonius (in Jul. Cæsar.) saith, that Curio call'd Cæsar a Husband for every Wife, and a Wife for every Husband. The Soldiers, in his Triumph over the Gauls, sung out, Ecce Cæsar nunc triumphat qui subegit Gallias: Nicomedes non triumphat qui subegit Cæsarem. Cæsar, who has subdu'd the Gauls, enters in Triumph this Day; but Nicomedes, King of Bithynia, who subdued Cæsar, has had no Triumph at all.*

* *Tho' Philip loved Flatterers, and encouraged 'em far, as to reward with the Title of King in Thessaly the Flatteries of Thrasideus, yet sometimes he was pleas'd with the Truth. He maintained a Man, (Æl. Var. Hist. 8. c. 15.) who was to tell him every Day before he gave Audience, Philip, remember thou art Mortal. Nay, he suffered Aristotle, (Arist. Ep. ad Phil.) to say him Lessons upon the Art of Government. He said more*

Avarice and Ambition send in Crowds into the Presence of Great Men, had the greatest share in their Esteem and Liberality. Add to all this, that their Morals, by which they guided themselves in their Conquests, were very like. *Philip* did not stick to say †, *That Children were to be amused with Play-things, and Men with Oaths.* *Cæsar*, for his part, had continually these Verses of *Euripides* in his Mouth: § *If the Laws are to be violated, for the sake of Empire they are to be violated.* Their Misfortunes shew them to be born to the like Accidents. Being themselves disloyal Husbands, they in their turns met with the Infidelity they deserv'd. The scandalous Chronicles reproach *Olympias* with more than *Jupiter*, and *Pompeia* with other Adventures than the Mysteries of the Good Goddesses. However it be, their Wives behaved themselves so loosely, that they were forc'd to have recourse to Repudiation; a Punishment no less shameful to him that inflicts it, than to her who undergoes it. Their manner of Death compleats their Resemblance. The first was Assassinated just upon his Expedition into *Persia* ‡; the second upon the

er, that he was much obliged to the Athenian Orators, who, in their *Invectives*, had taught him to mend his manners.

† *Æl. Var. Hist. l. 8. c. 12.*

§ *In orè semper Græcos Versus Euripidis (in Phædræ) habebat; nam si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia violandum est. Cic de Off. l. 3.*

‡ The first Year of the 111th *Olymp.* in the height of his Revels for the Marriage of his Daughter *Cleo-*

the point of marching against the *Parthians*: Both the one and the other fell by the Contrivances of their Creatures and Relations ||: Both for having no Regard to some sinister Presages and forewarning Advices. Such was the King, to whose Progresses *Demosthenes* put a stop so often by the force of his

patra with *Alexander* King of *Epirus*. A Denial of Justice cost this Prince his Life, of which take this short Account. *Attalus* in a Debauch infamously abused *Pausanias* a young *Macedonian*, of Noble Birth; and not content with this Violence from himself, he prostituted him to all his Guests, one after another. *Pausanias* for a long time after solicited a Revenge due to so ignominious an Affront, and never ceas'd to implore the Royal Power to assist him. But *Philip*, either out of Complaisance to *Attalus* the Uncle of *Cleopatra*, whom he had married after the Divorce of his first Wife *Olympias*, or out of Regard to his own Follies in the same kind, never gave Ear to *Pausanias's* Petition: who, from being Angry, grew Mad thereupon, and calling his Judge to Account, imagined the way to clear his Reputation, was to soil it with an abominable Parricide. *Arist. Pol.* l. 5. c. 10. *Diod.* l. 16. *Zonar. Annal.* Tom. 10. *Josephus* l. 11. c. 7. *Just.* l. 9. *Oros.* l. 1. c. 14. *Artaxerxes Ochus* King of *Persia* dy'd the same Year.

|| *Olympias* and *Alexander* are thought to have had a Hand in the Assassination. *Philip*, upon his Expedition design'd against the Persian, consulted the Oracle of *Delphi*. The *Pythia*, who had the Reputation of *Philip* pizing, (*Cic. de Divin.* l. 2. *Minut. Fel.* in *Octav.*) made him a very ambiguous Answer, which, after the Blow was given, was look'd on, according to Custom, as an evident Prophecy of his approaching Fate. *Diod.* l. 16.

Eloquence. This Orator, born † two Years after Philip, had not for his Father a filthy smoking Blacksmith, as *Juvenal* is pleased to describe him *; but a Man who employed a great Number of Slaves to work at his Forges. 'Tis not out of a ridiculous Dotage upon my Author, I endeavour to ennoble him. I, who demand for him no other Titles of Nobility than the Merit of his Works, and who besides judge of every Man by his Actions, propose to assert no more than what is warranted by History, which tells us besides, that *Demosthenes* lost his Father ‡ when he was very young, continuing under the Conduct of his Mother *Cleobule*, whose chief Care was to effeminate him by a tender, delicate Education §. Infomuch that his Companions in Derision call'd him *Battalus* ||. After this he fell into the Hands of Tutors, who took more Pains to get his Money than cultivate his Mind §§. We have in him an evident Example, that Orators are made by Art, and not by Nature. For, besides his untoward Education, which too often influences

† Olymp. 99. An. 4.

* Sat. 10.

‡ At seven Years of Age. Demost. Orat. 1. in *Aphob.*

§ *Æschin* in *Timar.*

|| *Battalus* was a Player upon the Flute, according to *Antiphanes* (who quotes *Atheneus*, l. 1. 3, & *Clem. Alexand.* l. 2. Strom.) a soft, effeminate Fellow; according to others, a Poet of the same Character, *Clem.* l. 3. *edag. Phot. in Biblioth.*

§§ *Demosthen.* *ibid.* *Dionys. Halic. lib. περὶ συγγραμμάτων.*

the whole Life, he had some natural * Defects very incompatible with the Profession he embraced. A thick, restiff Tongue, hardly pronouncing the Letters that require any Emphasis, or Pliantness of the Organ; a trembling Voice, given to interrupt the Articulation of the Words, and destroy the Harmony necessary to the most Noble Expressions: In fine, an Outside void of that Eloquence, which takes the Eye, and prepares the way for Persuasion. Thus *Demosthenes* fail'd in his first Attempt, in which he succeeded so ill, that Spite and Distaste had like to have banished him for ever from the Bar and the Pulpit. However, Perseverance and Application surmounted all. *Isocrates* †, *Plato* §, and *Isæus* ‡, initiated his Eloquence; but Action being, according to his Judgment, the chief, or rather the only Part of an Orator ||, he had also three Masters ** to instruct him in the comeliness of Gesture, justness of Motion, and graces of Pro-

* Cic. 1. *de Orat.* Val. l. 8. c. 7. Laert. in *Euclid.*

† Plut. Phot. in 10. *Rhet.* Aul. Gell. l. 3. c. 13.

§ Cic. in Brut. *de Clar. Orat.* & 1. *de Orat.* & 1. *de Off.* Laert. l. 3.

‡ Juven. *Sat.* 10. Plut. in *Demosth.* Dion. in *Isæo.*

|| Cic. 3. *de Orat.* Val. l. 12. c. 10. *actionem* in dicendo primas, secundas, & tertias obtinere solitam tradunt. An Expression taken from the ancient Stage, in which there were never but three Actors at a time, viz. the two Interlocutors, and the Chorus. Nec quarta loqui persona laboret. *Hor. de Arte Poet.*

** Neoptolemus, according to Photius; Andronicus, according to Plutarch; Satyrus, according to Quintilian. nunciatio

nunciation. To these foreign Censors he added a domestick one (if the Expression may be allowed) that never failed him; I mean his Glass, which he made use of to let him know what others would not tell him, or at least were weary of repeating to him *. These faithful Monitors, and frequent Lectures, produc'd Wonders, and acquired him a Vehemence of Action, and a Majesty, that were inimitable. *Æschines*, when retired to *Rhodes*, one Day reciting the Oration *Demosthenes* made against him †, and being continually interrupted by the Acclamations of his Auditors §, *What would you have done*, said he, *had you heard him speak it your self?* As to the Organs of Speech, *Demosthenes* took all imaginable Care to make 'em pliant; he subjected 'em to that flexibility the Cadence of Periods requires; and to sum up all, he omitted

* Plut. Liban.

† When *Æschines* after having miscarried in his Accusation, which, tho' intended against *Ctesiphon*, openly attack'd *Demosthenes*, was making the best of his way to *Rhodes*, *Demosthenes* took Horse and pursued his fugitive Accuser: He, observing the Pursuit, concluded himself lost; and fell flat upon the Ground: But *Demosthenes* raised him, and forced him to accept of a good Sum of Money. This Generosity touch'd him so nearly, that he could not forbear saying, Am I in the wrong for regretting the loss of a Country where I have better Enemies, than I can expect to find Friends in another Place? Some Authors (Plut. in *Demosth.* & *Rhet.* *Helladius apud Phot. in Biblioth.*) put these Words in *Demosthenes's* Mouth.

§ Cic. 3. de Orat. Val. Max. l. 8. c. 7.

nothing that was able to correct Nature, or bring it to Perfection *. Sometimes, to fortify his Voice, and accustom it to the Noise of a tumultuary Audience, he would declaim upon the Sea-shore, and harangue the Waves; a lively Image of a popular Assembly. Sometimes, that he might the better recollect himself, he would withdraw into dark Caves, where nothing could discompose or distract him. He would very frequently cut off half his Beard, and disfigure himself to that Degree, that he was necessarily confined to Solitude for fear of appearing ridiculous. That, which cost him the greatest Pains to correct, was his Shoulders, which he was apt to shrug up very disagreeably in the heat of Declaiming. He never practised at home, but he had a naked Sword hanging over him, ready to prick his Shoulders whenever they rose into that ungraceful Posture. These painful Exercises were renewed every Day with fresh Vehemency, and the earliest Tradesmen in the whole City were later up than him §. He borrow'd a great deal from his Sleep, and spent it in finishing his Orations, which made some pleasant People say, *they smell of Oil*. The Success answer'd all his Watching, and his Labour. He Consecrated 'em to the good of his Country, and the rest of Greece, whereby he deservedly was called by *Philip* the only Bulwark of *Athens*. The Conjunction of Affairs then

* Cic. 5. *de Fin.* Valer. 1. 8. Plut. Phot. Liban. Suid.

§ Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 4. Æl. Var. *Hist.* 1. 7. c. 7. Stob.
Serm. 27.

afforded great Matter † for the Zeal, and Talents of this Orator. How many Differences had he to pacify, Jealousies to suppress, Distrusts to quiet, Grudges to dissipate, Animosities to extinguish, Treasons to unravel, Dangers to prevent, and Damages to repair? What Prudence was there necessary, to manage, and apply to the Publick Good, so many different Interests, and opposite Designs? That Discord, which continually held the *Greeks* upon the very brink of a Rupture, broke out with Violence, upon the occasion of the *Phoceans* *. These were the Inhabitants of the Parts adjacent to the Temple of *Delphi*. They bethought themselves of Tilling the Lands dedicated to *Apollo*, which was a Prophanation of it: immediately the People round about cry'd out a Sacrilege; some in good earnest, and others, that under the Mask of Piety they might wreck their private Revenge. The War that commenc'd hereupon was called *Sacred*, as being undertaken upon a religious Motive. The matter was referred to the *Amphictyons*, who composed the States General, and who met sometimes at *Delphi*, and sometimes at *Thermopylae*. Upon a thorough Examination, the *Phoceans* were declared Sacrilegious, and very severely fined. † One of 'em called *Philomelus*, a bold Man, and of great

† Luc. in Encom. Demosth.

* Diodor. Pausan. in Phoc. Arcad. Lacon. & Messen. El. Var. Hist. l. 9. Athen. l. 6.

† Diod. Pausan. ibid.

Esteem, persuaded 'em to disobey this Decree: they took up Arms, assur'd themselves of Assistance from *Athens* and *Sparta*, and proposed nothing less than to humble the Pride of the *Thebans*, who appear'd the most violent against 'em. The first Advantages they obtained served to increase their Hopes. But in a short time the necessary Funds for the Expences of the War falling short, they supply'd themselves by another Sacrilege. *Philomelus* had so much Religion as not to violate the Temple of *Delphi*. *Onomarchus*, and *Phaillus* †, who succeeded him in the Command, were not so scrupulous. They took away the consecrated Vessels, and all the rich Presents, which the Piety of several Kings and Nations had deposited there. The Sums, they at several times raised by this means, amounted to above ten thousand Talents; that is to say, to more than six Millions of Gold of our Money. At this rate they found out a means of maintaining the War at the Expence of the Divinity they had offended, and forc'd the *Thebans* at last to throw themselves into *Philip's* Protection. This Prince needed only to appear, to put an end to a War which had lasted ten Years, and had equally exhausted both Parties. The *Peloponnesians* immediately despair'd of making head against so powerful an enemy: the bravest of 'em obtain'd leave to retire into *Peloponnesus*; the rest surrendered on Discretion, and as a Reward of a Vic-

† Brethren. Diod. Pausan. in Phoc.

story, which cost the Victor only the trouble of appearing, he had, as we have already observ'd, besides the Reputation of a religious Prince, and faithful Ally, gain'd the Streights of *Thermopylae*, the only Passage out of *Macedon* into *Thessaly*. This was at that time the chief State of *Greece*, abounding in Republicks, and Dissentions. On one side, *Athens*, and *Sparta*, thought of nothing but mortifying *Thebes*, their Rival. † On the other, not only the *Thessalians*, partly to get rid of their Tyrants, and partly to be restored to their Prerogatives of *Amphictyons*, of which they had been divested by the *Phoceans*, but also the *Thebans*, that they might secure themselves in the Superiority which the Battels of *Leuctra*, and *Mantineia*, had acquir'd 'em, were entirely devoted to *Philip*, and, without intending it, assisted him to forge their own Chains. Besides, *Philip's* Exploits against *Thrace*, bordering upon *Macedon*, rais'd every Day new Arguments for a War betwixt him and the *Athenians*. This Prince, for the Security of his Frontiers, earnestly desir'd to encroach upon *Thrace*; and this he could not do but at the Expence of the *Athenians*, who, ever since the Defeat of *Xerxes*, had several Colonies in that Country, besides divers States, Allies, or Tributaries. Neither did he omit any thing that could help him to get *Eubaea* into his Hands, which he called, *The Fetters of Greece*. On the other side, it was the *Athenians* chief Interest not to suffer that Island, which by a Bridge

† Demosth. Orat. upon the Peace.

might be joined to the Continent of *Attica*, to fall into the hands of their Enemies. Add to all this, as an Aggravation of their Misfortunes, that *Persia*, at that time, was not able to assist, as she ought, according to the Rules of right Policy, the weaker side; and thereby preserve an equal Balance, which was her only Safety. The Battles of *Marathon*, *Salamine*, *Platea*, and *Micala*, had shown her the Vanity of her Dependance upon the mighty numbers of her Vessels and her Troops. She dreaded the Courage of the *Grecians*; especially since having seen ten thousand of their Soldiers *, the Remnant of a defeated Army, traverse the Body of that vast Empire, with the countenance of Conquerors, and recover their own Country, without ever being broken or disorder'd. She therefore held it as a fundamental Maxim, never to suffer, in this respect, the Increase of any Power that might give Laws to the rest, and by that means unite the Forces of *Europe* against *Asia*. *Artaxerxes Ochus* † governed himself as long as he was able by this Principle; which, as the Event justified afterwards, might be termed the Buckler of his Monarchy. He protected the *Rhodians*, *Bizantines*, and other Islanders, confederated against *Athens*, and forced the *Athenians* to own 'em free and independant

* *The Retreat of the 10000. Xenoph. They served in young Cyrus his Army, who was defeated and slain by his Brother Artaxerxes Mnemon.*

† *Then King of Persia. Isoc. in Orat. Soc. Demosth. de Libert. Rhod. Diod. l. 16. Corn. Nep. in Chabr.*

States. He sent *Thebes* a Supply of Money against the *Phoceans*; and at last, shewed a sort of Jealousy of *Philip's* Proceedings, obliging him, in concert with the *Athenians*, to raise the Siege of *Bizantium*, and *Perinthus*. † But while *Macedon* was laying the most solid Foundation of her Greatness, and giving *Greece* the fatal Blow, he was taken up not only in reducing some rebellious Nobles, but also in a War with *Egypt* and *Phœnicia*: So that his Troubles at home suffer'd him to make but slight Observations upon what was acting abroad. 'Twas much about these difficult and tempestuous Times §, *Demosthenes* came to the Helm ||. *Greece* had never till now lain under such heavy Calamities. Never till now had her civil and bloody Wars threatned her with so near a Ruin. * 'Tis true,

† Diod. Demosth. in his Oration upon Philip's Letter. Diod. l. 16. Isoc. in Panegyrr.

§ The first Year of the 107th Olymp.

|| Plutarch contradicts himself in this Chronological Point; for after having said (in vit. Demosthenis) That *Demosthenes*, at the Age of 27, entered into the Administration of the State, in the beginning of the *Phœnian* War; he forgets what he had advanc'd just before, and assures us, that this Orator spoke his Oration against *Midias* at 32 Years of Age, before ever he had meddled with the Government. But *Demosthenes* himself decides this Question; in his Oration for the Crown, he declares positively, That at the beginning of the *Phœcean* War, he was not concerned in the Affairs of the Republick.

* Demosth. Orat. upon the Peace.

that

that heretofore, in the course of her Wars, the Weak were always sure to side with one of the Parties; but then they, who contributed most to the Success of the Conqueror, never suffered him to pursue his Advantages too far: So that the Vanquish'd found in his Weakness an infallible Remedy for his Disgrace. But the Times were altered upon the Fall of *Athens* and *Lacedemon*. For *Thebes*, after the Loss of *Epaminondas*, had neither Strength enough to keep the balance even between *Macedon* and *Greece*, nor Authority enough to make herself obeyed by the whole Nation. The *Grecians*, naturally turbulent and untractable, follow'd the bent of their own Humour; all was full of Quarrels and Divisions: There was no such thing as Deference, or Subordination among 'em; no Common Interest pursued, every Party pretending to the whole: 'Twas almost impossible to reunite, or compose 'em. Their Jealousy degenerated into Hatred, and a sort of Spitefulness; which made 'em insensible of the Common Good of a Nation. That in such a Condition it was defended so long against the Attempts and Fortunes of *Philip*, is more wonderful than its being formerly preserv'd from the Invasion of the *Persians*. This appears a Paradox, though it is nothing less. † One might see, in the Person of *Philip*, a King of almost as great Power over his Allies, as his Subjects; and no less formidable in his Treaties, than his Engagements: A Prince vigilant, active, himself his own Treasurer,

† Demosth. Olynth. 3.

his own Minister, his own General: Covetous and thirsty after Glory, seeking it where it was to be bought at the highest Price; delighted in nothing more than Fatigues and Dangers; continually Master of that ready Harmony between Counsel and Execution, which is so necessary to all Military Expeditions; and attacking, upon so many Advantages, Republicks weakened by their long Wars, rent by their domestick Divisions, sold by their own Citizens, serv'd by a foreign Soldiery, averse to wholesome Counsels, and obstinate to their own Ruin. On the other hand *Darius* †, and his Son *Xerxes*, with their Millions of Men, wanted Soldiers that were able to face Men couragious enough to withstand the first Impressions of Fear. *Xerxes* was convinc'd of this, when, not being able to gain a Pass kept by 300 *Lacedemonians*, he cry'd out, *He had a great many Men, but few Soldiers*. Besides, these two Princes were very apt to rely upon their Generals §. They were a long time threatning at a distance, before they struck; spent whole Years

† Son of *Hystapes*. 'Tis him *Esdras* and *Philo* call *Chasuerus*. If *Ælian* (*de Animal.* l. 11. c. 27.) may be credited, he undertook this Enterprize to please his Wife *Stoffa's* Fancy, who wanted to be served by Attick and *Ionian* Women. So true is it, that the noblest Undertakings fall into disgrace, when the real Cause of 'em is *Love*. *Corn. Nep.* (*in Aristid.*) assigns a more solid Reason for this Expedition.

§ *Dares* and *Artaphernes* commanded *Darius* his Army at *Marathon*; and *Mardonius* that of *Xerxes* at *Platea*. *Corn. Nep.* in *Miltiad.* and *Aristid.*

in mustering up innumerable Troops, and thereby gave their Enemies all the time they could desire to prepare against 'em. Moreover, a confus'd heap of People, like to *Gigantick* Bodies, whose monstrous bulk expose more than defend 'em, must be of a weight almost immoveable. || This Multitude, overcharged with useless Mouths, fetter'd with the Train the King and his Grandees drew after 'em, commanded by Officers, whose chief Talent lay in despising their Enemies, for want of a certain Agility, always useful in War, but absolutely necessary in long Expeditions, especially in *Greece*, a narrow dry Country, in comparison of the Plains of *Asia*, starv'd, as we said before, and overthrew itself. *Greece* had not wherewithal to nourish at one time so many Men and Horses; scarce Fountains and Rivers enow to slake their Thirst. To such Enemies she opposed only small Bodies, but such as were all Sinew and Soul. Concord and Unanimity did then so closely cement her Inhabitants together, that they seem'd to compose but one State, and to dwell in but one City. The same Designs, the same Desires, the same Fears, the same Precautions, and the same Ensigns. Their Cares, Expences, Labours, all conspired to the general Good; every one thirsted with Emulation after Glory and Liberty. *Demosthenes* found this Armour extremely languid, not to say, extinguished. There was no such thing as the Common Cause. Jealousies, Distrusts, and inveterate Animosities,

|| *Ælian*. Var. Hist. l. 12. c. 40.

had so extremely soured and alienated their Minds, that these different Commonalties, though all of the same Nation, though in full peace, look'd on each other as Enemies, or at least as Strangers. Sometimes indeed they laid down their Swords, their Quarrels never. The Animosity was without Bounds, without Measure. *Parmenio* reflected upon this intestine War, which had so long time kept the *Grecians* in a sort of Lethargy, as to their real Interests, when, observing the Ambassadors of Greece to murmur one Day at *Philip* for using so late to give them Audience, he told 'em; † *No wonder, Gentlemen, my Master sleeps now while you are awake, since he watched while you was sleeping.* This will appear by the pains *Demosthenes* was at in contriving the League between *Athens* and *Thebes*, even then when their common Danger seem'd sufficient to reconcile 'em, and *Philip* at their very Doors informed 'em under what pressing Necessities they lay of a straight and speedy Confederacy. *Pytho*, the *Macedonian* Ambassador, an able Statesman, great Orator, and one who had learnt to lye with a good grace for his Master's Interest, so far imposed upon the *Thebans*, as to satisfy 'em with captious Conjectures, and frivolous protestations. In comparison of him, *Demosthenes*

† *Another Day when he had lain too long a Bed in his Camp, he own'd himself a Sluggard, and excused it with a high Complement to his Minister: I have been taking a sound Nap, said he, because I knew Antipater was awake for me.*

his Collegues spoke nonsense, and were hardly heard: But when *Demosthenes* began, he undeceived the stupid *Bæotians*, and made 'em resolve immediately to conclude the Alliance he propos'd. Sometime after, *Demosthenes* himself, reduc'd to save his own Honour, and defend his Benefactor by a particular Recital of his Services, * extremely extoll'd, and placed at the head of his Politic Exploits, the Success of this Important Negotiation. Besides this general Division, the Spirit of Discord reigned in every particular Republick; and † Avarice so effectually did *Philip's* Business, that he boasted he had conquered more with his Gold, than with his Sword. *Sparta* only was free from this Contagion. Every where else the Credit of the Mercenary Faction protected the Traitors from the Resentment of the honest Citizens, and the Severity of the Laws. As to her Militia, *Greece* did not stand so much in need of Soldiers as Officers. For at *Cheronea*, where it may be said her Liberty expired, the Commanders § very much contributed to the Loss of the Battle. The Incapacity of || *Chares*, that unworthy Successor of *Timotheus*, *Iphicrates*, and *Chabrias*, but who would have eclips'd 'em all, had been as just in keeping his Word, as he was confident in giving it, had the largest share in the Mis-

* Orat. de Corona.

† Plut. in Paul. Æmil.

§ Lyficles, and Chares.

|| These are Chares his Promises, became a Proverb to signify a vain Promise.

Fortunes of that Day. One might at that time have look'd on *Agésilauſ* as the laſt General of *Sparta*; and *Epaminondas* of *Thebes*. But *Athens* was not even then unprovided of good Captains. In *Phocion* ſhe might have had her *Miltiades*, and her *Themiſtocles*, if her Cabals had not excluded him from the Command, and preferr'd thoſe before him that hardly deſerved the honour to obey him. After he had defeated *Philip* in *Eubæa*, he was depoſed without any other Deſign than to ſubſtitute in his room ſuch * a one as *Philip* himſelf would have deſired; whoſe Conduct, as unfortunate, as it was imprudent, gave *Phocion* a ſufficient Revenge for the Injuſtice done him. On the other hand, the *Macedonian Phalanx*, able to have match'd the *Greeks* at *Marathon* and *Salamine*, that new piece of Infantry, the beſt and moſt regular that till then had ever been known, fighting in the Preſence of their King, commanded by old experienc'd Officers, and ſuſtain'd by an extraordinary Cavalry, could eaſily deal with a parcel of mercenary Troops ill paid. How eaſy muſt it therefore be for *Philip* to bring *Greece* under Subjection? How difficult for *Demosthenes* to preſerve her from it? Who could ſet this Body, ſo languiſhing, ſo crazy, into motion? Let this Body, ſuch as it was, did *Demosthenes* undertake to reanimate: With this Body he wreſtled with *Philip*, and more than once had like to have ſlain him. We muſt own, however, that *Greece*, even in this miſerable Condition, had notwithſtand-

* Hegeſilaus. Ulp. in Orat. de falſ. leg.

ing a very powerful Refuge, had she known how to make use of it. *Whoever is Master at Sea*, said the Great Pompey, *must be so likewise at Land*. Both Greeks and Romans lost their Liberty for want of understanding, or following this important Maxim. The Athenians by their Naval Forces, infinitely superior to those of Philip †, might have prolong'd the War, harass'd and fatigu'd the Enemy by frequent Diversions; undertaken some Descents upon his Coasts; arm'd and supported those who obey'd him with an Ill-will: Have drain'd his Purfes; disunit'd his Designs; forc'd him to divide his Army: In short, have waited for some favourable Revolution or Supplies from Persia, as much concern'd as themselves to clip the ambitious Wings of this new Conqueror. As powerful as Macedonia appear'd by Land, it's most certain, she might in a moment have lost all her Advantages. 'Twas but to have debauch'd the Theffalians, irritated at the new Form of Government she had impos'd upon 'em. In this case Philip, after twenty-five Years Victories and Conquests, would have found himself

† Upon the Peloponnesian War, Pericles in Thucydides (l. 1.) argues always like an able Seaman. If we dwelt in an Island, said he, we should be free from Insults. The Marine Forces of Athens (Isoc. in Paneg.) doubled those of the rest of Greece; and every Vessel was able to oppose two of the Enemies; 300 Sail were sent from Athens in the Sicilian Expedition. Have you not, said Demosthenes, (de fall. leg.) 300 Gallies, and a Fund able to equip 'em?

* Ari
ing of
eech up
† Her
Plut

first where he was when he began. Without an Assurance of the Passage of *Thermopylae*, which he call'd *The Key of Greece*, and which the *Thessalians* had in their Hands, his Communication with *Argos*, *Messene*, and his other Allies in *Peloponnesus* had been lost; every State of *Greece*, voluntarily, or by force, would have declar'd against him, and he have been obliged to sustain, at home, the War he had carry'd into the heart of *Greece*.

But no Remains of that masculine and vigorous Policy, that knew equally how to form Designs, and repair Losses, were now to be found in *Athens*: There was nothing left but an ill-advis'd Haughtiness, subject to evaporate into insolent Decrees.

They were no more those *Athenians*, who, when threatned with an Inundation of *Barbarians*, demolish'd their Houses to furnish a Navy; and where the Women stoned a Man to death †, who proposed to appease the great King, by paying Tribute, or doing Homage. The love of Ease and Pleasure had almost stifled that of Glory and Independence. || *Pericles*, that great Man, so absolute, that his Enemies call'd him the second *Pisistratus*, was the first that introduc'd this Remissness and Corruption. He, with a design of ingratiating himself with the People, ordain'd, That on the Days

* *Aristophanes* (in his *Clouds*) saith, They had nothing of the Soldier but the Tongue. *Isocr.* (in his *Speech upon the Peace*) saith much the same thing.

† *Herodot.* l. 9.

|| *Plut.* in *Peric.*

of Feasts and Sacrifices, a certain Sum of Money should be distributed among them: † And that, in the Assemblies, where Matters of State were handled, every private Man should receive a certain Fee for his Attendance. Thus we see the Members of the Commonwealth brought to sell to the Republick the Care they were to take of her; and reckon among mercenary Employments the most noble Functions of the Sovereign Power. It was not difficult to foresee what would be the consequence of so terrible a Disorder. A Remedy was pretended to be found out for this, by setting apart a Fund for the War, with a Prohibition, on pain of Death, to advise the applying it to any other purpose. Notwithstanding this, the Abuse continued. It appear'd tolerable as long as the Citizen, who liv'd upon the Publick Liberties, endeavoured to deserve 'em by a constant Attendance of nine Months in the Army. Every one served in his turn, and he, who declined his Duty, was most certainly punish'd as a Deserter. But by degrees the number of Offenders were too powerful for the Laws; and Impunity, as it usually happens, increased the Guilty. A People, accustomed to a delightful Residence in a City, among continual Sports and Festivals, conceiv'd an unconquerable Aversion to Labour, which they look'd on as unworthy a free-born People. It was therefore necessary for such an idle People, to find out somewhat to amuse them, and employ the Hours

† Plut. *ibid.*

an unactive lazy Life: 'Twas this that wrought
 them that Passion, or, rather, extravagant
 fondness they had for Shows. *Epaminondas's*
 death, which seem'd to promise them great Ad-
 vantages, compleated their Ruin and Destruction.
 their Courage, saith *Justin* §, did not outlive that
 austrious Theban. *Deliver'd from a Rival that*
not their Emulation awake, they fall into a lethar-
gic Insensibility. The Funds, design'd for their
 Forces by Land and Sea, were consum'd in Sports
 and Festivals: The Money, due to the Seamen and
 Soldiers, distributed among idle Citizens. A soft
 voluptuous Life dispirited their Hearts. Valour, and
 the Art of War, were in no esteem; their great
 Commanders, discountenanc'd; and all their Favours
 were conferr'd on the best Poets, and the most excel-
 lent Actors. * Comedy and Tragedy, which owe
 their Original to two Icarians, *Susarion* and *Thes-*
pis, were born in Greece; and like Fruits natural
 to their Soil, the People thought they could never
 be cloy'd with them. This Desire was more ge-
 neral in *Athens*, than elsewhere: Poets throng'd
 from all Parts to entertain her: There they found
 ready Market for their Wares; and according to
 Plato, there was no readier or more certain way
 to enrich themselves. They kept not within the
 bounds of Inoffensive Wit; they grew so licentious
 to abuse the Magistrate; and so bold as not to
 conceal his Name. Merit was, no more than
 greatness, a Security from their Satires. *Pericles*,

Lib. 6. * Suid. θ. Steph. ιαα.

that Man so much honour'd, so respected, could not escape those of *Cratinus*, *Eupolis*, and *Teleclides*. But the Condemnation of *Socrates* may be reckoned the capital Crime of Poetry. *Aristophanes*, by the Arts of Comedy, made him be declared Impious, and as such condemned to die, whom *Apollo* by his Oracle at *Delphi* had declar'd a wise Man; and whose Virtues, tho' a Heathen, tempted *Erasmus* to add him to our Litany. This Reputation the Poets were in, was a publick as well as a private Mischief. They had a principal Share in the Deliberations of State; and the Talent they had to direct the People gave 'em a Power to betray and sell 'em. * In this Capacity *Aristoxenus* and *Neoptolemus* were of great use to *Philip*; and very much weakned the Power of *Demosthenes*. Their Advice pleased as well as their Poetry. Perhaps their Works were as much in vogue as those of their Predecessors, who had the pleasure to see their Plays, as soon as represented, learnt and repeated by every one. We read that some *Athenian* Soldiers, who had the fortune to escape the Enemy's Hands at the Defeat in *Sicily*, gain'd their Lives by repeating to the *Sicilians* some Verses of *Euripides*. It is not difficult to conceive what a Crowd of Spectators throng'd to these Representations. There was nothing spar'd, nothing thought too much to make 'em perfectly beautiful. †

* *Demosth. Orat. upon the Peace, and the 4 Phil.*
Id. de fals. leg. Æsc. de fals. leg.

† *Demosth. contr. Mid. & contr. Near. Athen. l. 4*

the Theatre required exorbitant Sums, which they did not hesitate to assign upon the Funds appointed for the War. † *Eubulus*, one of the principal of the Faction against *Demosthenes*, propos'd this Decree; the People approved the Proposal; and like a Madman, that makes use of his Strength only to assault his Physician, and oppose the Remedies prescribed him, they made it Death for him that should move to restore this Fund to the Necessities of the State, to which it had been before appropriated under the same Penalty.

This wild Profuseness had strange Consequences: There was no way to repair it but by Impositions, which being unequally laid, and arbitrarily rais'd, bred perpetual Quarrels, and made the Supplies for War so dilatory, that, without lessening any Charge, rendred all Designs fruitless. For the Artisans, and Seamen, who were more than two thirds of the People, contributed nothing to these Taxes, paying only in their Attendance; the whole weight fell consequently on the Rich: These did not fail to complain, and reproach the rest for having consumed the Publick Treasure in Feasts, Plays, and such-like Superfluities. The People, who knew themselves Masters, gave little heed to their Remonstrances; having no Inclination to lessen their Diversions, to ease those, who (exclusive of the meaner sort) were in possession of all the Honours and Employments. This unjust and tyrannical Proceeding slackned the Zeal of the best at-

† Demosth. 2. Olynth.

fects to the Publick. Every one thought himself overcharged, and endeavoured to evade the Payment; the way to which was by pretending to be poor. * The Law itself gave a large scope to vexatious Suits on such Occasions. The Citizen, who pretended himself taxed too high, might be relieved, if he informed of another richer than himself. This last had liberty to oppose and offer to change Estates with the Informer, who, in that case, must either pay the Tax, or accept the Exchange. These Disputes spent a great deal of time, which *Philip* knew how to make Advantage of. The *Athenian* Army always took the Field too late; and tho' they every time found the Inconvenience of their Backwardness, they would not be corrected by Experience itself. Traitors and Flatterers were perpetually crying out, that all *Philip's* Designs were only against the Barbarians; that he would never try his Strength with the *Athenians*, whose Power and Courage he dreaded; that his insatiable Ambition was their Security, by the great number of new Enemies it every Day created him. That however, with the least Effort, they could bring him to reason, and that Fortune, their never-failing help, would not desert them in time of need. A People, already too presumptuous, fed themselves with these vain Hopes, and blindly followed their treacherous Guides, who valued themselves for having, as they pretended, made their Pleasure and Repose consist with their Honour and Reputation.

* Xenoph. Dion. Demosth. 1. Phil. Isoc. Orat. upon the Exchange.

Demosthenes, alone uncorruptible, and as such, by *Philip's* own Confession, the only Man who had reason not to fear him *, was necessitated to combat the natural Effeminacy of the *Athenians*; to surmount haughty mutinous Spirits, and a Prejudice fortify'd by evil Advice; to contend every Day with the domineering Passion of a free People, a crowd of Governors, seduc'd by the Flattery of Orators, no less pernicious than that of the most obsequious and artful Courtiers. Every Hour was to present the Counterpoison, and force his intractable Patients to swallow down his unpleasant Physick; to venture at odious and disagreeable Predictions; to recal the Images of past Dangers and Revolutions; in short, in the midst of a thousand scoffers, and applauded Opposers, to talk of nothing but Whips and Chains, and whatever else slavery has of Melancholy and Frightfulness.

This Zeal, in its highest Transports, was notwithstanding discreet and regular. Man, of himself inclin'd to give a loose, is by Order curb'd and restrain'd: he that passionately endeavours to reform him, makes him revolt; and a too obstinate

* As one was reading to *Philip* an Oration *Demosthenes* had spoken against him, at which *Parmenio* was very much displeased, Let us, said *Philip*, permit this Orator to speak freely against us, since he is in our Pay, though I had rather hire him than the best Officer in my Household; for he is the Man that breaks my Designs, and defeats all my Undertakings. *Lucian* in his *Commendations* of *Demosthenes*.

Severity, instead of doing service to the State, establishes those Disorders it labours to remove. Hence *Cato*, who deserv'd a better Age than that wherein he liv'd, *Cato*, I say, with the best Intentions in the World, with an admirable Constancy, and an unshaken Fidelity, rendred his Virtues useles to his Country, and had the Misfortune more than once to prejudice the Commonwealth, for want of making a just Distinction betwixt the Easiness of Speculation, and the Difficulty of Practice; or, to explain myself according to the Oracle of those times, by speaking in the degenerate State of *Rome*, as if he had lived in the Commonwealth of *Plato* *. *Demosthenes*, 'tis true, at first opposes, and openly condemns all Abuses; but when he finds his Reproaches cannot reclaim, but exasperate them, he turns, and grows more compliant than that noble *Roman* was; he yields somewhat to the People's Humour, and prudently connives at what he cannot correct. The skilful Physician has a regard to the Strength of his Patient, and is cautious of recurring to violent Remedies; he asswages and softens the sharp Humours, and takes care not to irritate and provoke 'em: So the able Politician searches the Wounds of the State, and cuts not off the Limb, till he despairs to cure the Gangrene †.

* Ille optimo animo utens, summa fide nocet interdum Reipublicæ, dicit enim tanquam in *Platonis* *πολιτεία*, non tanquam in *face Romuli*, sententiam. *Cic. l. 2. Ep. ad Attic.*

† Non minus est probanda Medicina quæ sanaret vitiosas partes Reipublicæ, quam quæ exsecaret, *Cic. ib.*

This Prudence temper'd the Severity of our Oration; and those Soothings, which that suggested, make him seem to differ sometimes in what he professes to reform. For having detested the squandering of those Funds design'd for the War, he seems after to approve it, when he says, the Revenues of the State could not be better employed, than in supporting the poorer Citizens, and retrieving them from a Misery, that was a Dishonour to the Government. His Condescension aim'd only at the Publick Good. He consented to these sorts of Distributions, provided the Citizens, who were to receive 'em, list'd themselves by turns in the Army, and the Money were apply'd to the Relief of the Indigent, rather than the Maintenance of the Idle. The Republick by this means would gain more than she lost, have an Army on foot of her own Subjects, and disband all her foreign Troops; a sort of Soldiers that make a mercenary Trade of Honour, and sell their Friendship, and their Hated, to the highest Bidder*.

This just Medium, which *Demosthenes* observ'd betwixt Rigor and Condescension, gave him, among his Citizens, the Preference to all his Collegues, and an Esteem that was proof against the most unlucky Accidents. This giddy, unsettled, People, not to punish their own Miscarriages and Negligence in the Persons of those, whose Projects had certainly succeeded, but for their dilatory Execu-

* *Isocrates* calls 'em the common Friends, and common Enemies of Mankind.

tion, acquitted, and rewarded, *Demosthenes* in the midst of a publick Calamity, and at a time when the Event, by which unsuccessful Councils are always judged, would have condemned him *. After the Loss of a Battel † ventured upon his word, at an Instant wherein the whole City, in the greatest Consternation and Despair, imagin'd they saw the Conqueror already at their Gates; and the Enemies of this Great Man expected every moment, the enraged People would tear him to pieces; *Demosthenes* then saw himself crowned with Honour, and proclaim'd Father of his Country. So much did the *Athenians*, convinc'd of his Capacity, Zeal, and Integrity, acknowledge themselves in fault for not having sooner, and intirely yielded to his Advice; and confess themselves the only Authors of their Misfortune. In short, he wanted no Talent fit for Government: His Speeches, and the History of his time, teach us, how far his Sagacity and his Vigilance extended; how exact he was in computing the Forces, either of his own Country, or those of his Enemy; how attentive in discerning present Conjunctures; how ready in taking Precautions; how quick in inventing Redresses; and in a word, how much Master of every thing that makes a perfect Politician. His last Attempt to restore the Liberty of *Greece* has something more no-

* Demades in *Arist. Rhet.* l. 2. c. 24. lays his Accusation of *Demosthenes* upon this Bottom.

† That of *Cheronæa*, the third Year of the 110th *Olympiad*.

ble in it than all the rest. 'Twas not then *Philip*, Conqueror at *Cheronæa*, before whom all *Athens* bowed, and to whom all *Greece* submitted, except the invincible Soul of *Demosthenes*; but 'twas *Alexander*, and *Alexander* already triumphing in *Asia*, whom this zealous Republican attempts to drive out of *Europe*: the Man, of whom the World stood in awe, could not silence this Orator. *Demosthenes*, tho' then an Exile, and unable to act by himself, raises up his Scholar *Leosthenes* *. This last, full of his Master's Thoughts, and Instructions, drew together the Soldiers *Alexander* had disbanded, and plac'd himself at their Head. The principal Cities of *Greece*, enrag'd to see, that, in contempt of their Laws, this Monarch was resolv'd to restore whom they had banish'd, favour'd the Revolt. The *Athenians*, who, during *Alexander's* Life, fomented it only under-hand, after his Death, declared themselves openly for it, and sent their Ambassadors over all *Greece*. *Demosthenes*, though an Exile, embrac'd the Cause, and went from City to City, exhorting the People to throw off the Yoke. The Eloquence of such an Agent had its Effect. The *Ætolians*, *Thessalians*, *Phoceans*, *Thracians*, *Illyrians*, the People of *Argos*, *Messene*, and *Sicyon*, together with several others, embrac'd the Cause, and chose *Leosthenes* General of the Confederacy. This General, a Man of Sense, and Courage, defeated the Enemy, and seized upon the Streights of *Thermopylæ*; thence he advanc'd into *Thessaly*, de-

* Diod. Plut. Suid.

feated *Antipater*, Viceroy of *Macedonia* *, and besieged him in *Lamia*, which he had taken, had he not been unfortunately killed by a Stone as he was visiting the Works, and thereby overthrew all the Hopes of the Allies †. After this, *Antipater* made an easy Market of the *Grecians*: every one strove who should first prevent his Anger, by a ready Submission. But to the *Athenians* he deny'd any Peace, unless they would deliver up ten of their Orators he should choose, among which he was sure not to forget *Demosthenes*. He, whom his Countrymen had in the like case deny'd upon the most vehement Threats of *Alexander* ‡, found not in them now the same Disposition, and therefore resolv'd to spare them the Dishonour of that Baseness. He escap'd into *Calabria*, an obscure Island, till it was honour'd by his Death §, and fled for Refuge into the Temple of *Neptune*. There encompass'd by *Antipater's* Guards, who pressed him to

* *Alexander had left him there with 12000 Foot, and 2500 Horse. Plut. in Alex. Strab. l. 15. Zon. l. 1.*

† *Diod. Plut. Suid. Antisthenes succeeded Leosthenes, a brave Man, and a great General.*

‡ *When Alexander declar'd he would never pardon the Athenians, unless Demosthenes, and ten other of their Citizens, were delivered up to him, Demosthenes told 'em very coolly, that once upon a time the Wolves proposed to make a Peace with the Sheep, provided they deliver'd up to 'em the Shepherd's Dog.*

§ *In Trezenio sinu est insula inter ignobiles insulas letho Demosthenis nobilis. Pomp. Mela. l. 2. c. 7. Strab. l. 8. Pausan. in Att. & Cor.*

trust to their Master's Clemency, *It shall never be said*, reply'd he, *that I owe any thing to the Tyrant of my Country*; and immediately drank poison ||, more pleasant, as he thought, than Servitude. Thus dy'd *Demosthenes* *, 60 Years of Age, whose Memory the *Athenians* honoured with a Statue, with Inscriptions, and divers Privileges † granted to his Posterity, and by a thousand other Marks of a uselefs Acknowledgment, little better than Ingratitude; for the more they express'd their Sorrow for losing him, the more they confess'd their Fault in suffering him to be lost.

We have sufficiently consider'd him as a Citizen, and a Statesman; let us now examine him as an Orator. Few are ignorant to what an height he carry'd the Power of Speaking: His Eloquence rais'd him a sort of Throne, and in him fix'd the Hearts of a Republick, whose Inconstancy made her call'd a Prostitute; and wherein an eminent Virtue, tho' modest, a conspicuous Merit, tho' uselefs, were look'd on as Crimes of State. ‡ The

|| *He always carry'd Poison in a Quill, to make use of upon occasion.*

* *The same Year with Aristotle, his Elder by three Years, the third Year of the 114th Olympiad. Lucian in Laud. Demosth.) tells us that as soon as Demosthenes felt the Poison work, he said to Archias, Captain of Antipater's Guards, Thou may'st carry my Corps to thy Master; but as for Demosthenes, he is out of thy Reach.*

† Plut. & Suid.

‡ Corn. Nep. in Arist.

Surname of Just, Fortunate, or Invincible, given to a private Person, offended these jealous, suspicious Spirits. They never pardon'd him, who served them with Virtues that made him worthy to Command: They often deprived themselves of real Advantages, to shun an imagin'd Evil.

Miltiades, and his Son *Cimon*, submitted to Judgments, that were most dishonourable to their Judges. The Rigour of the *Ostracism* * was seldom put in Execution, but out of a Caprice. This sort of Exile seem'd design'd rather to quiet the Diffident and Malicious, than to punish the Guilty. There can hardly be any other Reason given, why *Themistocles*, *Conon*, *Timotheus*, *Iphicrates* and † *Chabrias* chose to reside in foreign Parts. To say nothing of *Alcibiades*, who, though a Disciple of *Socrates*, was very unworthy so great a Master. Nor were they in the wrong when they banish'd him, of whom *Timon* the Man-hater said; *I love nothing so much as Alcibiades; for I know no Athenian more fit to set Athens in a Combustion*. But for one just Sentence, or well founded Suspicion, there were a thousand unjust, and on groundless

* *A Sentence, by which those, whose Greatness grew suspected to the Athenians, stood banished for Ten Years.*

† *Chabrias quod ei licebat plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod tantum se ab invidia putabant absuturos, quantum à conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Themistocles Lesbi, &c. Corn. Nep. in Chab.*

Conjectures. Upon these frequent Ostracisms, a King of *Persia* † said, *I pray the Gods to make my Enemies continually send me their Heroes, and adorn my Court with these illustrious, unfortunate Persons.* They knew well how to fawn on them in time of need, and to employ them in case of Danger: But scarce had they saved the State, when they were treated as dangerous themselves, or at least useless. This base Proceeding, (which is but too much perpetrated, to the Dishonour of Mankind) so touched *Themistocles*, that, in the heat of a just and generous Resentment, to see himself totally laid aside after the Peace, he could not forbear comparing himself to those great Trees in open Campaign, which are only then minded, when People have Occasion to fly to them for shelter against a Storm. The *Orators* lived still in a more terrible Subjection; they had almost as many Masters as *Athens* had Citizens. This *Diogenes* objected very pleasantly to *Demosthenes*, who refused to dine with him in a very poor Eating-house: || *Why are you so nice?* said the *Cynic*, *you scorn to be seen with me in a Place where some of your Masters are to be found every Hour in the Day.* And yet these Masters, whatever *Diogenes* says, suffered themselves to be governed by *Demosthenes*. The high Opinion they had of him kept 'em in order: Nor were they prevail'd upon to banish him, but in a time full of

† Artaxerxes Longimanus.

|| *Æl. Var. Hist.* l. 6. c. 19.

Trouble and Confusion *. Envy herself, that never ceases to persecute Virtue, repented her having once attack'd a Man so necessary; who in his Exile sought no other Revenge but that of new Services, and apply'd himself continually to save his ungrateful Countrymen. Excepting this only Instance, he was the constant Oracle of *Athens*. She had no other Will but his; he persuaded and dissuaded with an equal Facility. He managed these intractable Spirits, and, as it were by Enchantment, turn'd 'em which way he pleas'd. Not that in his Discourses he affected always to be admir'd, to heap together abundance of Figures, to make fine Periods, or seek far-fetch'd Thoughts; to use extravagant and unnatural Expressions, such as might deserve the Name of Monstrous, which *Æschines* † gave them, not out of Judgment, but personal Quarrel and Envy, being his Rival in the Profession. This was not the Language of *Demosthenes*; he first thinks, and then arises to a sort of Inspiration: The Fire of his Imagination, and Height of his Genius, despise Elegancy of Stile. An Energy of Thought, peculiar to himself, makes his

* The 2d Year of the 113th Olympiad, three Years before Alexander's Death, Demosthenes was accused for having betrayed his Trust in the behalf of one Harpalus, whom Alexander upon his Indian Expedition left Governor of Babylon; and who afterwards being convicted of several Misdemeanors, fled to Athens for Refuge; from whence Olympias and Antipater demanded him. Phot. in Demosth.

† Contr. Ctesiph.

Character, and sets him above all others. His Discourse is a Series of Inductions, Consequences, and Demonstrations form'd by Common-sense. His Reasoning, whose Force continually augments, mounts by degrees, and with Speed gains the Point he drives at. He scorns to creep into the Minds of his Auditors; he attacks 'em openly, presses them home, and at last forces them to yield. But in this his Auditor is so far from being ashamed of his Defeat, that he finds a Pleasure in giving way to Reason. * *Isocrates*, saith *Philip*, *fences with a Foil*; but *Demosthenes fights with a Sword*. I had almost said, he knocks us down with a Club. One may make some Answer to other Orators, but none to him. He lays down such Rules, such Principles, that their Evidence strikes with equal Certainty upon all Men. He builds upon simple and natural Ideas, which only have the Power to persuade and convince. For that Persuasion, that arises from the Regard we have to the Thoughts of other Men, only glances upon the Mind; but that inward Conviction, which is framed from the Sentiments arising in our selves, takes an absolute Possession of the Soul. As soon as the Auditor finds his own Reflexions the same with those of the Orator, when he conceives, thinks, and judges like him, he can no longer refuse his Attention, nor his Assent. Now 'twas natural for those, who heard *Demosthenes*, to find them-

* *Dionys. Halicarn. in Isæo. Liban. in Demosth. ut. Suid. Phot.*

selves thus disposed. Full of those free and generous Inclinations which bear up the Mind against the Corruptions of the Times, and will not allow her to suffer them, he boldly gives the wisest Counsel, with an Assurance, which false Virtue could not imitate. One might discern the Man who had no other Enemies but those of the State; no other Passion but love for Order and Justice; who pretended not to Impose, but to Instruct; was not desirous to Please, but to do Service; seeks no Ornaments, but what arise naturally from his Subject; nor uses any Flowers, but those he meets with in his way. But one may say he aims at nothing but to be understood; and that, without design, he makes himself admired. Not that he was void of Beauties, but they were severe, and agreeable to that Plainness and Freedom he profess'd. In him Truth appears without Paint; he scorns to render her effeminate, on pretence to make her beautiful; nor allows of those Arts that would disguise her, that she may not be frightful. He never dissembles, but to conceal his own Virtues and Services; and that without Ostentation or Reflexion. He neither makes show of, nor has Regard to himself: He only regards and makes appear the Business in Hand; and that Business is always either the Safety or Advantage of his Country. In the second Period, and very often in the first, he enters upon the Matter, and points out the only Difficulty. He leaves to vulgar Orators their Exordiums, and their Preambles. He supposes you to look into his Soul, and holds it needless to bespeak your Good-will, which an honest Man thinks

thinks he deserves, and may be sure of. This Uprightness and Sincerity of Intention fills him with a noble Confidence, and make him speak to his Masters, not so much with the Liberty of one Friend to another, as with the Authority of a Father to his Children. On the other side, the Method he proposes himself restrains and confines him to a very narrow Compass, and obliges him to turn perpetually within the Compass of a few Customs and Accidents *. He is no Declaimer, who diverts himself at Random, on imagined Subjects; nor, according to the false Reproach of his Enemies, is more concern'd for the Cadence of a Period, than the Fall of a Republick: But a true Orator, whose indefatigable Zeal is ever employ'd to awaken the Lethargick, confirm the Fearful, terrify the Presumptuous, rouse the Voluptuous, who would neither serve their Country, nor pay those that do: In fine; to new mould a People, who made no other use of their Liberty, and their Power, but to free themselves from all the Restraints of Reason. Those Abuses, that afford Pleasure instead of Labour, meet with powerful Protectors; especially in a State where every particular Person has a share in the Supreme Authority; and where often the People, only to shew that they may do what they please, will not be persuaded to do what they ought. That of *Athens*, especially, did but practise the excellent Precept of one of her wise Men; *That the readiest and surest way to get rid of censurers, is to correct our selves* †.

* *Æsch. contr. Ctesiph.* † *Plat. in the Apol. for Socr.*
Who-

Whoever should propose the repealing of a Law § that was pleasing, tho' never so Destructive, ran the hazard of a Capital Punishment. If any Man could not with Patience behold the fall and ruin of his Country, but had the Courage to endeavour to prevent it, Death was usually the Reward of the best Council, and the most worthy Action. Thus the most fatal Disorders in Peace acquired Authority by Time, which gains no less Respect to ill Customs than to good. And what Reformation must it be, that a Man shall love better than his Life? Let his Enemies therefore upbraid *Demosthenes* as much as they please, for having taken the Alarm, and thrown away his Arms upon a Defeat †; he confesses it himself *, and therefore I acquit and esteem him. For if I may be allowed to give my Opinion in matters out of my Sphere, I should say, that, next to Valour itself, I know nothing more brave, than to acknowledge one's Weakness. Besides, to reason truly upon this Occasion, Courage it self, as well as Success, is not always in our Power: Or rather, there are several sorts of Valour, which seldom meet in the same Person. 'Tis not every Man, who runs to Death, that has Courage to wait the Stroke. One that is fired, and exposes himself in a Battle, turns pale upon an Assault: Another who charges bravely at the Head of a Troop, and is the first

§ It was to be proposed in Writing.

† At Cheronæa the Third Year of the 110th Olympiad.

* *Æsch. contr. Ctesiph.*

in an Encounter, is backward at proposing a single Combat. The Disproportion appears still greater between the Dangers of War, and those of the Pulpit. And yet if they equally expose their Lives, they certainly are Masters of equal Courage. We ought therefore in Justice to compensate the Flight of *Demosthenes*, once drawn on by the Crowd of those who fled also, with the Constancy of the same *Demosthenes*, so often unmoved in the midst of a tumultuous Populace, ready to tear him in pieces. For the Days were past, wherein the readiest way to gain their Love, was to reprove their faults; and in which they gave a Crown to him, who had the Courage † to tell them, That they reasoned like Children; that Success did sometimes attend their Resolutions, only because the Gods delighted in doing Wonders; but at length the same Gods would grow weary of protecting Fools. Their folly increas'd daily, while the Sense of bearing reproach diminished. At last they had no Relish for Declaimers, who debased themselves to the meanest Compliances: No Ear, but for a sort of forwardly Talkers, who stood in awe of a Multitude; ever humourous, often outrageous, and who, according to *Socrates*, revered in general what they despised in Particulars. In a Word, upon Points most important to the safety of the State, it was

† *Aristophanes by this Liberty, which appeared something bold, attain'd the highest Honour a Citizen was capable of, viz. a Crown of the Consecrated Olive, presented in the Citadel.*

absolutely

absolutely necessary, either to hazard one's Life, or to hold one's Tongue.

The Courage, wherewith *Demosthenes* braved the Madness of the People, does not more raise my Wonder and Esteem, than his Constancy to reject the Flatteries of Eloquence, for the good of those, who had the fortune to hear him. Much less an Orator than Patriot, he never ceases to combat the Abuses in Fashion. He pursues the Traitors without Intermision, exposes their Crimes, lays open their Designs, inveighs against the Deluders of the People, those common Plagues of all Ages and Nations, whom he would entirely destroy. Fired with this only Aim, he resolves to conquer the most Obstinate, pursues them with resistless Arms, and Strokes of sure Success. To speak without Figures, he uttered the most distastful Truths, and lest they should not make their Impression, he often employs, and sometimes repeats Word for Word, the same Reasons and Examples he had found most moving and persuasive. This Repetition imprints and ingraves what the first Delivery had only traced out. With this Intent he renews, inculcates, establishes, and quits the Charms of Variety for the Advantages of Persuasion. One cannot discern the necessity of these Repetitions unless one imagine one's self in the place of those to whom they were at first Address'd; and therefore, I fear, unless one could transport one's self to *Athens*, it will not be easy to discern the natural Beauties I have endeavour'd to delineate. To the end, one ought to think and act like the *Athenians* of that Time; to adopt their Sentiments, and the

inclinations; to espouse their Interests, their Quarrels, their Jealousies, their Hopes, and their Fears. Without this, *Demosthenes* will not find in us his first Auditors. But how can we so put off our selves, as to believe in good earnest, we are running the same Dangers, and that we have no greater enemy than *Philip* of *Macedon*? The Mind can never be so imposed on; nor can Fiction, however we yield to it, move so much as Reality. Whilst a Stranger speaks to us in our own Tongue, and says nothing but what is suitable to our own Customs, and our Manners, he insinuates himself easily into our Minds; we readily naturalize him, and make his Sentiments our own. But on the contrary, if, instead of coming to us, we must pass over to him; when he leads us from home and entertains us with Manners, to which we are Strangers; sets before us Customs of ancient Usage, and remote Parts; if he descends into Particularities, from whence he draws Conjectures and Consequences, in which the present *Athenians* would have no concern; whatever Tongue he speaks, he wearies and tires us; and wherever the want of Understanding lies, we are forward to dislike what we cannot easily understand.

I know there is another sort of Readers, who are apt to judge of an Army by the Number of Men only; and, consequently, ready to despise an History that presents 'em with but little Subjects, and wherein the greatest Strength of Policy, and moving Efforts of Eloquence, are employ'd only in bringing into the Field about three or four Thousand Soldiers. But that, which disgusts them, ought rather

rather to raise their Curiosity, and increase their
Admiration. Are great Revolutions nothing, be-
cause a few Hands have brought them to effect?
Has the Glory of the Art of War increas'd with
the Multitude of Warriors that share in the Success?
The *Grecians* were of another Opinion; they va-
lued not the Advantage of Numbers, nor envy'd
the barbarous Nations that Vanity; but, upon good
Experience, despis'd them, as no sufficient Balance
against Valour.

Notwithstanding all this, into whatsoever Hands
Demosthenes shall fall, that diversity of Judgment
(which cannot be avoided while only Men are Judges)
will not take from him that Precedency among
Orators, which the most Judicious of all Antiquity
have unanimously given him, and which he has
peaceably possess'd for so many Ages.





THE FIRST
OLYNTHIAN.

Translated, in 1702,

By the Earl of PETERBOROUGH.

THE ARGUMENT.

Olynthus was a City of Thrace, held by the Greeks, who came from Chalcis, a Town of Eubœa, and an Athenian Colony. The Olynthians had distinguish'd themselves, among the Eubœan Greeks (of whom there were many Cities in Thrace) by their frequent and memorable Wars, both with the Athenians, while they maintain'd the Sovereignty of Greece, and with the Lacedæmonians. At length, they enter'd into an Alliance with Philip King of Macedon, in consideration

consideration of his giving up to them the Town of Anthemus, the Right to which had been matter of dispute between them and Philip, and the Town of Potidea, which that Prince had besieged and taken from the Athenians. In consequence of which Alliance, Philip and the Olynthians made war jointly against the Athenians, and engaged not to lay down their Arms but by mutual Consent. Nevertheless the Olynthians, growing jealous of Philip's increasing Power, and suspecting besides his Sincerity, took the opportunity of his Absence on some Expedition, and clap'd up a separate Peace with the Athenians. That Prince, who had long sought an occasion of breaking with the Olynthians, took this occasion of declaring War against them, as having violated the League, and confederated with his Enemies.

Demosthenes undertook the Cause of the Olynthians, and, in this and the two following Orations, pleads strongly for the sending Succours to Olynthus. He represents, that the Safety of Athens was included in that of Olynthus; that, so long as the Olynthians

were

were safe, Philip cou'd never invade Attica, while the Athenians had it always in their power to attack Macedon by Sea, and carry the War into the Enemy's Country; but that, if Olynthus should fall a Sacrifice to Philip, the way wou'd then be open for his invading the Athenians. And, to keep up the Spirits of his Countrymen, he endeavours to prove, that it was not so difficult to conquer Philip, as was generally thought. He likewise touches upon the Affair of the Public Money, and advises them to transfer the Application of it from the Support of the Theatre to the Maintenance of the Army.

To understand this last Topic, it must be observed, that, antiently, all the People of Athens were admitted gratis into the Theatre, which was not then built of Stone, but of Wood only. And, as the great concourse of People to their public Shews occasion'd frequent Quarrels, and sometimes Bloodshed, the Magistrates, to prevent this Inconvenience for the future, order'd that no one shou'd be admitted without paying two Oboli, or twopence halfpenny. But, that this Regulation might not seem to oppress the Poor, by excluding

cluding them from the Diversions of the Theatre, it was order'd likewise, that each Spectator shou'd receive his two Oboli out of the public Stock. This Custom at length was so abused, that, under pretence of Theatrical Money, almost all the public Treasure was distributed among the People. Hence the Athenians contracted an Aversion to War, whilst the Money, which used to be expended in foreign Expeditions, was now spent at home on Stage-Plays and Festivals. Besides which, it was made capital, by Law, for any one to propose the restoring the Theatrical Money to its original Uses. Demosthenes, therefore, manages this part of his Advice with great Caution.

He likewise considers the Affair of National Troops, and advises the Athenians to send an Army of their own Countrymen into the Field, and not, as usual, assist their Allies with foreign Troops only; to which Practice he ascribes their want of Success in those Expeditions.

I AM persuaded, O Men of *Athens*, nothing can be more agreeable to your Desires at this time, than the Proposal of some Expedient, which may secure a happy Event to the Publick Affairs now under Deliberation. They therefore, who are ready to give their Opinions upon this Occasion, may expect a favourable Hearing, whether they lay before you such Thoughts as are well weigh'd and digested, or such as offer themselves upon the spot, and arise from the course of your Debates: for nothing is more likely to direct to a right Choice, than the exposing to your view variety of Prospects, and offering many Expedients to your Consideration. The present Opportunity, *Athenians*, calls upon you, and tells you, this is the Time effectually to provide for the Safety of your Allies, if you have any regard to your own safety. But so far am I from knowing whether you incline to follow the Advice, that I doubt whether you are dispos'd to hear it you ought: but this I know, it will not be sufficient, that you resolve upon a War

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(to avoid those Mistakes, which have already cost you so dear) tho' you Arm with the utmost diligence for the Relief of the *Olynthians*; you must at the same time take this farther care, that they be speedily acquainted with your Resolutions and Preparations, and that the Presence of your Embassadors may give them Courage from the Expectation of your Succours. I fear, if this be neglected, the cunning King of *Macedon*, so well instructed in all the Arts of managing Opportunities, he who knows so well when to recede, and when to push his Advantages, and whose Threats alone are to be depended upon; this Prince, I fear, may impute as a Crime to your Allies the very Measures you take for their Relief, because they are so disproportionate and slow; and by turning himself every way, and into every shape, he may frustrate the Hopes you entertain from the present Posture of Affairs.

However, this Encouragement you have given the *Athenians*, That the very Power of your Enemy, which appears so formidable, gives you a prospect of Success. It must be considered that

feels'd to be no small Advantage to *Philip*, towards his Conquests, that he can impart or conceal his Secrets as he thinks fit, that he can unite in Himself the Sovereign and the General, and, at the same time, be the sole Disposer of his Treasures; and that he can give Life and Vigour by his Presence to all his military Operations. This enables him, I confess, to form and put in Execution those speedy and just Measures, which secure Success to great Enterprizes: but when these Advantages, which make it so easy for him to conquer, are the strongest Obstacles to the Treaty, which he wou'd willingly conclude with the *Olynthians*; they leave no room in the Hearts of the People for that Trust and Confidence, which he would only make use of to betray them. They see plainly, they do not take up Arms for the sake of Glory, or to have some part of their Dominions; but are convinc'd, the War is necessary to prevent the total Ruin of their Country, and the eternal Loss of Liberty. They are not ignorant, how he reward-
ed those, who treacherously open'd to him

the Gates of *Amphipolis* and *Pydna* *. In a word, what can give more just Suspicions to a Commonwealth, than the too near Neighbourhood of a potent Monarchy?

These Considerations, and many others, justify me, O Men of *Athens*, when I take upon me to tell you, now or never you must turn your Thoughts entirely to War; now you must rouse your Spirits; now you must Sacrifice, with pleasure, part of your Estates, to secure the rest: In short, you must be wanting to yourselves in nothing that may be requisite to the common Safety. Have you any reason, or the least pretence, to be excused from so doing? What have you more earnestly desir'd, than a difference betwixt *Philip* and the *Olynthians*? What, by the general Voice of the People, ought to

* He was no sooner admitted into *Amphipolis*, than he put to death those who had given up the City, saying, If they have been false to their own Countrymen, much less will they be faithful to me. --- As for the Betrayers of *Pydna*, hearing that *Philip* intended to treat them with Severity, they fled into the Temple call'd *Amyntium*, dedicated to *Amyntas* the Father of *Philip*; from whence being drag'd by force, they were all put to death.

have been purchas'd at any rate, that Fortune alone hath brought about, and given a turn to Affairs highly to your Advantage. For, if they had engag'd in a War, by your Persuasions, against the common Enemy; if they had only espous'd your Interest; an Animosity, inspir'd by others, might perhaps have cool'd, and they might have been less resolute in a Quarrel, they wou'd not have look'd upon as their own. But now, when united to you by a self-interested Revenge against *Philip*, when confederated with you by a Resentment, which the bloody Injuries, receiv'd from him, have created, and must continue, what fear is there they should ever go back? No, this Alliance must be cemented for ever by their Apprehensions, and by their Resentments. Let us make use then of this Advantage, so long desir'd; and speedily lay hold of these happy Moments, made precious by the loss of so many Opportunities.

Can that Day be remember'd with sufficient Regret, when, entirely forgetting your own Interest, after the *Eubæan* Expedition,

tion *, you rejected the Offers of *Hierax* and *Stratocles*, Embassadors from *Amphipolis*? who, from the Place from whence I speak, us'd their utmost Solicitations, only in order to put their City into your Hands: nevertheless you were deaf and inexorable. Then you might have been Masters of *Amphipolis*, if you would have been as kind to yourselves as to the *Eubœans*, and as warm in your own Interest as you had been in theirs: Then, only by accepting the offer'd Advantage, you might have prevented all those Mischiefs, which have follow'd your Refusal. In what a fatal Tranquillity did you remain, when you receiv'd the news of the Sieges of *Pydna*, *Potidea*, *Metbone*, and *Pagassæ*, and other Places, which I omit naming, to avoid the odious Recital! You are now sufficiently punish'd by the Consequences of your Insensibility; for, had you sent speedy Relief to the first of those

* *The Thebans, having defeated the Lacedemonians at Leuctra, march'd into Eubœa, intending, after the Conquest of that Island, to invade Attica. But the Athenians so powerfully assisted the Eubœans, that the Thebans were defeated, and obliged to retire.*

Places, when besieg'd, as the common Rules of Prudence and Policy requir'd, at this Day you wou'd have found *Philip* more gentle and complying; but, by perpetually neglecting the present, and vainly hoping that time wou'd adjust Matters, and bring them to a better Issue, you have rais'd that Prince to such a pitch of Glory, you have establish'd him in that high degree of Power, that no King of *Macedon* cou'd ever hope to have arrived at. And yet you need not despair, if you have Courage enough to make use of the present Opportunity, the *Olynthians* offer you, which restores the probability of those Advantages, you have so often neglected. Who can pretend not to see the particular Protection of the Gods in blessings so often offer'd? And if we make just Estimate of the repeated Favours of heav'n, what Soul but must be touch'd with the highest Gratitude? For, to what can we impute our Losses, but to the little Concern we have shew'd to prevent them; while a superior Power, never ceasing to protect us, does yet point out a short and secure way of repairing all our former Mistakes, by ac-

cepting the Alliances which are now propos'd, and has given us this farther Opportunity of providing for our Safety, and retrieving our Reputation, after having so long deferr'd our Ruin?

But we may compare the right use of favourable Conjunctions to the proper use of Riches. As the frugal Man, who knows both how to enjoy and to secure his Wealth, is sensible of the Favours of Fortune, while the wastful Prodigal loses at once his Gratitude and Estate; so those, who neglect and do not improve the favourable Opportunities offer'd by the Gods, forget the Acknowledgments that are due to them; and the same Imprudence, which makes them unfortunate, makes them ungrateful; for, commonly, in the Minds of Men, the last Accident qualifies all the rest, and impresses the Character of Misfortune, on Happiness, upon the whole.

It is time, *Athenians*, to reform our false way of Reasoning, and our more extravagant way of Acting: Let us preserve what remains, to prevent an eternal Stain upon our Reputation. Nor is our Interest less at

Stake:

Stake: If you dismiss those, who now solicit you, as you did the Embassadors from *Amphipolis*, if you suffer the *Olynthians* to be ruin'd, you assist your greatest Enemy, and put it in his Power to carry his successful Arms wherever he pleases. What Barrier shall secure you from the Conqueror of *Olynthus*? Will none of you, *Athenians*, look back to his inconsiderable Rise? Will none of you consider the rapid and surprising Progress of his Arms? First *Amphipolis* is taken; then *Pydna*; he next surprizes *Potidea*; then makes himself Master of *Methone*; from thence he falls upon *Thessaly*; *Pherea*, *Magnesia*, *Pagasaë*, own his Power; and *Thrace* is the next Object of his Ambition: There he seizes and breaks Scepters at his will; and, out of the Ruins of Governments overthrown, and Kingdoms divided, he erects new Monarchies at Pleasure. At last, a Disease gives some small stop to his Progress; but hardly is he restor'd to Health, when his natural Disposition prevails; and, without the least intermission to his Arms, he attacks the *Olynthians* with the utmost Fury. I shall

say nothing of his Attempts against the *Peonians*, the *Illyrians*, and against *Arymbas* *. It may be ask'd, perhaps, why I have mention'd so many of them, and to what purpose this disagreeable recital of his Exploits? It is to convince you, to make you sensible, if possible, both how remiss you have been in suffering these Encroachments upon your Neighbours, and how restless and enterprizing an Enemy you have to deal with, who, great as he is, is still aiming to be greater, and can set no Bounds to his Ambition.

Consider in time, what must be the last fatal Scenes of the bloody Tragedy, if, while he acts the part of an indefatigable Conqueror, you remain the patient and gentle Spectators of his unbounded Violence. Are any of our Citizens so weak-sighted, as not to see that the War is hast'ning to them? It must be a voluntary Blindness in those, who will not perceive, that the Calamities, the *Olynthians* now endure, are the very

* He was King of the *Molossi*, and Uncle of *Olympias*, Philip's Wife.

same that are preparing for themselves. I fear, *Athenians*, you will, at last, meet the same Fate, which attends those Borrowers, who, if they can procure the Money they want, never consider the Interest they must pay : The ancient Patrimony and Estate is soon consum'd by such idle Prodigals, and their short-liv'd Abundance brings them headlong into a tedious Poverty. I fear, you will, some time or other, pay the like destructive Reckoning for those soft and easy Moments you now enjoy, thro' the fatal Remissness of your present Disposition.

I shall be told, perhaps, how easy it is to find fault ; that censuring is every Body's Talent ; but that the part of an Orator is to give proper Advice in difficult Conjunctions. They are in the right, who deliver his Opinion : But I should be much in the wrong, if I were not fully convinc'd, that it is much more dangerous to undertake a reformation of Miscarriages, than to commit them. When Success does not answer our Expectations, your Anger does not discharge itself upon those, who are the

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Authors of your Disappointment ; but he, who spoke last, bears the weight of unsuccessful Events. It is now my turn to be placed on this Station ; but I can never betray my own Judgment ; and, happen what will, my private Safety shall always be sacrificed to the Publick Good.

Upon the whole, my Opinion is, that, taking into Consideration the Interest of the *Olynthians*, and your own, you are oblig'd to attempt their Relief two several ways. Your Army must march directly to *Olynthus* ; and, at the same time, with your Fleet you must make a Descent upon the *Macedonians*. I should distrust the Event, if either of these Attempts were made alone. Do you think a Descent sufficient ? *Philip* will continue his Enterprizes, and, exposing for some few Days a corner of his Country to your Injuncts, will soon return in Triumph to repel the Invasion. Are you content with sending Succours to *Olynthus* ? *Philip* will press the Siege, and, being in no care about his own Country, by his obstinate Attacks will force the Town to a Surrender. If my Opinion can prevail, let our Army be divided into

two Bodies, strong enough to act separately, and both with success. If the difficulty lies in the expence of your Preparations, and the pay of your Troops, are you not, O Men of *Athens*, better provided than any others? Have you not better Funds, than any People of *Greece*, to carry on the War? But you are obstinately bent to divert them to other uses; and you make no scruple to dispose of them to less noble Ends. Will you give back these Revenues to your Troops? then you will have nothing more to look for: But if this cannot be obtained, try if you can provide other Supplies; tho' it will not be answerable that such can be found as will not prove deficient.

It will presently be ask'd me, What? would you have a Law to resume all those Funds formerly destin'd to the War? No, surely: I shall not be guilty of so great a Mistake: I only say, that you must levy on your Troops; that those Funds were appropriated for their Pay; that Pay is the Soldiers due; that Rewards and Duty are inseparable; and that, if your Recompence be not ready, it is vain to expect their Service. But you,

Albe-

Athenians, without any scruple, can allot to your selves the Publick Money, and, abandon'd to a most shameful Idleness, can spend it in Revelling and Pleasure. You may dispute, if you please, of the proportion of the Tax, more or less, as the necessity of the State requires; but no Man can pretend to expect any Relief under our present Difficulties, but from a general Imposition: A Fund must be establish'd; and such is the indispenfible Necessity of the thing, that, without it, you can do nothing. Let others, if they please, contrive Expedients for supplying your Military Expence; and do you choose the best which they offer: But while there is yet time to do something, suffer not yourselves to be frightened by the first view of Things: Observe them nearer, and you will find them otherwise than they appear to be, and that the present Situation of Affairs, more than ever, gives you Encouragment to undertake a War.

Philip began not this War with an expectation of carrying it on: He flattered himself, that his first appearance in the Field wou'd secure him Submission. The Olynthian

Thians have deceiv'd his Expectations; their obstinate and unexpected Resistance has disconcerted his Measures: His Disappointment and Disorder increase by the Disposition of the *Theſſalians*; and he is like to experience their known and natural Perfidiousness. They are resolved to re-demand *Pagassæ* *; they will not suffer him to fortify *Magnesia*; and may prove as faithless to him as to the rest of Mankind †. There is a Report they have stop'd the Payment of several Customs, which he us'd to receive. They wou'd be excusable indeed, if their Inconstancy were always properly shewn; for surely they have as good a Right, as *Philip*, to the Revenues arising from *Theſſaly*. When these Supplies are wanting, he will hardly be able to support his foreign Troops; and can it be

* One Alevas, a *Theſſalian*, descended from *Hercules*, usurp'd the Kingdom of *Theſſaly*, and left it to his Children. The *Theſſalians*, grown weary of this Tyranny, applied for Succour to *Philip*, who drove out the Family of the Alevadæ, and restored the *Theſſalians* to their Liberty. In return for which Service done them, they put him in Possession of *Pagassæ*, together with the Customs and Duties paid on Merchandises in that Town.

† The *Theſſalians* were faithless to a Proverb.

doubted,

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doubted, but that all People prefer being govern'd by their own Laws before being in subjection to others? The *Pæonians*, the *Illyrians* will agree, with the whole Race of Mankind, in this, that Liberty is preferable to Slavery.

This Prince has a Character of Haughtiness, which I am apt to believe he deserves. How can people, who have known the happiness of Independance, lose it, without Regret, under the Discipline of so severe a Master? His prosperous Successes persuade him he need keep no Measures with Mankind; and a happy Temerity encourages that enterprizing Humour, which is not always attended with Prudence. Those, who believe they know how to acquire, do not always take the Measures most proper to secure their Acquisitions.

This, *Athenians*, lay down for a Maxim whenever This Prince meets with a great Disappointment, That Juncture is your lucky Hour, which you shou'd improve to the utmost. Send then your Embassadors wherever your Interest requires them; send in Person with your Troops; encourage the People

People by your Example; and set up the Standard of Liberty.

Take it for granted, in the like Circumstances *Philip* wou'd never spare you; if he had the lucky Opportunity of a War upon your Frontiers, with what fury would he fall upon the *Athenians*! and will you not, when you have it in your Power, venture to do that against him, which he would never want the Heart to attempt against you, were there a fair Occasion? Remember, *Athenians*, you have now in your Choice, which of the two shall be upon the Defensive, whether you will, to Day, carry the War into *Macedonia*, or expect To-morrow, in *Attica*. You have it in your Power to ravage the Enemy's Country, and secure the peaceable Possession of your own. If *Philip* be once Master of *Olynthus*, his next Visit is to you; and who shall hinder him? Shall the *Thebans* stop his Progress? who knows, but, in their resentments against you, they may even prevent his Solicitations? Shall the *Phoceans*, who dare not think of defending themselves without your Support? and whence have

have you any other hope of an Opposition to him? Perhaps, at that time, *Philip* may not think of the *Athenians*: but from whence this Thought? Is it because the *Athenians* do not now think of themselves? what idle Expectations, when the fair Occasion, and the inviting Facility, wou'd encourage the most moderate and unattempting Person! Will those great Designs be laid aside, which he is ever meditating, and which, with an indiscreet Confidence, he cannot forbear to publish in all places? Surely, you are not now to learn the difference between attacking *Philip*, and expecting his Invasion. Deceive not yourselves; were your own Troops, without any Prejudice from the Enemy, to encamp some time in *Attica*, and to be maintain'd from thence the Damages, the Country wou'd sustain by them alone, you wou'd willingly repair at the Price of the late War*: but when even the dismal Scene is to be play'd at your own Gates, and your Country proves the bloody Theatre of War, what Devastations, what

* *The War of Amphipolis, which cost the Athenians 1200 Talents.*

affronts must you expect, attended with the highest Infamy! Such Infamy, as great Men wou'd account the heaviest Aggravation of their Ruin!

Are not these Motives strong enough to incite you, without delay, to send Succours to the *Olynthians*, and keep the War at a distance? Shou'd not the Rich concur in these Measures, which, for a small Contribution, may preserve to them a quiet Possession of their Wealth? Shou'd not the young applaud them, and desire to learn that Art of War, at *Philip's* Cost, in an enemy's Country, by which they may be able to defend their own? Shou'd not those, who give Advice, encourage such Measures, may render them safe in the Success of their Counsels? Fools indeed, if they do not expect, in all Events, the same Usage from you, which you receive from Fortune. May we all, by doing in our several Stations what we ought, conspire with her to the publick Good!





THE SECOND OLYNTHIAN*.

Translated, in 1744.

THE ARGUMENT.

The Athenians had received an Embassy from the Olynthians, and had come to a Resolution of assisting them, but deferred the Expedition thro' fear lest it should engage them in a difficult War with Philip. Demosthenes in this Oration, endeavours to encourage the People, chiefly, by representing to them the Weakness and declining Condition of the Macedonian Power.

 HE Favour of the Gods towards this State, O Men of Athens, was never, in my Opinion, more discernible, than in the present Juncture of Affairs.

* In the Edition of part of these Orationes, published in 1702, the Third Olynthian, translated by Lord Lansdowne.

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airs. For nothing less than the hand of Heaven itself cou'd raise up such Enemies against *Philip*, as not only are his Neighbours, and powerful enough to resist him, but (which is the most fortunate Circumstance of all) who look upon all Treaties of Peace with him, not only as insecure, but even pernicious to their Country. It becometh us, therefore, O Men of *Athens*, not to be wanting to ourselves in this Conjunction. For what Disgrace, yea, what Infamy shall we not bring upon ourselves, if we now desert, not only the Towns and Places we were once Masters of, but the very Alliances and Opportunities Fortune has thrown into our Hands!

It is not my Design, O Men of *Athens*, to set before you a Recital of *Philip's* Power, but to exhort you, from that Consideration, to the discharge of your Duty. And my Reason is, because, whatever is said upon

one, is printed as the Second; and that printed as Third is, in reality, the same with Lord Lansdowne's; that, by some mistake, there were two Translations of the Third Olynthian, and ne'er a one of the Second; which is here supply'd.

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that Subject, as it must tend in some measure to *Philip's* Praise, so it will reflect some Disgrace on our own Conduct. For in proportion as *Philip's* great Actions render him the Admiration of all Men, your own Misconduct exposes you to the Contempt of all Men. On this head, therefore I will be silent. For, O Men of *Alban* whoever considers the matter right, will easily perceive, that *Philip* is not indebted to himself alone for his present Greatness. I shall not tell you, how far he is obliged to those, who have managed our Affairs as they had consulted only his Interest; and whom certainly you ought to punish. But it shall be my business, at this time, *Albanians*, to put you in mind of some other things, which it may be greatly to your Advantage to be inform'd of, and which upon a fair Enquiry, will be found to reflect no small Dishonour on *Philip's* Character.

To call him treacherous and perfidious without supporting the Accusation by Facts might justly be thought mere Calumny. But in truth, a very few Words will suffice to set all his Actions in their proper light; and

* PH
thenia
Mace
negotiat
who were
alarm,

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Two very good uses may be made of it: first, to demonstrate, that he is a very bad Man; and, secondly, to convince those, who are alarm'd at his Power, as if it was invincible, that he has already exhausted all those wicked Arts and Stratagems, by which he rose to this height of Power, and that his Affairs are upon the decline. I shou'd entertain as dreadful Apprehensions of *Philip's* Power, as any among you, *Athenians*, if I saw it founded on good and virtuous Actions. But, when I look nearly into the truth, I find this Man, first, abusing our simplicity, and prevailing upon some among us even to refuse the *Olynthian* Embassadors an Audience, by promising to deliver *Amphipolis* into our Hands, and undertaking secretly to bring about that, which was publicly talk'd of among us *: afterwards, courtuing the Friendship of those very *Olyn-*

* *Philip had promis'd to deliver Amphipolis to the Athenians, provided they restored to him Pydna, a Town of Macedonia, which had revolted from him: but the negotiation was to be kept a Secret, lest the Pydneans, who were averse to Philip's Government, shou'd take the alarm, and oppose the Execution of it.*

thians,

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thians, by unjustly taking from us, his first Allies, our own Town *Potidea*, and giving it to them; and now, lastly, insinuating himself into the good Graces of the *Thebians*, by promising to put them in possession of *Megalesia*, and taking upon himself the Conduct of the *Phocean* War, in which they are engaged. In a word, every State that has had any thing to do with him, has, in its turn, been deceived by him. For he has aggrandized himself, by imposing on the Ignorance of those, who were unacquainted with his Arts, and turning it to his own Advantage. Therefore, as he has raised himself to this pitch of Greatness, by promising some Advantage to every State about him, it is high time his own Arts shou'd be employ'd to pull him down, since it is now manifest, he did every thing with view to his own private Interest.

This, O Men of *Athens*, I take to be the State of *Philip's* Affairs. If any one thinks otherwise, let him stand forth, and disprove what I have said, by shewing, that those who have been once deceived by him, are ready to trust him again; and that the *Thebians*

salians actions

*G*alians, unjustly reduced to Servitude, are not desirous of recovering their Liberty. But if any one thinks I have fairly represented the matter, and yet is of opinion, that *Philip*, by seizing on Towns, Harbours, and other strong Places, will be able to maintain his Acquisitions, he judges wrong. For, while the Interests of the several Allies in a War are equally taken care of, they will all readily lend their Assistance, and chearfully submit to the Inconveniences attending it: but if One among them, like *Philip*, usurps more than his share of Power, the first Opportunity, and the slightest Miscarriage, dissolves the Union. It is impossible, it is utterly impossible, O *Athenians*, that a lasting Power can be establish'd upon Injustice, Perjury, and Falshood. For, tho' such Arts may succeed for a time, and great Expectations may be built upon them, they will, sooner or later, be detected, and of themselves fall to nothing. As the lowest Parts of a House, or a Ship, ought to be the strongest, so ought all Actions to have their foundation in Truth and Justice. But this is not the case, at present, with *Philip's* Actions.

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I, therefore, give it as my Opinion, that we immediately send Assistance to the *Olynthians*, and, at the same time, Embassadors to the *Thessalians*, to acquaint them with the Situation of Affairs, and to instruct them how to act: for they have already decreed to re-claim *Pagassæ* *, and to take the Affair of *Magnesia* into consideration. But it concerns you, O Men of *Athens*, to see that your Embassadors carry something more than Words, by setting on foot an Army worthy the Dignity of this State, and engaging heartily in the War. Words, without Actions, are empty and insignificant, especially when they proceed from such a State as ours; and the more readily we seem to employ them, the less Credit will they meet with. If, therefore, you expect to be trusted, you must demonstrate a great Change in your Conduct, by raising Supplies, fitting out Armies, and acting with the utmost Vigour. If you perform this as you ought, O Men of *Athens*, you will find, not only that *Philip's* Allies are neither able nor

* See the First Olynthian, the Note in p. 135.

ling to support him, but that his own Forces and Kingdom are in a weak and tottering condition.

The Kingdom of *Macedon*, it is true, in Alliance with other States, is no inconsiderable Power; as appear'd, when it assisted you, under your General *Timotheus*, against the *Olynthians* *, and afterwards the *Olynthians* against *Potidea*; and as the same is evident, at this very time, in the Assistance it affords the *Theffalians*, labouring under Seditions and Tumults, against a Family that wou'd oppress them †. Indeed, the least Accession of

* *Perdiccas*, Philip's Brother, had assisted the Athenians against the *Olynthians*. *Timotheus*, the Athenian General in that War, was Brother of the famous *Cimon*, and so fortunate at first, that he never engaged in a Battle without gaining the Victory. Whence the Painters represented him sleeping, with a Net lying by him, and the Goddess Fortune standing near him, with Toils and other Instruments of Hunting in her Hands; intimating by this Fiction, that Fortune did every thing for him, without his Concurrence. *Timotheus* was so angry at this Imputation, that he openly protested, he never conquer'd by the favour of Fortune, but singly by his own Valour and Conduct. After which, as if the Goddess wou'd revenge so arrogant a Declaration, it was observed, he never gain'd a Battle.

† That of the *Aleuadæ*. See the First *Olynthian*, Note pag. 135.

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Strength is of great service to a State. But the Kingdom of *Macedon* is, in itself, weak, and full of Distempers; and *Philip*, by those very Wars and Expeditions, which, in the opinion of some, have render'd him so great, has weaken'd it still more. You must not imagine, *Athenians*, that *Philip* and his Subjects take pleasure in the same things. He is fond of Glory, and scruples not to expose his Life and Safety to the greatest Dangers, in order to acquire the Reputation of doing what no King of *Macedon* ever did before him; while the *Macedonians* murmur and repine at the Hardships and Fatigues they are obliged to endure, which neither permit them to look after their own Affairs, nor to stay at home in their own Houses. Besides, they can reap no advantage by what they acquire this way, the War having shut up all the Markets, and obstructed the whole Commerce of *Macedon*. And from hence we may easily judge, how the *Macedonians* themselves stand affected to *Philip*.

As to the Mercenaries in his Pay, though they have been represented as the best of Soldiers, I have been credibly informed by a

Macedonian

* The
gent of
ome of

The Second Olynthian. 149

Macedonian, of the strictest Veracity, that they are not better than others. For, as the same Person inform'd me, *Philip* constantly dismisses from his Service the most skilful and valiant among them, his boundless Ambition not suffering him to share the Reputation of great Actions with others: and if any good and virtuous Man expresses his dislike at the daily Intemperance, Drunkenness, and obscene Dances, practis'd in the Court, he is sure to be despised and neglected. As for the rest of *Philip's* Attendants, they consist of public Robbers, Flatterers, and such Wretches, as, in a drunken fit, will dance after a fashion not fit to be mention'd.

The Truth of all this cannot be denied. For who are his principal Favourites and Companions, but those very Men, whom we unanimously expell'd from hence, as more infamous than common Jugglers; such as *Callias* the public Officer *, and others of the

* *The Athenians had certain Officers for the Management of public Affairs, taken from among their Slaves. Some of these they sent into the Fields with their Generals*

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the like Character; Men, who play the Buffoon, and divert the Company with obscene and scandalous Songs? Trifling as this may seem, *Athenians*, it is however a strong Indication of *Philip's* profligate Disposition. It is true, his Successes have, for the present, thrown a Veil over his Misbehaviour: for Prosperity wonderfully hides and conceals a Man's Faults; but the least failure of Success exposes his whole Life and Actions to the severest Scrutiny. And of this, O Men of *Athens*, *Philip*, I think, will soon afford us an eminent Example, if the Gods favour us, and we are not wanting to ourselves. For, as, in the human Body, when a Man is, in general, healthy, the Indisposition of a single Part gives him little or no Disquiet; but, when he falls into any Distemper, the Fracture, the Dislocation, or other Disorder of any one Part affects and discomposes his

rals; and their business was to keep an Account of the Expences of the Army. The reason of their choosing such was, because, if they had any suspicion of corrupt Practices in the Generals or Treasurers of the Army, they had it in their power to extort the Truth from these Officers by giving them the bastinado; which they cou'd not lawfully do to free-born Athenians.

whole

whole Frame : so the Defects of Kings and States, when they are at war abroad, are scarce discernible by the Multitude ; but, when it is brought home to their own doors, the least Flaw is distinctly perceived.

If any one among you, O Men of *Athens*, thinks *Philip* to be formidable, because he is fortunate, he reasons like a wise Man. For human Affairs are greatly, if not entirely, under the direction of *Fortune*. Nevertheless, for my own part, cou'd I have my choice, and you were ever so little inclined towards the discharge of your Duty, I shou'd prefer the Fortune of this State to that of *Philip*, since I am persuaded you have greater reason to expect the Assistance of Heaven, than he. Yet still we sit idle, not considering, that a Man, who does nothing to help himself, has no right to require the Assistance even of his Friends, and much less of the immortal Gods. Nor is it to be wonder'd at, that *Philip*, at the Head of Armies, present in every military Operation, and improving every Opportunity and Advantage, shou'd get the better of you, who still invent new Delays, and employ your time in

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making

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making Decrees, or enquiring after News, On the contrary, it wou'd be strange indeed, if you, who do nothing befitting a State at war, shou'd conquer him, who performs every Duty of a vigilant Commander.

But I much wonder, O Men of *Athens*, that you, who formerly took up Arms, against the *Lacedemonians*, in defence of the *Greeks* *, generously sacrificed many private Advantages, and submitted to the Expences and Hazards of War, to secure the Rights and Possessions of others, shou'd now hesitate, and delay to take the Field, in defence of your own; that you, who have protected all the *Greek* States in their turns, shou'd now sit still, when your own is in danger;

* Demosthenes speaks of the War undertaken in defence of the Thebans, when the Lacedemonians had surprized Cadmea. For, in the Peloponnesian War, the Lacedemonians, perceiving that the rest of the Greeks were oppress'd and enslaved by the Athenians, prevailed with many of them to revolt, upon a Promise of restoring to them their Liberty: But, at the end of that War, the Athenians, finding that the Lacedemonians oppress'd the Greek States much more than they had done, took up Arms in their defence, and began a new War with the Lacedemonians.

and

and that not one of you, *Athenians*, shou'd consider, how long you have really been at war with *Philip*, and in what manner all that time has been spent. It has been spent, you very well know, in fruitless Delays, in expecting that others wou'd act for you, in blaming and accusing one another, in forming new Expectations, in short, in doing the very same things you now do. And are you so devoid of Sense, O Men of *Athens*, as to expect, that the very same Conduct, which has reduced the State from a flourishing to a distress'd Condition, shou'd now restore it from a distress'd to a flourishing Condition? The thing is incredible and unnatural. It is easier to defend, than acquire Possessions. But War having left us none of our antient Possessions to defend, we can only think of recovering what we have lost: And this is precisely our Duty at present.

My Advice, therefore, is, that you immediately settle the necessary Funds, for carrying on the War with Vigour, and desist from accusing any one, till you have recover'd the Power and Authority of the State. Then let each Man's Actions be the Rule of judg-

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ing, whether he deserves Praise or Punishment. But especially let there be no more pretence for Deficiencies *, nor too rigorous an Enquiry into the Conduct of others, till you have removed all Imputation from your own.

Wou'd you know, why most of the Generals, you appoint, decline the present War, and look out for foreign Services ; the reason is (if I may speak freely of the Generals) because you engross to yourselves all the Advantages, for which the War is undertaken: if *Amphipolis* shall submit to our Arms, the Possession of it will immediately be yours; in the mean time the Generals are intitled to all the Danger, and none of the Rewards ; whereas, in the Service of other States, both the Danger is less, and the Profits accrue to the Generals and the Army ; they share among them the Plunder of *Lampsacus*, *Sigeum*, and whole Fleets. In

* By Deficiencies the Orator means the Arrears of Money due to the Officers and Soldiers, occasion'd by the Application of such large Sums to the maintenance of the Theatre. See the Argument of the First Olynthian.

this, therefore, every one consults his own particular Interest. As for you, *Athenians*, when you find your Affairs in a bad Situation, presently you accuse your Generals; and no sooner are you told their Necessities *, than you acquit them. And thus, while we are disputing and quarrelling among ourselves, the Public Affairs go to Ruin.

Formerly, O Men of *Athens*, you paid your Contributions by *Classes* †; now you govern the State in the same manner; each

* By Necessities *he means the same as* Deficiencies *just before.* See the preceding Note.

† The Athenians were divided into Ten Tribes; from each of which were selected an hundred and twenty of the richer sort, for the Discharge of the Public Offices. Each hundred and twenty was subdivided into sixty very rich, and sixty less rich. In case of a sudden War, when the less rich were not provided with ready Money, the richer paid their Contributions for them, and the Money so advanced was repaid in time of Peace. This Order of sixty Persons was call'd Συμμετοχαι, or a Class; and there being ten Tribes, each appointing an hundred and twenty, the whole Number amounted to one thousand two hundred Persons capable of discharging the publick Offices. These being divided into richer and less rich, the whole Athenian People became likewise divided into two Parts, as they respectively belong'd to one or the other of those Divisions.

Class,

Class has its particular Orator and General: three hundred only give their Votes: the rest are distributed, some under one, and some under another Head. It is high time we shou'd return to our original Constitution, and leave the Right of Speaking, Deliberating, and Acting, in common. But, if you impower some to issue out Orders, like so many Sovereigns, and others to fit out Ships, raise Money, and command Armies, while others have nothing to do but to make Decrees against all the rest, no business can ever be dispatch'd as it ought. For that part of the Administration, which thinks itself aggrieved, will desist from acting, and you will have no other Remedy, but that of punishing them as Enemies to their Country.

Wherefore, in conclusion, my Advice is, that we all contribute Money in proportion to our Abilities; that we all take the Field in our turns, till all have served; that you allow every Man liberty of speech; and, when all have deliver'd their Opinions, that you choose the best, without respect to the Speaker. In so doing, you will

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will find reason, not only to praise your Orators at present, but yourselves likewise hereafter, when it shall appear, that your Affairs are in a more flourishing Situation.



T H E



THE THIRD OLYNTHIAN.

Translated, in 1702,

By Lord LANSDOWNE.

The ARGUMENT.

The Athenians having sent Succours to the Olynthians, and gain'd some little Advantages in the prosecution of the War, the whole City was full of Rejoicing, and the Orators excited the People to take immediate Revenge on Philip. But Demosthenes, who justly fear'd, lest this Confidence in the present Success of their Arms, as they had obtain'd a complete Victory over the Enemy, shou'd induce them to neglect making any farther Provision for the safety of the Olynthians, endeavours, in this Oration, to restrain their Arrogance, and convince them, it was not a time to think of being

being revenged on Philip, but to provide effectually for the Security of their Allies.

*The Orator here mentions the Affair of the Theatrical Money * with more freedom than in the two former Orations, and openly demands an Abrogation of the Law, which made it Capital to propose restoring it to its original uses. He exhorts the Athenians to serve personally in the War, and to emulate the glorious Actions of their Ancestors. He likewise inveighs against the Misconduct of the Magistrates, and the effeminacy of the People.*

HEN I compare, *Athenians*, the Speeches of some amongst us with their Actions, I am at a loss to reconcile what I see with what I hear.

Their Proteſtations are full of Zeal againſt the publick Enemy; but their Meaſures are inconſiſtent, that all their Profeſſions become ſuſpected.

By confounding you with variety of Proſts, they perplex your Reſolutions, and

* See the *Argument of the Firſt Olynthian.*

lead you from executing what is in your Power, by engaging you in Schemes not reducible to Practice.

'Tis true, there was a Time when we were powerful enough, not only to defend our own Borders, and protect our Allies, but even to invade *Philip* in his own Dominions.

Yes, *Athenians*, there was such a Juncture; I remember it well; but by neglect of proper Opportunities, we are no longer in a Situation to be Invaders; it will be well for us if we can provide for our own Defence, and that of our Allies.

This is the present Point to be settled; we can look no farther, as Circumstances now stand; it is in vain to form Projects of greater Consequence. In the end we may hope to humble our Enemy; but in order to arrive at a happy End, we must fix a wise Beginning.

Never did any Conjunction require so much Prudence as this: However, I should not despair of seasonable Remedies, had I the Art to prevail with you to be unanimous in right Measures. The Opportunities, which have so frequently escap'd us, have not been

lost thro' Ignorance, or want of Judgment,
but thro' Negligence or Treachery.

If I assume at this time a more than ordinary Liberty of Speech, I conjure you to suffer patiently those Truths, which have no other End but your own Good: You have too many Reasons to be sensible how much you have suffer'd by hearkning to Sycophants. I shall therefore be plain in laying before you the Grounds of past Miscarriages, in order to correct you in your future Conduct.

You may remember, (for it is not above three or four Years since,) we had the News of *Philip's* laying Siege to the Fortrefs of *Meréa* in *Thrace*; it was, as I think, in *October* we receiv'd this Intelligence: We voted an immediate Supply of threescore Talents; forty Men of War were order'd to Sea; and zealous we were, that, preferring the necessities of State to our very Laws, our citizens above the Age of forty Years were commanded to serve †. What follow'd? A whole

† According to the Laws of Athens, the younger Citizens were obliged to serve in the Garrisons of the City, and

whole Year was spent idly, without any thing done; and it was but in the third Month of the following Year, a little after the Celebration of the Feast of *Ceres*, that *Charidemus* set sail, furnish'd with no more than five Talents, and ten Gallies not half mann'd.

A Rumour was spread that *Philip* was sick; that Rumour was soon follow'd by another, that *Philip* was dead *. Thus, as all Danger died with him, you drop'd your Preparations. Then, then was your time to push, and be active; then, then was your time to secure your selves, and confound him at once. Had your Resolutions, taken

and the neighbouring Towns, 'till the Age of Twenty after which they were incorporated in the Army 'till Fort and might then demand their Dismission.

* *At the Siege of Methone, one After, a Citizen flung a Javelin at Philip, on which was written the Verse;*

Ἀσὴρ Φίλιππῳ θανάσιμον ἐπιπέμπει βέλος:

After to Philip sends this fatal Dart.

Philip was wounded in the Eye by this Javelin, and in return, flung another into the Town, with this Inscription:

Ἀσέρα Φιλίππος ὡς λάβῃ κερμήσεται.

Philip will hang up After, if he takes him.

with so much Heat, been as warmly seconded by Action, you had then been as terrible to *Philip*, as *Philip*, recover'd, is now to you.

To what purpose at this time these Reflections? What is done cannot be undone. But, by your leave, *Athenians*, tho' past Moments are not to be recall'd, past Errors may be repeated. Have we not now a fresh Provocation for War? Let the Memory of Oversights, by which you have suffer'd so much, instruct you to be more vigilant in the present Danger. If the *Olynthians* are not instantly succoured, and with your utmost Efforts, you become Assistants to *Philip*, and serve him more effectually than he can help himself.

The Strength of that Commonwealth was once sufficient alone to curb and keep that aspiring Monarch within Bounds; neither durst *Philip* attack the *Olynthians*, nor the *Olynthians Philip*; so equal was the Balance of Power between them. We join'd them, and it was no small Mortification to *Philip* to see at his very Gates a Republick, by being confederated with us, not only able to thwart all his ambitious Designs, but even
to

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to carry the war into the very Bowels of his own Kingdom. So exorbitant his Power was grown, that there was nothing left for us to wish, but to see him embroil'd with his Neighbours. Fortune has seconded our Wishes: What then have we to do but to second our Fortune, by sending a quick and powerful Assistance to these People thus happily engaged by Providence for our sakes? Should we neglect an Opportunity so seasonable, and of such Importance, we shall not only be covered with Confusion and Reproach, but exposed to a long Chain of inevitable Evils from the Conqueror, especially considering the Disposition of the *Thebans*, ready to catch at any Occasion to hurt us; and the Inability of our Friends the *Phoceans*, drain'd by a long War, to assist us.

What Way then to put a stop to the Torrent? Or to prevent the Conqueror from turning his whole Force against *Athens* itself? The Man, who is for deferring his Duty till then, had rather see War and Desolation in his own Country, than hear of it in another; and scandalously beg Assistance

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from his Neighbours, than generously give it. Nor can any thing be more obvious than that we are destin'd for his next Prey, if we permit him to succeed in his present Enterprize.

But, you will say, Have we not already unanimously voted to stand by the *Olynthians*? 'Tis true; but how will you do it; That's the Question. Be not displeas'd, *Athenians*, if I should point you the Way by offering any Advice disagreeable to your Inclinations, or the common Opinion.

I would have you begin by appointing a certain Number of Legislators or Commissioners to inspect your Laws; not to create confusion of more; we have already but too many; but rather to repeal such as upon Examination may be found prejudicial to the Publick. Let me speak plain—I mean those Laws *, which discourage and oppress the Soldiery, by appropriating to the Maintenance of our Theatre that Money, which

* There was a Law, by which it was made Death on any one to propose applying to any other Use the Money appropriated for publick Shows. See the Argument of the first Olynthian.

ought to be applied as a Provision for those who daily venture their Lives for their Country.

When you have reformed those Abuses which give away the Bread of the Soldier to Citizens idle and unuseful, and which squander, in Pensions to Mimicks and Buffoons, what might be converted to the Support of Men of honour; When you have abrogated those sanguinary Laws, that may be no longer dangerous to speak plainly. You will not then want Friends, who, with Freedom and Sincerity, will offer such Expedients, as your Safety and the Exigence of State shall require. But if you are too obstinate to revoke any Act once passed, tho' never so contrary to Sense, and to the Publick Good; if it shall remain a capital Crime to arraign any such Act, or demand the Revocation; you may spare yourself the trouble of enquiring after Truth; for who will seek to make you honest or wise by the forfeiture of his own Head? --- No Athenians, no, you must expect no Friends at that Price; the most forward and zealous of your Citizens will be circumspect,

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silent, when their Sincerity must be fatal to themselves, without being serviceable to you, and as long as such Examples can be turn'd only to terrify others from endeavouring your Good with the same Freedom.

Since therefore such Laws there are, with such dangerous Penalties annex'd, that honest Men dare not speak plain, let the Promoters of the Mischief be condemned to repair it, by being obliged to run the hazard of demanding the Revocation. For what freedom of Speech can you expect, if, while you honour with your Protection, and encourage with your Favour, such Sycophants only as humour your Fancy, and flatter your Inclinations, tho' never so contrary to your Interest, or your Honour; the true Patriot, who has no other View but the Publick Good, shall be suspected and impeach'd, and deliver'd up a Sacrifice to the Hatred and Fury of the People. Let me tell you, Men of *Athens*, till some legal Redress may be had of this Grievance, the very best of your Citizens, let his Interest be never so powerful, will be question'd for the freedom of his Advice, if he should be
so

so mad as to give it. But who will be a Friend, when he is sure to be treated as an Enemy?

It is not necessary to warn you, that Votes are of no Force, unless seconded by Action. If your Resolutions had the Virtue to compass what you intend, without other Aid, we should not see yours multiply every Day as they do, and upon every Occasion, with so little Effect: Nor would *Philip* be in a Condition to brave and affront us in this manner: It has not happen'd thro' want of warm and seasonable Votes, that we have fail'd to chastise him long since. Tho' Action is the last in Place, and must succeed to Deliveration, it is the first in Efficacy, and crowning the Work; for nothing can be done without it.

Proceed then, *Athenians*, to support your Deliberations with Action: You have Heads capable of advising what is best: You have Judgment and Experience to discern what is right; and you have Power and Opportunity to execute what you determine.

What Time so proper for Action? What Occasion so happy? And when can you

hope

hope for such another, if this be neglected?
Has not *Philip*, contrary to all Treaties, insulted you in *Thrace*? Does he not at this instant straiten and invade your Confederates, whom you have solemnly sworn to protect? Is he not an implacable Enemy? A faithless Ally? The Usurper of Provinces to which he has no Title or Pretence? A Stranger, Barbarian, a Tyrant, and indeed what not?

And yet, O ye immortal Gods! when we shall have abandon'd all things to this *Philip*; when, by the Indifference of some, and the Treachery of others, we have as it were added Force and Wings to his Ambition, we shall yet make our selves a greater Scorn to our Enemies, by upbraiding and loading each other with the Reproach. Each Party, tho' equally guilty, by their Divisions, of the common Calamity, will be imputing the miscarriage to his Neighbour, and, tho' never so conscious, every one will be excusing himself, by laying the Blame on another: after the loss of a Battle, not a Man fled, but accuses his Companion, condemns his General; and, separately examin'd,

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no

no one takes Shame to himself, each shifting the common Disgrace from one to another; but yet it is certain that every individual Man who gave ground was equally accessory to the general Defeat. The Man, who accuses his Companion, might have stood firm himself had he pleas'd; and that, which was a Rout, had then been a Victory.

Such is the Pride and Folly of Parties overborn and sway'd by personal Prejudice, sacrificing the Publick to private Resentment and charging each other with Miscarriages for which they are every one equally accountable. A Manager for one Side proposes; he is sure to be opposed by a Manager for the other, not gently and amicably but with Heat, Malice, and unbecoming Reflexion: Let a third more moderate arise, his Opinion is not to be received, but he is known to be engaged in a Party. What Good can be hoped from such a Confusion of Councils, directed only by Prejudice or Partiality, in defiance to Sense and right Reason?

If no Advice that is given is to be received, but as it suits the Humour of

Party, or flatters the Distemper of the Times; it is not his Fault who speaks honestly, but yours who resolve to be deaf to all Arguments that displease you. In Debates for the Publick, we are not to seek what will please, but what will profit. If our Wishes exceed what we have means to accomplish, we must contract our Wishes, and confine them to what is in our Power. Let the Gods have your Prayers to grant what is out of your Reach; nothing is impossible to them: But we, who have only human Means to act by, must be govern'd by Circumstances, doing as well as we can, and trusting the rest to Providence.

Suppose now, for Example, some Person should rise, pretending to find sufficient Funds for a War, without touching your Appointments for publick Diversions, and thus endeavour to reconcile your Duty with your Pleasure, with what Joy would you hearken to the Proposal! But where to find this able Projector, I should be glad it were possible. But that Man must be a Fool, or a Madman, or not think you much better, who would persuade you to continue dissi-

pating real and solid Funds in ridiculous and superfluous Expences, under a vain Expectation of imaginary Ways and Means, that may never be found. And yet you would relish the Proposal, tho' never so inconsistent or incongruous; what flatters never fails of Reception; every one is adding to his own Deceit, and, overlooking the Improbable and the Impossible, sooths himself with any Extravagance that humours his Inclinations.

In Cases where Necessity is not to be reconciled to Pleasure, we must sacrifice Pleasure to Necessity, and conforming ourselves to the Nature, Condition, and Circumstances of our Affairs, act according to what we can, and not according to what we would. Thus if it were lawful to propose to you, to employ for the Service of your Country those Sums, which daily come into the publick Coffers to be idly spent, a vigorous War might be supported without any other Charge or Fund.

It is beneath the Spirit and Bravery of *Athenians* to bear thus patiently to be insulted for want of Funds necessary to support a

honourable War. How is it of a piece with that Fire and Gallantry, with which we took Arms to stop the *Corinthians*, and to punish the Treachery of *Megara* *? Shall we, who could resist *Greeks*, submit to be brav'd by a *Macedonian*, a Barbarian!

I mean no Offence: I am not so rash as to run headlong upon your Displeasure, and fail besides of doing you Service. But sure it is the Duty of every faithful and sincere Lover of his Country, to prefer the Welfare of his Fellow-Citizens to the Desire of pleasing them. It was with this honest Freedom the Commonwealth was directed by those ancient and memorable Patriots, who to this Day are so prodigally prais'd, tho' so sparingly imitated---*Aristides, Nicias, Pericles*, and the great Man whose Name I bear.

But since we have been pester'd by a vile Race of Hypocrites and Sycophants, who dare not open their Mouths till they have learnt their Lessons, till they have servilely

* *The People of Megara had seized upon a part of that consecrated Territory, call'd Orgas (from the Orgies or Feasts of the Gods) and were assisted by the Corinthians.*

inquired what they shall say, what they shall propose, what they shall vote, and in what they shall make themselves agreeable: In a Word, since Advices, publicly given, must first be whisper'd by some great Man, or Minister, and you bespeak, as it were, and prepare your own Poison; how can it otherwise happen but your Debates must be corrupted, your Councils ineffectual, your Reputation blasted, and Disgrace accumulated upon Disgrace, whilst those illustrious Parasites flourish and prosper by their Country's Ruin!

Observe, I beseech you, Men of *Athens*, how different this Conduct appears from the Practice of your Ancestors: I shall be short, and alledge no Instance but what is notorious: To induce you to be honest and wise, there will be no need of foreign Examples; the domestick will be sufficient.

Your Ancestors, who were Friends to Truth and Plain-dealing, detesting Flattery and servile Compliance; your Ancestors, I say, by unanimous Consent, continued Arbiters of all *Greece* for the Space of Forty five Years without Interruption; a publick

Fund

Fund of no less than ten thousand Talents was ready for any Emergency: They exercis'd over the Kings of *Macedon* that Authority which is due to Barbarians; obtain'd both by Sea and Land in their own Persons frequent and signal Victories; and by their noble Exploits transmitted to Posterity an immortal Memory of their Virtue, superior to the rest of Mankind, and above the reach of Malice or Detraction.

Such were your Ancestors in respect to their Figure abroad, and in regard to all Greece in general. Let us now consider these great Men in their private Capacities, and their particular Stations in *Athens* alone.

It is to them we owe that great number of publick Edifices, by which the City of *Athens* exceeds all the rest of the World in Beauty and Magnificence. It is to them we owe so many stately Temples so richly embellish'd, but above all adorn'd with the Spoils of vanquish'd Enemies, * bearing an eternal Re-

* Particularly, Xerxes's Chair of State, the Feet of which were of Silver, and Mardonius's Sword, the former taken in the Battle of Salamis, and the other in that of Platæa.

cord of their immortal Virtue. But visit their own private Habitations; visit the Houses of *Aristides*, *Miltiades*, or any other of those Patriots of Antiquity; you will find nothing, not the least Mark or Ornament, to distinguish them from the meanest of their next Neighbours. They meddled not in Government to enrich themselves, but the Publick; they had no Schemes or Ambition, but for the Publick; nor knew any Interest, but the publick. It was by a close and steady Application to the general Good of their Country, by an exemplary Piety towards the Immortal Gods, by a strict Faith and religious Honesty between Man and Man, and a Moderation always uniform and of a piece, they establish'd that Reputation, which remains to this Day, and will last to utmost Posterity.

Such, O Men of *Athens*! were your Ancestors, so glorious in the eye of the World, so bountiful and munificent to their Country, so sparing, so modest, so self-denying to themselves. What Resemblance can we find in the present Generation to those great Men? How much unlike! What a provok-

ing

ing Reflexion! But tho' much might be said,
I shall observe only this:

That at a time when your ancient Com-
petitors have left you a clear Stage; when
the *Lacedemonians* are disabled; the *Thebans*
employ'd in Troubles of their own; when
no other State whatever is in a Condition to
oppose or molest you; in short, when you are
in full Liberty; when you have the Oppor-
tunity and the Power to become once more
sole Arbiters of *Greece*; you permit patient-
ly whole Provinces to be wrested from you:
You lavish the publick Money to scandalous
and obscure Uses; you suffer your Allies to
perish in time of Peace, whom you pre-
serv'd in time of War: And, to sum up all,
you yourselves, by your mercenary Court,
and servile Resignation to the Will and
pleasure of designing, insidious, Leaders,
abet, encourage, and strengthen the most
dangerous and formidable of your Ene-
mies.

Yes, *Athenians*, I repeat it, you your-
selves are the Contrivers of your own Ruin:
Is there a Man that has Confidence to deny
this; let him arise, and assign if he can any

other Cause of the Success and Prosperity of
Philip.

But you reply, What *Athens* may have lost in Reputation abroad, she has gain'd in Splendor at home: Was there ever a greater Appearance of Prosperity, a greater Face of Plenty? Is not the City enlarg'd? Are not the Streets better pav'd, Houses repair'd and beautify'd? — Away with such Trifles! shall I be paid with such Counters? An old Square new vamp'd up! A Fountain! An Aqueduct! Are these Acquisitions to brag of?

Cast your eye on the Magistrates, * under whose Ministry you boast these precious Improvements. Behold the despicable Creatures rais'd all at once from Dirt to Opulence, from the lowest Obscurity to the highest Honours. Have not some of these Upstarts built private Houses, and Seats vying with the most sumptuous of our public Palaces? And how have their Fortunes and their Power increas'd, but as the Commonwealth has been ruin'd and impoverish'd?

* Demades, Eubulus, Phrynon, Philocrates, & others.

To what are we to impute these Disorders? And to what Cause assign the Decay of a State so powerful and flourishing in past Times? The Reason is plain: The Servant is now become the Master. The Magistrate was then subservient to the People; Punishments and Rewards were Properties of the People; all Honours, Dignities, and Preferments were disposed by the Voice and Favour of the People: But the Magistrate now has usurp'd the Right of the People, and exercises an arbitrary Authority over his ancient and natural Lord.

You, miserable People, the mean while, without Money, without Friends, the Supports of Power, from being the Ruler, are become the Servant; from being the Master, the Dependant: Happy, that these Governors, into whose hands you have thus resign'd your own Power, are so good and so gracious as to continue your poor Allowance to see Plays.

Altho' this pitiful Provision was originally an Establishment of your own, you are as thankful, as well pleas'd, and as acknowledging, as if these Creatures of your own making

ing were your real Benefactors, and as if the Obligation was deriv'd from their Bounty, and not from your own Institution.

It is by means of this implicit Trust, this absolute Resignation and Deference, that these cunning Imposers have by little and little work'd themselves into arbitrary Power, undermin'd your Liberties, and prepar'd you insensibly for Slavery. Neither is it in Nature, *Athenians*, that from Men of such vicious and selfish Principles any generous or noble Design can be expected: There can be no better Rule to judge of a Man, than by his ordinary Occupations, and common course in private Life.

I should not be surpriz'd, if I incurred your Displeasure by my Frankness; nor if, by seeking to open your Eyes, I should be treated more like an Enemy, than those who blind and abuse you: I know very well, you are seldom in humour to suffer bold Truths, and am rather surpriz'd at this unusual Attention, by which I am encouraged to proceed.

Believe me, *Athenians*, if, recovering from this Lethargy, you would assume the ancient
Freedom

Freedom and Spirit of your Fathers; if you would be your own Soldiers, and your own Commanders, confiding no longer your Affairs in foreign or mercenary Hands; if you would charge yourselves with your own Defence, employing abroad for the Publick, what you waste in unprofitable Pleasures at home, the World might once more behold you making a Figure worthy of *Athenians*.

Of what Benefit, of what real Advantage to you is that wretched Subsistence, with which you are so poorly contented? What is but a mere Encouragement for Idleness? Too little to satisfy, and but just enough to prevent a more honest Industry: Like the tender Diet allow'd to the Sick, which neither contributes to Health, nor Strength, but barely serves to keep together a miserable Life.

“ You would have us then (*say you*) do Service in our Armies, in our own Persons, and for so doing, you would have the Pensions, we receive in time of Peace, accepted as Pay in time of War. Is it thus we are to understand you? ”

Yes,

Yes, *Athenians*, 'tis my plain Meaning. I would make it a standing Rule, That no Person, Great or Little, should be the better for the publick Money, who should grudge to employ it for the publick Service. Are we in Peace? the Publick is charg'd with your Subsistence: Are we in War, or under a Necessity, as at this time, to enter into a War? Let your Gratitude oblige you to accept as Pay, in defence of your Benefactors, what you receive in Peace as mere Bounty. Are there, who, taking the Benefit of the Law, would excuse themselves by pleading their Age? Their Age, however, hinders them not from eating the Bread of the Commonwealth. Let then the Claim of him who wou'd shun the Service, be given over and above to him who is willing in what he can to serve his Country.

Thus, without any Innovation, without altering or abolishing any thing but pernicious Novelties introduced for the Encouragement of Sloth and Idleness; by converting only for the future the same Funds to the Use of the Serviceable, which are spent at present upon the Unprofitable; you may be well served

served in your Armies, your Troops regularly paid, Justice duly administred, the publick Revenues reform'd and increas'd, and every Member of the Commonwealth render'd useful to his Country, according to his Age and Ability, without any further Burthen to the State.

To conclude: What I insist upon is no more than this: That the Wretch, who, during Times of Danger is not asham'd to linger at home, and chooses to lead a lazy, sauntering, unprofitable, Life, canvassing the Actions of others, questioning and inquiring after News, under what foreign General, and with what Troops of Mercenaries, such and such a Battle was fought, should no longer be permitted to eat the Bread of the Diligent and Laborious. For it is thus to a little these domestick Loiterers spend and waste their miserable Hours.

When I nam'd Foreigners, it was not to reflect upon those Men, who perform for you that Duty, which you ought to perform for yourselves: But to provoke you, if possible, not to resign to Strangers those Opportunities of gaining your Esteem, which might

might be made use of to intitle you to theirs: Nor to renounce and abandon, as you do, that Reputation which you inherited from your Ancestors, and was purchas'd for you with so much Toil, Hazard, and Glory.

This, O Men of *Athens*! is what my Duty prompted me to represent to you upon this Occasion. May the Gods inspire you to determine upon such Measures as may be most expedient for the particular and general Good of our Country *.

* *Notwithstanding the Efforts of the Athenians to succour Olynthus, it was soon after taken by Philip, through the Treachery of two of its Citizens, Eutycrates and Lasthenes; its Walls razed, and its Inhabitants reduced to Slavery. Diod. l. 15, 16. Polyb. l. 9. Strab. l. 10.*





THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.

Translated, in 1702,

By Dr. G A R T H.

The ARGUMENT.

The Athenians, having been unsuccessful in the War against Philip, met together in a general Assembly, full of Grief and Despair. Our Orator, after representing to them, that their own Misconduct had occasion'd their ill Success, endeavours to raise their drooping Spirits, and points out to them the properest Methods of carrying on the War. He advises them to raise two Armies; the one consisting of a larger Body of Forces, to be kept at home, in a readiness against all Events; the other, not so numerous, to be sent to the Frontiers of Macedon, to divert Philip from attempting to invade Attica, by keeping him employ'd nearer home.

IF

F, *Athenians*, the Design of our Assembly were in order to a Debate upon some new Subject, I had been silent, till some others had spoken; and, if they had propos'd any thing for the Advancement of the Public Interest, I had willingly acquiesced; if the contrary, I had taken the freedom to offer my own Opinion. But, since we are assembled upon an Affair that has been canvass'd already, I cannot imagine I shall give offence by being the first who speaks upon this Conjuncture, since the Necessity of our present Deliberation evidently implies the Insufficiency of our past Measures.

However, *Athenians*, let not the melancholy posture of our Affairs deject us, since what occasions the Disease directs to the Cure: For, if we were satisfied, we had already taken all necessary Precautions, I must own, Patience would be the only Remedy left. But, on the contrary, I advise you to reflect on what you cannot be ignorant of, I mean, with how great Zeal for your Liberty and Regard for your Honour, you formerly suppress

suppress'd the growing Power of *Lacedemon*.
The reason, why I remind you of this, is,
that, when you consider, how much your
Vigour has contributed to restrain the *Lace-*
monians, and your Inactivity to aggrandize
Philip, you may be sensible, there is nothing
you ought not to expect from your Vi-
lance, or apprehend from your Insensi-
bility.

If *Philip* should be thought so formidable,
to make you conclude it will be difficult
succeed against him, I confess I shou'd be
of your opinion; but you must also allow,
that, when we were Masters of *Pydna*, *Po-*
lea, *Metbene*, and the adjacent Countries;
Philip, then weak in himself, and with-
out Allies, had despaired of Success against
the *Athenians*, possess'd at that time of the
most important Places of *Macedonia*, he had
never undertaken an Enterprize, wherein he
has been but too successful; nor had he ever
liv'd at that pitch of Grandeur you see
him in at present. But he well knew, the
strongest Places would be theirs, who had
the most Resolution to carry them; and that the
Fortunes of all those, who avoided Danger,
wou'd

wou'd quickly be in the hands of those, who durst meet it.

These are the Maxims, which have rais'd him to this prodigious height; so that he either rules universally as a Conqueror, or governs as a Protector. For we generally see the Alliance of those, who, we judge, are neither wanting to others, nor themselves. If therefore, *Athenians*, you wou'd resolve on new Measures, and have nothing in view but the Public Good; if the Rich wou'd contribute with their Fortunes, and the Young with their Persons: If you wou'd forbear to expect every thing from others without concurring in any thing yourselves, we might, by the Assistance of the Gods, reduce *Philip* to be thought as inconsiderable in *Attica*, as he is at present formidable in *Macedonia*.

You must not imagine, that good Fortune is essential to *Philip*, as Attributes to a God: he is hated as well as fear'd; nay even those who are in Alliance with him, are not more cordially affected towards him, than those who are not; and, if they act under a Masque, it is because your Stupidity discourages them.

See the

from taking it off. I hope you will soon be convinced, how far the Arrogance of this Man transports him. At present he will not offer you to choose either Peace or War. His Language (they say) is insolent; he is not content with his past Usurpations, but is daily forming some new Designs; and, you never open your own Eyes, so he ever shuts his.

When, therefore, will you recover your senses? when some new Calamity happens, when Necessity alarms you? But, tell me, with what Thoughts can you reflect on your former Miscarriages? In my opinion, a sense of Mismanagement ought to be the greatest Motive to a generous Spirit, to attempt some Redress; but, instead of that, you are still sauntering in all Publick Places, and inquiring of every one you meet after news, as if there cou'd be any more surprising, than that one single *Macedonian* gives Laws to all *Greece*. *Philip* is dead, says one: No, says another, he is only sick *. Gods! and why, *Athenians*, are

See the Third Olynthian, Note in p. 135.

you solicitous whether he be or not? If some Accident should deliver you from one *Philipp*, your Misconduct wou'd soon create you another, since he owes his Grandeur not to his own Activity, but to your Indolence; for tho' Fortune shou'd open to us the Gate of *Amphipolis*, our Irresolution wou'd shut them again.

I shall insist no longer on reminding you of your Duty, because I hope you are convinced of it already. It is now time I propose to you a Scheme of such Preparations as are necessary for your Security; as also for raising a number of Troops, and the Funds for their Subsistence. I beg you will not anticipate what I have to say, but suspend your Opinion, till I have made an end; and that you will not mistake my Circumspection for Prolixity. For such as are immediately *To Arms*, without laying down a Plan of the War, are fitter to Execute than Advise.

It is certain, our Imprudence has exposed us too much, and he, who is most capable of directing you in the carrying on a vigorous War, or the securing an honourable Peace

The First Philippic. 191

Peace, is the Person you ought soonest to hearken to. As I shall lay before you my own Project, without expecting to have others excluded from doing the same, so, after you have heard it, you may reject, or approve it, as you shall think fit.

I am of Opinion, therefore, you ought to begin with fitting out fifty Gallies, and resolve to go on Board yourselves. You must provide also several Sail of Ships for transporting some Squadrons of Horse where you shall think convenient; as also a good Number of Storeships, for your Ammunition and Provisions. You must be always in readiness to receive the Enemy, whether he moves towards *Thermopylae*, *Chersonesus*, *Olynthus*, or any where else. Thus will he find, you are at last awake, and that he will meet with the same *Atbenians* he found at *Eubaea*, *Haliartus*, and, last, at *Thermopylae*, whenever he shall think fit to make the Experiment.

But suppose we shou'd not act precisely according to this Plan, we shall at least have some of these Advantages, by putting ourselves into

into a posture of Defence; either *Philip*, being inform'd of our Military Preparations (for he has a Correspondence in the very Heart of your Senate) will, thro' a Distrust of his own Strength, be inclined to an Accommodation; or, if he should give no Credit to his Intelligence, he will be the less cautious himself, and his whole Country more expos'd.

What I have propos'd I hope you will judge to be necessary, as also a flying Camp to harrass the Enemy; but let the Army be compos'd of some Citizens rather than of Foreigners altogether, since they are less Mutinous, and under better Discipline.

I shall now speak to the Number of Troops, where they must serve, and how they must be subsisted. I am sensible, how generous you are in your Votes, and how penurious in your Supplies; you grudge Necessaries, but you promise Superfluities; you had much better be more moderate; begin with reasonable Levies, and encrease them as occasion shall require. I wou'd have you raise two Thousand Men; of which let there be

Five Hundred effective *Athenians*, who, from time to time, may be reliev'd from hence by their Fellow-Citizens; the rest of the Body may be compos'd of Mercenaries. I wou'd also have two Hundred Horse; of which let Fifty be *Athenians*, and on the same Establishment with the Infantry. There must be Transport-ships also for their Accommodation, with ten Gallies that are good Sailers. *Philip* has a Fleet, and, therefore, a Convoy must be prepared for the Security of your Troops. The Reason, why I ask so few, is, because it will be impossible on a sudden to raise a Force sufficient to give Battle. It is therefore better to stand upon the Defensive, and to act in Parties. Besides, a Handful of Men are the more easily subsisted. I wou'd have the Fleet consist partly of Citizens, and partly of Strangers. You may remember, that, when you march'd in Person to *Corinth*, and joined the Auxiliaries under the Command of *Polystratus*, *Iphicrates*, and *Chabrias*, it was by this Method you convinced the *Lacedaemonians* you had not forgot to be *Athenians*: But, since our Armies have been composed of nothing but Foreigners, instead

of gaining Victories over our Enemies, they triumph over our Friends, and are their own Masters, and not our Servants. If they take the Field, it is to go over to *Artabafus*, or to any Place but *Athens*: Nor can we blame their General; for as soon as he ceases to Pay, he ceases to Command.

Now, the way to remedy these Miscarriages, is, to see, that both Officers and Soldiers duly receive their Pay, and to appoint some of your Citizens to inspect their Behaviour. At present, we are under a strange Management. If some Body should ask you: *Athenians*, are you at Peace? No, you will reply, we are at War with *Philip*: have we not at present ten Generals in our Service, several Lieutenant-Generals, and two Commanders of Horse? And, pray except one, what service do the rest? Why they march at the Head of our Processions, they distinguish themselves at our Festivals, Solemnities, and the Blood of each Sacrifice is a Trophy of their Valour.

The Truth is, your Conduct is most extraordinary: Your Officers, it seems, are for Show, and not for Service. You send to

the Relief of *Lemnos* your General of Horse, who is a Citizen, and you leave the Defence of your own Country to *Menelaus* a Stranger; not that I have any Objection to *Menelaus*, farther than that I think no one can legally be a Commander, who is not constituted so by you.

I shall now attempt to make an Estimate of what Supplies may be necessary for the bare Subsistence of our Troops, and am of Opinion it need not much exceed Ninety Talents. There must be assign'd, for the ten light Ships, forty Talents, which will be twenty *Minas* a Month each Galley. The two Thousand Foot will require forty Talents more, that is, to each Foot-Soldier ten Drachmas a Month; and, for the two Hundred Horse, there must be allow'd twelve Talents, which will be thirty Drachmas a Month to each. If any shou'd think this Allowance too scanty, they are in the wrong. I am persuaded, our bare Pay would subsist without any free Quarter upon ourselves or Allies. I would undertake this Expedition upon these Terms, and be answerable for the Success, and shall now go

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upon Ways and Means for raising the Supplies.

Here Demosthenes gives in his Projects for Funds, and then goes on.

You have heard my Proposals, *Athenians* and, after you have considered them, I hope you will come to some Conclusion, that you may, at last, make War upon the Enemy, with Fire and Sword, and not with frivolous Debates, and insignificant Votes; and, that you may do it effectually, peruse well the Chart of the Country you design for the Seat of War. Reflect on the Enemy's Methods, and you will find he owes his Success to his Head, as well as to his Hands. He took care to be too early for us in the Field, and always to have the Winds and Seasons on his Side; and the Winter that wou'd not suffer us to be in Action wou'd not permit him to sit still.

These Considerations shou'd teach us, how much we ought to prefer a regular and disciplin'd Army to a raw and unexperienc'd one; and how far we shou'd be solicitous about Winter-Quarters: *Lemnos, Thase, Scia*

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vous, and the Islands thereabouts, will be convenient for that Purpose: There are Ports, Magazines of Corn, and all other Necessaries. Your General will take care of the rest; but do you inspect his Actions, and your own Accounts, and things will succeed better than they have done hitherto: The Enemy will not always be able to make War upon us with the Prizes he takes from our Allies; nor hurry away our Citizens in Chains, as at *Imbros* and *Lemnos*; nor surprize our Fleet, as at *Gereftus*; nor carry off our consecrated Galley, as at *Marathon*.

But, *Athenians*, why are your *Bacchanalia*, and your Feasts of *Minerva*, so duly observ'd, and the fitting out your Fleet so shamefully neglected? Nothing so magnificent as the first, nothing so ill equip'd as the last. Your publick Solemnities, under what Direction soever, are in readiness precisely at the time; but in your Naval Expeditions, as those of *Metbone*, *Potidea*, and *Pagasa*, your succours arrive after the Reduction of the Places. And the Reason of this is obvious: Every Body knows his Duty in regard to the first; but, in what relates to the last, no

Body. In your Feasts, every thing is concerted, every thing adjusted; but, in your Military Preparations, every thing is undetermin'd, every thing unadvis'd. When we hear the Enemy is in Motion, immediately Commanders of our Gallies are appointed Aliens, and such as are enfranchis'd, are lifted; then we consult about raising Subsidies; by and by our Citizens embark. Thus we protract Time till the whole Expedition is frustrated, and our Fleet puts to Sea after our Country is invaded. In the mean time *Philip* has the Insolence to express himself in these Terms.

Here he produces a Letter of Philip to the Eubœans, to show the Insolence of his Style and then proceeds.

What you have heard, *Atbenians*, is not agreeable, as true. If the concealing of ungrateful Truths could remove the ill Consequences attending them, the Harangue, which pleas'd you best, would profit you most. But fine Speeches are no longer so, when they are unseasonable. If they set our Calamities at a distance, they only retard

our Precaution in providing against them ;
and it is easier to prevent, than redress them.

You cannot but be sensible, *Athenians*,
you are stronger, both at Sea and Land,
than any other State; nor are you in want
of any thing, but the Inclination to make
use of what is already in your Power. But, in-
stead of doing that, you fight with King *Philip*
like a sort of Gladiators, who have neither
Courage to annoy their Adversary, nor to
defend themselves; but, instead of warding
the Blow, still clap their Hands upon the
Wound. If you hear, the Enemy has made
a Descent upon the *Chersonesus*, immediately
you resolve to throw in some Troops there :
By and by you have Advice of his being at
Thermopylae * ; then on a sudden you march
thither : Afterwards you hear of him else-
where ; then you resolve, without any delay,

* *A narrow Pass, between Mount Parnassus and the
sea, but Twenty-five Feet wide, so call'd as being the
Gates of Greece, and the Place where Minerva provided
Hercules with a warm Bath, after some Fatigue. It is
famous in History for the death of the celebrated Leonidas.
Philip, being in Thessaly, meditated an Incurfion into
Greece this way; but the Athenians prevented him by
sending a Fleet thither.*

to be at his Heels. Thus you follow him officiously as your General; whereas you ought to meet him bravely as your Enemy.

These Reflexions make me conclude, some Guardian Power, that protects *Athens*, inspires King *Philip* with an Ambition that must destroy him. For if he wou'd but be content with the peaceable Enjoyment of what he unjustly possesses, and not continually attempt new Incurfions, I dare say, there are some amongst you, who wou'd willingly acquiesce in your present Infamy. But luckily for us, his Ambition knows no bounds, and every Day some new Usurpation convinces you his Thirst of Power is inextinguishable. At first, you thought yourselves oblig'd to make War upon *Philip*; but, at present, your only concern is, lest he should make War upon you. Is it your Opinion, *Athenians*, you ought to be neutral at this Juncture? Do you not think it reasonable you should immediately fit out a Fleet? Suppose we should, you will say whither shou'd we go? Do but once Embark, and not only your own Honour, but the Circumstances of the Enemy, will shew

you

you the way. But, instead of that, you are still clashing in your Assemblies, and your only business is, clamorous Invectives, and groundless Impeachments.

I am satisfy'd, the same Providence, that watches over *Athens*, will never desert you in any Enterprize, you shall go upon. But, when you appoint only one General, with doubtful Orders, and an imperfect Commission, you must necessarily miscarry: Such Expeditions are the Jest of your Enemies, and the Dissatisfaction of your Friends. It is impossible one Man can execute what you all Command. He will promise you Wonders, and will not fail to charge his want of success on some Body else. But how is this to be remedied? Let some of you serve in person, first be Witnesses of the Behaviour of your General, and then return home to be his Judges. For it is come to this pass, that some of your Officers choose rather to venture their Lives twice at a Court-Martial, than once in the Field, and stick not to prefer an infamous to an honourable Death: and, indeed, they are in the right; for the criminal ought to die by the Hand of the

Hangman, but the Man of Honour by that of the Enemy.

Now, *Athenians*, let us but examine what it is we are doing at this critical juncture: In truth, nothing, but hearkning after every trifling Story, and ridiculous Rumour. One reports, that *Philip* is in a Confederacy with the *Lacedemonians* against *Thebes*, and some other Republicks: Another, that he is in Treaty with the King of *Persia*: A third, that he is fortifying certain Towns in *Illyria*. A fourth has some new Chimeras. For my Part, I think him so intoxicated with his past Success, that he judges nothing impossible to his future Attempts. Instead therefore of busying our Thoughts about what he designs to do, let us reflect on what he has already done, and we shall be convinced, that, if we refuse to make War upon him Abroad, he will do it upon us at Home.

Thus, Men of *Athens*, I have given you my Thoughts: You know, I had rather what I say should be for your Advantage, than for your Entertainment. I could wish, that my Advice might prove as serviceable to

the Person who gives it, as to those who receive it. If I had not considered the publick, more than my own private Interest, I had urg'd it with less Vehemence. I knew the result of what I had to say would be doubtful; but because I was satisfy'd it would be for your Advantage to hear it, I resolv'd not to be silent; and I hope, that Advice, which is for the general Good, will at last prevail.





THE
O R A T I O N
On the P E A C E.

Translated, in 1744.

The A R G U M E N T.

The War of Amphipolis having lasted a long time, both Philip and the Athenians were desirous of Peace; the Athenians, on account of their ill Success in that War; and Philip, that he might be at liberty to perform his Engagements with the Thebans and Thessalians, for whom he had undertaken to finish the Phocæan War. A Peace being accordingly concluded, Philip, notwithstanding meeting with no Obstruction from the Athenians, march'd his Army, and, surprizing the Pass of Thermopylæ, enter'd Phocis, and entirely subdued the Country. After which, the Representatives of the Greek States

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States at Delphi, by a general Decree, conferr'd upon Philip the Place, which the Phoceans had held among the Amphictyons, or Great Council of the Greeks, assembled in that Place. This done, Philip sent Embassadors to the Athenians, desiring they wou'd confirm this Decree of the Amphictyons. Demosthenes, in this Oration, advises the Athenians to comply with Philip's Demand; not that he approved the Thing, or thought it right to admit a Macedonian into the Great Council of the Greeks, but lest their Refusal shou'd provoke Philip to break the Peace, which it was their Interest to maintain, and draw upon them the united Force of all Greece, which they cou'd ill withstand.

I AM sensible, O Men of Athens, that the Affair now under our consideration is attended with no small difficulties; not only because we have let slip many Advantages thro' our Carelesness, and in representing them properly at this time will be of no service to us, but because, even with respect to what is still in our power, our Sentiments.

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Sentiments are greatly divided. Besides, as the giving Advice is, in itself, a difficult and dangerous thing, so you, *Athenians*, have made it much more so. For, whereas others usually deliberate beforehand, you never consider things till the Event has made it too late. From whence it has happen'd, ever since I can remember, that, tho' you can patiently enough, and even with Approbation, hear your Conduct arraign'd, you still neglect the Opportunities of effecting those things, which fall under your Deliberation. But, tho' all this is but too true, I am persuaded (and with this Persuasion I rise up to speak) that, if you will hear me with that Calmness and Attention, which ought to accompany all your Debates, especially in Affairs of such consequence to the Public Good, I shall be able to propose and advise such Measures, as will tend, not only to better the present State of our Affairs, but even to retrieve our past Losses. I know, the repeating what one has before said, and talking of one's self, has its use in these Assemblies; but, for my own part, *Athenians*, I think it so odious and irksome a thing, that, though

Necessity

Necessity plainly requires it, I shall do it with the greatest Reluctance. However, as it will enable you to judge better of what I shall now advance, I will put you in mind of some things formerly said by me.

In the first place, *Athenians*, when the Affairs of *Eubæa* were in great confusion, and some advised you to undertake an inglorious and expensive War, in order to support *Plutarch*, I alone opposed and dissuaded it, and narrowly escaped being torn to pieces by those, who, for the sake of a small Advantage to themselves, precipitated you into many and great Calamities. You soon return'd from that Expedition, with nothing but Infamy, and such Injuries, as no State ever received from an Ally, in whose Defence it had taken up Arms. And this open'd your Eyes to see the Iniquity of those Counsellors, and the Rectitude of that Advice I had given you.

On another occasion, *Athenians*, observing, that *Neoptolemus*, the Dramatic Poet, under colour of his Art, did many ill things with Impunity, and betray'd your Riches and Strength to *Philip*, I stood forth, and openly exposed

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exposed his Conduct to you ; and, that I was not induced thereto by private Resentment, or love of Slander, was evident from the Event: in mentioning of which, I shall rather accuse you, *Athenians*, than the many Defenders of *Neoptolemus* ; whom you would not have heard with so much Indulgence, nor me with so little Favour and Attention, if, instead of debating on publick Affairs, you had then sat as Spectators of some Tragedy at the Feast of the *Bacchanalia*. But, I doubt not, you are all now convinced of his real Design in going into the Enemy's Country, under pretence of collecting some Monies due to him, that, upon his return hither, he might be qualified to discharge publick Offices ; and why he was perpetually declaiming against the Injustice of accusing a Man merely for transporting his Effects out of one Country into another : for he took the first Opportunity, which the conclusion of the Peace afforded him, to sell all his Possessions in *Attica*, and go over with the Money into *Macedonia*.

These two Instances prove the truth of what I then said, and that things were really

such

such as I had pronounced them to be. But there is a third Instance, which I will but must mention, and then come to the point. After the Ratification of the Peace, when we, who were sent Embassadors for that purpose, were return'd, and some gave you hopes, that *Thespiæ* and *Platea* wou'd be restored to their former condition; that *Philip*, if he shou'd subdue the *Phoceans*, wou'd spare their City, but wou'd raze the Walls of *Thebes*; that *Oropus* wou'd be yours, and that *Eubæa* wou'd be given you in exchange for *Amphipolis*; when, I say, many such fond Expectations were artfully raised, by which you were induced, contrary to Equity, your own Interest, and the Dignity of the State, to desert the *Phoceans*; I contributed nothing to the Delusion, nor dissembled my Opinion, but (as you cannot but remember) assured you I knew nothing of, nor expected any such things to happen, and that I look'd upon all those, who profess'd to believe them, as out of their Senses.

But, tho' it is evident I saw farther into these matters than others, I will not arrogantly ascribe it to my own singular Discernment,

cernment, but rather to these two Causes: First, Good-fortune, the Mistress of all human Ingenuity and Wisdom; and, secondly, the Disinterestedness, with which I consider and judge of all public Matters: for no Man can say, I ever regarded my own private Advantage, either in my Actions, or my Words. Hence I presently distinguish in every incidental matter, what Good may arise to the Public from it. But, if you throw Money into the Scale, it weighs down the Understanding, and a Man is rendered thereby incapable of forming a right judgment of things.

But, to come to the point: In the first place, *Athenians*, whoever shall propose the raising Supplies of Money, making Alliances, or any other Measures for the service of the State, let him do it in such a manner as not to infringe the present Peace: not that it is an advantageous, or an honourable one, but because, tho' it had been better for us it had never been made, it is not our Interest, now that it is made, to break it. For the Losses, we have sustain'd thro' our own Misconduct, render the engaging in

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War more difficult and unsafe for us than ever.

In the next place, *Athenians*, you must be careful not to afford any just cause to those States, who are now confederated together under the Name of *Amphictyons*, of uniting in a War against you. Shou'd a new War break out between us and *Philip*, about *Amphipolis*, or any other matter of dispute, in which neither the *Thessalians*, *Argives*, nor *Thebans* have any concern, I do not believe any one of those States wou'd take up Arms against us, and least of all ——— I desire to be heard without Interruption ——— I say, least of all the *Thebans*: not that they wish well to *Athens*, or are not inclined to gratify *Philip*, but because (stupid as they are generally said to be) they well know, that, if they involve themselves in a War with us, they will expose themselves to great Inconveniences and Distresses, and some other State, at peace, will lay hold of the Opportunity to run away with those Advantages they at present enjoy. Nor, if we shou'd make war upon the *Thebans*, on account of *Oropus*, or any other Claim, do I think we shou'd suffer

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suffer much by it. For such is the nature of the *Greek* Confederacies, that the Allies on either part are ready to assist in repelling an Invasion, but not in making Conquests. No State wishes so well either to us or the *Thebans*, as to desire that either shou'd swallow up the other: they wish the Safety of both for their own sakes, but not the Subjection of one to the other. What then are we to fear? What are we to provide against? Why, lest the War now in agitation shou'd afford the confederate States a Common Cause. For, shou'd the *Argives*, the *Messenians*, the *Megalopolitans*, and the rest of the *Peloponnesians* who espouse their Interest, become our Enemies on account of our throwing some Obstacles in their way, and negotiating a Peace with the *Lacedemonians*; shou'd the *Thebans*, already indisposed towards us, become more so on account of the Shelter we afford their Exiles, and the Ill-will we so manifestly bear them; shou'd the *Thessalians* declare against us, for receiving the *Phocean* Exiles; and *Philip*, for our refusing to allow him a Place among the *Amphictyons*; it is to be fear'd, all these States

on the score of their own particular Resentments, and under pretence of a Decree of the *Amphictyons*, will unite in a common War against us, and each be induced, contrary to its own private Interest, to attempt our Destruction; as, in fact, happen'd in the *Phocean War*.

Nor are you ignorant, that the *Thebans*, the *Thessalians*, and *Philip*, tho' their principal Views were different, concurred, by their Actions, in bringing about the same end. The *Thebans* cou'd not hinder *Philip* from penetrating, and seizing the Pass of *Thermopylae*, or prevent his reaping all the Glory of their long and painful endeavours. For they suffer'd greatly in their Credit and Reputation, tho' they were able to maintain themselves in the possession of the Country. But their real View, and for which they bore all this, was the getting possession of *Archomenus* and *Coronea*. Some, indeed, pretend, that *Philip* was constrain'd to deliver up these Towns to the *Thebans*. But, in truth, he was little concern'd about That; his principal Aim being, to secure *Thermopylae*, to have the honour of putting an end

to

to the War, and to preside at the *Pythian Games*. These were the chief Motives, upon which *Philip* acted. As for the *Thebans*, they were far from desiring to aggrandise either *Philip* or the *Thebans*: but they had their eye upon the *Pylean Assemblies* * and the Privileges of *Delphi*, and, in hope of obtaining these, lent a helping-hand to *Philip* in carrying on his Designs. Thus you will find all those States led, by the pursuit of their own particular Interests, to Measures they never intended to come into. And this ought to be matter of Caution to us.

But you will ask me, Must we then, through fear of these Consequences, comply with their Demands? And is this what you wou'd advise? I answer, By no means. But I am confident, we have it yet in our Power to act the prudent part, without drawing a War upon us. As for those, who

* There were two General Assemblies of the Greeks held at *Pylæ* or *Thermopylæ*, one in Spring, and the other in Autumn; at which time they sacrificed to *Cerberus* at *Pylagora*.

you'd precipitate you into dangerous Measures, and never reflect on the Consequences of War, I desire they wou'd consider these things. We suffer the *Thebans* to keep possession of *Oropus*; and, shou'd we be ask'd, why? we must fairly acknowledge, it is to avoid the Necessity of a War upon that account. We have just given up *Amphipolis* by Treaty to *Philip*; we suffer the *Cardians* to be independent of the rest of the *Chersonesus*; we permit the Viceroy of *Caria* to keep the Islands *Chios*, *Cos*, and *Rhodes*; and we hinder not the *Byzantians* from committing Pyracies in our Seas; and all because we prefer the Tranquillity, which attends Peace, to the Disturbances, which War brings along with it. And, surely, it wou'd be the height of Folly and Absurdity, when we behave in this manner towards particular States, in things of the utmost Importance to our own Government, to engage in a War against the united Force of All Greece, for mere *Delphic Shadow* *.

* Demosthenes means the Title of Amphictyon, and, using this Phrase, perhaps alludes to the following story told of him by Plutarch. ----- The Athenians, once, in

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in an Assembly, forbidding him to proceed in an Oration he desired leave to add but a few Words, which being granted him, he said: "A certain young Man, being on
 "a Journey to Megara, in summer-time, hired an Ass
 "by the way: About Noon, the Heat of the Sun being
 "very great, the young Man and the Owner wou'd both
 "have taken shelter under the Shadow of the Ass: but
 "the Owner wou'd not suffer the young Man to do so
 "telling him, he had let him the Ass, and not his Shadow
 "down; but the young Man insisted, that, by hiring the
 "Ass, he had a right to both." Here Demosthenes
 "left off, and was going out; but the Assembly call'd him
 "back, desiring he wou'd conclude the Fable. Whereupon
 "Demosthenes said: "O Athenians, are you so eager to
 "hear a Story of an Ass's Shadow, and so unwilling to
 "hear what I have to say upon Matters of the greatest
 "Consequence?"





THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.

Translated in 1702.

THE ARGUMENT.

Philip, after other Encroachments upon the People of Greece, was now in League with the Messenians and Argives, to invade the Lacedæmonians, and had sent Embassadors to Athens, with those of his Confederates, to justify his Proceedings. The Athenians, being unwilling to break with Philip, or to see the Lacedæmonians ruin'd, were at a loss how to answer their Embassadors. Demosthenes undertakes to do it; but at the same time puts them in mind, that it was the Peace, which they had concluded with Philip, at the Persuasion of Æschines, which occasion'd this Difficulty. He not only blames that Orator, but accuses the rest of Cowardise, and the People of Remissness. He likewise inveighs bitterly against Philip.

L

Notwith-

otwithstanding that those, who spoke before, have sufficiently proved the Justice and great Moderation of your Proceedings, and that *Philip* has broken the Articles of the Peace, from the time it bears date to this very Day; (and indeed all, which has been offer'd on this Subject, has been receiv'd with general Approbation,) yet so little is done in pursuance of these Discourses, that I cannot imagine to what purpose you heard them with such Attention. All our Affairs are still in such a Confusion that, by how much the more plainly it is made appear, That he has not only violated the Peace, but form'd Designs against the Liberty of all the *Grecians*, by so much the more difficult it is to advise you, on this critical Occasion. The reason is; we generally mis-time our Consultations. For it is not, *Athenians*, by Words, but by Actions it is not by force of Arguments, but of Arms, that such unheard-of Insolencies ought to be repress'd. But this is so tender a Point, that your Orators dare not touch upon it, lest, by disturbing your Quietude, they

they shou'd incur your Displeasure, and therefore meanly content themselves with Invectives against his Perfidiouſness, his Injustice, and Oppression. And thus it comes to pass, that both they, and you who sit here in Council, are much better qualified to vindicate yourselves by Arguments and Reasons, than to demand Satisfaction, and stop the progress of *Philip's* continual Usurpations. Common-sense, and Experience, shew us, that every Man excels in that, which he studies and practises with greatest Application: and therefore it is no wonder, if he as much surpasses you in Dispatch and Execution, as you excel him in the Art of composing or judging of popular Orations. If it would answer your purpose to discourse readily of the obligation of Oaths, of the Laws of Nature, and of Nations, you are indeed very well qualified; you might encounter any Adversary at this sort of Weapons. But if it be your business at present, if it immediately concerns our Safety, to stop the growth of his Power, lest it insensibly rise to such a height, that we shall not be able to stem the torrent, it is high time to dismiss these fine

Speculations, and both Speaker and Hearers shou'd prefer the Solid and Necessary to that which is only plausible and entertaining.

In the first place, therefore, if there be any one so credulous, as not to apprehend the fatal Consequences of this formidable Greatness of *Philip*, especially to this State (against which his Designs are principally level'd) I cannot but wonder at that Man's Security. I fear for him who is not in fear for the Public at this Juncture. I intreat therefore, the favour of your Attention, whilst I briefly lay before you the Reasons why I look upon *Philip* as our most dangerous Enemy. If it shall appear, that I see further into these matters, than those who differ from me, you will come over to my Opinion; if not, follow those, who have such honourable Thoughts of his Justice and Integrity.

I will begin with a few Remarks upon the first Attempt he made, immediately after the Ratification of the Peace: which was his seizing the important Pass of *Thermopylae* and possessing himself of *Phocaea*. This done, what use made he of his new Acquisition

To which of the States of *Greece* did he chiefly endeavour to recommend himself, after so considerable an Accession of Power? Did he not seek all occasions of gratifying the *Thebans* (not your best Friends) in preference to you? And wherefore did he this? It was not merely to mortify you; he had much greater views in it. Having no regard for the Peace and Quiet of the World, nor for the Laws of Justice and Equity, but aspiring to nothing less than absolute and universal Empire, he wisely consider'd, that you were no proper Confederates in an Enterprize of that nature: he saw plainly, that neither the nature of our Government, nor the Genius of our People, nor the constant Practice of this State in all Ages, would ever permit you to betray the meanest City of *Greece*, whatever Proposals or Promises he could make; but on the contrary, out of a true Sense of Justice and Honour, and a reasonable Foresight of the bad Consequences of so scandalous a Procedure, you would oppose him with as much Earnestness and Vigour, as if the War had been already declared.

But he had a very different opinion of the *Thebans*; nor was he mistaken in his Conjecture, that they would never be disturb'd at his Encroachments and Depredations, provided they could come in for a share of the Booty; upon that condition, they would be so far from molesting him, or opposing his Designs, that they would be ready to join him with all their Forces, upon the first notice.

In like manner, and with the same view, he at this time courts and caresses the *Messenians* and *Argives*. But this seeming neglect, O *Athenians*, redounds highly to your Honour and Glory: It is an authentic Proof of the secret Veneration he has for your Virtue and Generosity: It is a Testimony from an Enemy, that he looks upon you as the only People of *Greece*, who would not give up the Common Cause for the greater particular Considerations, nor admit of any Equivalent for the general welfare of *Greece*.

This Opinion, which he has conceiv'd both of you, and of the *Thebans* and *Argives*, is confirm'd, not only by the present Conduct of the interested Parties, but by many

many notorious Instances in History. For, (as much a Barbarian as *Philip* is) he has heard, at least, if not read, that, when one of his Predecessors, *Alexander* by name, was sent hither by the Great King, with full Power to offer your Ancestors the Sovereignty of all *Greece*, upon condition that they would do homage to him, they had scarce Patience to hear such a Proposal; but unanimously chose to forsake their native Country, to abandon their Houses and Temples to the Flames, and undergo the greatest Extremities, rather than be Masters of all *Greece* upon such dishonourable Terms. Supported by such an heroic Magnanimity, they perform'd those many glorious Exploits, which so many Historians and Panegyrists have endeavour'd to describe, but never with that Force and Majesty, which so great a Subject requires. We have neither Words, nor Conceptions, equal to their Actions: And therefore I pass them by with silent Veneration. But how different was the conduct of the *Thebans* and *Argives*, on that dangerous occasion! They either stood wholly neuter, or join'd their Forces with those of the Barbarian.

He therefore understood perfectly the Character of both People: He knew, he should have an easy Purchase of those, who had no other measure of Right and Wrong, but their own Interest: but that an Alliance with you would be clog'd with many heavy Incumbrances; which he by no means could endure. You would have served him, so far as Justice, and a due regard to the common Good, would permit, and no further. What should *Philip* do with Friends of that nice and scrupulous Temper? But the *Thebans*, he was assur'd, would stick at nothing; they would not only wear, but even forge, their own Chains. This is the true reason, why he preferr'd their Friendship to yours; for he has not such bad Intelligence, as to believe, they have a greater Fleet than we; nor is he so well satisfied with his Inland Dominions, as to despise the great Advantages accruing by Traffic and the Sovereignty of the Seas: Nor, tho' he seems wholly to have forgot the Articles, has he yet forgot, with what Submissions he obtain'd the late Peace.

But some one, perhaps, will here object, that, tho' *Philip* was appris'd of all this, yet I maliciously assign a false Reason of his Proceedings; and that it was upon a Principle of Justice, not Ambition, that he preferr'd the Friendship of the *Thebans* to yours.

But this is the most unlikely Pretence that can be alledg'd, and especially by *Philip*, at this time: For with what face can he, who now commands the *Lacedemonians* to quit *Messene*, and not long since delivered up *Orcbomenus* and *Coronea* to the *Thebans*, how can he, I say, pretend to do this out of a principle of Justice?

But, they will say, he was constrain'd to do it, much against his Will: (For this is the only Excuse which is left for him): He was so press'd by the *Theban* Infantry on one side, and by the *Theffalian* Horse on the other, that it was not in his power to do otherwise. A very likely Story indeed! Do they then pretend, that he begins to distrust, or is upon ill Terms with the *Thebans*? Some of our wise News-mongers indeed spread about such Stories, and confidently

dently affirm, that he intends to fortify *Elateia*; and yet, how much soever he may be said to intend it, I dare engage he will never perform it. But I will tell you, not what he intends, but what he is now doing. He joins with the *Messenians* and *Argives* to invade *Lacedemon*: He furnishes them with Money and Men: himself too is expected in their Camp with a formidable Army. And can any one believe such Inconsistences, as that he, who so cruelly persecutes the *Lacedemonians*, merely because they are Enemies to the *Thebans*, would re-establish the *Phocians* in *Elateia*, whom, not long since, he has ruin'd? For my own part, I cannot conceive, that, if what he did before was by compulsion, or if he despair'd of the Steadiness of the *Thebans* to his Service, that he would fight their Battels, or express, upon all occasions, so much Zeal for their Interests. It appears therefore plainly, by his Proceedings at this time, that what he did before was not the effect of Necessity, but of Choice.

But his real Design, how much soever he may disguise it by Fictions and Pretences,

by frequent Marches and Counter-marches, is, the Ruin of this Commonwealth. The Violences, he has already committed, lay him under a sort of necessity of attempting it; nor can he think himself safe till it be effected. Consider, I beseech you, what is his prevailing Passion. It is Dominion, it is Empire: And he looks upon you as his only Antagonists, and Obstacles in his way to it. He has long treated you most injuriously; his Conscience tells him so: Nor could he enjoy the Fruit of his other Usurpations without keeping possession of those Places, which, contrary to his Oath, he has wrested from you. For if once you should recover *Amphipolis* and *Potidea* out of his hands, he would then be as unsafe in *Macedon*, as you now are at *Athens*. He knows therefore, both that he has given you the highest Provocations, and that you are sensible of his Intrigues and Practices against you. Nor does he think you so mean-spirited and tame, as to let things pass in this manner: But, taking it for granted, that you only wait for a favourable Opportunity to express your Resentments, he improves

proves all Occasions to take from you the Power, since he can no longer doubt of your Will and fix'd purpose of doing it. There is nothing so vigilant and active as Wickedness detected: and therefore he observes and watches all your Motions; he strengthens himself with Alliances; caresses and bribes the *Thebans*, and such Cities of the *Peloponnesus*, whose Avarice disposes them to sit down contented with any present Advantage, or whose natural Stupidity and corrupt Manners render them incapable of foreseeing the sad Consequences of such Engagements.

We have very plain Instances of this before our Eyes: no Man of common Sense can plead Ignorance of the matter of Fact. I will go no farther than barely to relate to you a Conversation I had, not long since with the *Messenians* and *Argives*: the Relation of it is more pertinent, than I could wish, to our present Circumstances. I spoke to them to this effect.

What think you, *Messenians*, of the People of *Olynthus*? would they not have taken it very unkindly, to have been told any thing

thing to the prejudice of *Philip*, at a time, when he gave them so many Demonstrations of his Affection? When he had lately put into their hands *Anthimus*, an ancient Domaine of the *Macedonian* Kings; had annex'd *Potidea* to their Territory, and expell'd the *Athenian* Colony out of the place, to make room for them, reserving nothing to himself, in all appearance, but only the Resentments of the Parties injur'd; and leaving to them all the Profits of that place and its Dependencies? Would they, then, have suspected such a sudden and sad Reverse of their Prosperity, or have believ'd the Person, who should have warn'd them of it? No, they would not have believ'd it. And yet they paid very dear for this Liberality of *Philip*: They enjoy'd, for a very short space, the Revenues of a Country usurp'd from their rightful Proprietors: They are for ever banish'd from their native Country; most infamously betray'd by one another; subdued, and sold, till they became the Drug of all Markets; expos'd to the Gallies and the Rack; and have learn'd, by dear-bought Experience, the certainty of this

this Maxim, That the too great Intimacy of Commonwealths with Tyrants always proves fatal to the Liberty of the former. What think you of the *Theſſalians*? Could they too have believed, that their Conſtitution wou'd be ſubverted, and new-model'd into arbitrary Tetrarchies, by that very Man, who, a little before, had expell'd their other Tyrants, had lately reſtor'd to them the Cities of *Niſæa* and *Magneſia*? that he, I ſay, who had made them a preſent of *Poſſeſſions*, which never belong'd to them, would deprive them of their ancient Revenues, their Eſtates and Liberties? They would never have believ'd it; and yet, every one knows, all this came to paſs. I apply this to you, *Mefſenians*: You have ſeen *Philip* in his promiſing, and his giving, Humour: you have begun likewise to taſte of his Perfidy and Violence: Take warning therefore by the Calamities of your Neighbours. Hold him, for the future, in the higheſt Detestation; abhor the very Sight and Name of him. Human Societies have, indeed, invented many means for their better Security; ſuch as Walls, Ditches, Ramparts,

and

and the like: All which Defences are rais'd with great Labour, and kept up with continual Expence: But there is one cheap, and never-failing, Preservative in the Breast of all considerate Persons, which is highly useful to private Men, but indispensably necessary to Commonwealths, which have the misfortune to be situated in the neighbourhood of Tyrants: And that is, Circumspection and Distrust. Carry this Charm always about you; never part with it upon any Terms: So long as you keep it you are safe. What is it you aim at? No doubt, at Liberty: and do you not perceive, that not only the Disposition, but the very Title, of *Philip* implies a direct contradiction to Freedom? Every such King, every Tyrant, at least, is a natural Enemy of Liberty, and Subverter of Laws. You earnestly desire an end of this expensive and bloody War: but weigh well the Consequences, lest it prove, upon Trial, not so much an End of the War, as a Beginning of our Slavery.

This is the Substance of what I said at that time: They receiv'd it with Applause, and

and even with troublesome Acclamations: it was press'd upon them by the other Embassadors, and by several others afterwards: and yet, after all, they will not be prevail'd upon to break Friendship with *Philip*, or to forbear giving credit to his deluding Promises.

But it is no such matter of wonder, if the *Messenians*, and some few *Peloponnesians*, should either mistake, or act contrary to, their true Interest: but that you, *Athenians*, Men of such Abilities and Discernment, who have been so often warn'd from this Place, and at this time by me, that the Designs form'd against you are ripe for Execution, that the battering Engines are brought under your very Walls, that you shou'd sit thus idly in this dangerous Juncture, is to me matter of Astonishment, but to you a Presage, or rather Cause, of inevitable Ruin.

There is nothing, in human Nature, so wretched as this unaccountable Humour of preferring a little dear-bought Ease and present Pleasure to our own Happiness and that of our Posterity. But you will take the
mean

means of your Safety into Consideration, as soon as you shall rightly understand the State of your Affairs.

I should now tell you, what Answer ought to be return'd to these Embassadors: Which would have been a much easier Task, if you had proceeded more cautiously in some former Votes and Resolutions. But, before this be done, it were but just that some Persons should be call'd to answer for themselves: I mean those who promised you great Matters, if you would condescend to Sign the late unhappy Treaty of Peace: For neither would I have gone Embassador on that Occasion, nor would you have disbanded the Army, if you had foreseen how great Advantages *Philip* would have made of it: But sure I am, that the Event was very different from the positive Assurances, which those Persons then gave us.

There is another sort of Men, whom I would have call'd to a strict Account. You may remember, when I return'd from my second Embassy, to exchange the Ratifications, perceiving that we were grossly imposed upon, I openly protested against the
Peace'

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Peace, and conjured you not to let *Philip* become Master of *Thermopylae* and *Phocaea*. But a sort of Men there were (and they are those, whom I would have accused) who ridiculed me as a difficult and morose Man (and what better, *said they*, can be expected from an abstemious Water-drinker?) and therefore not to be regarded on this Occasion; but they would engage, provided you would grant *Philip* a Passage thro' those Places, that you should find him as tractable as you could desire; that he would fortify *Thespiae*, and *Phocaea*; would humble the Pride of the *Thebans*; would finish the Campaign thro' the *Chersonesus* at his own Expence and give you nothing less than the Island of *Eubaea* and *Oropus* in Exchange for *Amphipolis*. All these fine Stories were not long since told you from this very Place; they are too remarkable to be forgotten, tho' you have very complaisant Memories, when the grossest Impositions and Indignities are put upon you.

But the most unhappy Circumstance of all is, that the pernicious Effects of this false Treaty do not determine with our own Lives

The Second Philippic. 235

Lives, but, besides the sad Prospect they afford us for our own time, extend, by your solemn Decree, to Posterity: So miserably have you been circumvented in this whole Affair. But you will demand, why I enumerate these Miscarriages, and would have those Persons accused so long after? I will tell you the true Reason without any Reserve, and I invoke Heaven to attest my Sincerity: It is not that I seek Honour to myself by Wranglings and Accusations: I rather abhor them, unless absolutely Necessary: much less would I give Occasion to my old Antagonists, the Pensioners of *Philip*, to demand of him fresh Remittances of Money, in Consideration of the great Risk they run upon his Account: And least of all, that I love to hear myself Talk: But, because I am convinced, that the exorbitant Power of *Philip* will occasion infinitely greater Mischiefs hereafter, than it does at present. The Cloud gathers daily; the Storm seems ready to break over our heads: I sincerely wish I may be mistaken; but if my Prediction should be verified, if the Day shou'd come, when you shall not be

be inform'd by this or that Orator, how sensibly the growing Power of *Philip* concerns you, but shall see and feel it yourselves, you will then grow impatient, and furious: Then, perhaps, these unhappy Instruments of your Misfortunes, silenced by the Consciousness of their Guilt, and fearing the just Rewards of their Treachery, will think of providing for their own Security, nor am I in that case without Apprehension, that your Resentments may fall upon those who had no other View, but only to recover, if possible, what these Men had lost. For Persons, whose Affairs are in the utmost Disorder, seldom look out for the true Author of their Misfortunes, but discharge their Spleen upon the first Man that comes in their way.

Since therefore *Philip* gives us a little Respite, and our Affairs and Minds are in some tolerable Consistency, so that we can yet calmly debate Matters amongst ourselves, I desire you to recollect, who was that good and wise Patriot *, who advis'd you to give

* *The Orator here, and elsewhere in this Oration points at Æschines.*

up *Thermopylae* and *Phocea* to *Philip*: Which
Concession of yours has put it intirely into
his Power either to fall upon the *Peloponne-*
sus, or to march directly hither. So that
we can no longer sit here at our ease, as
formerly, to arbitrate and compose Diffe-
rences betwixt the several Estates of *Greece*,
or consult about foreign Affairs, but are
reduced to a Necessity of providing for our
selves, and securing our own Country from
Invasion and Ruin. When this shall come
to pass, tho' the Concern of some amongst
you may then begin, the Blow was given,
in effect, when that fatal Treaty of Peace
was concluded. If you had not been so
miserably deluded in that Affair, you might
have been the happiest People in the World
at this Day. For neither would *Philip* have
had such a naval Force as to think of making
a Descent upon your Territory; nor could
he have invaded you by Land, whilst you were
secured by *Thermopylae* and *Phocea*. Notwith-
standing the Restlessness of his Temper, he
would have been forced to sit still, and ob-
serve the Rules of Justice and Moderation,
or would quickly have found himself engaged
in

in such another War, as the last, which constrained him to sue for Peace with so much Importunity.

This may suffice to refresh your Memories, for the present: But I pray all the Gods that there never may be Occasion of examining into these Matters with the utmost Severity and Rigour. For I would not have any one punished, how great a Criminal soever he may be, if it cannot be done without Detriment and Danger to the Publick.





THE
ORATION

Concerning the CHERSONESUS.

Translated in 1744.

The ARGUMENT.

*This Oration is a Defence of Diopithes *, the Athenian General, in respect to an Accusation laid against him by Philip King of Macedon. The Athenians had been a long time in Possession of the Thracian Chersonesus, and, about this Time (according to antient Custom) had sent thither a Colony of their poor and indigent Citizens, under the Command of Diopithes. The Chersonesians, in general, received these Athenians very kindly, and allotted them Possessions of Houses*

* He was the Father of Menander the Comedian, and Pericles's particular Friend.

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and Lands. But the Cardians, a People of the Chersonesus, under pretence that the Athenians had no right to that part of the Country they inhabited, refused to admit any of the new Colony; and, when Diopithes wou'd have compell'd them to it by Force of Arms, they demanded Succours of King Philip. That Prince hereupon sent Letters to the Athenians, desiring they would offer no violence to the Cardians his Clients, but settle the Dispute, if they had any cause of Complaint, in a legal way. But, the Athenians paying no Regard to this Request, Philip sent a Body of Forces to the Assistance of the Cardians. Diopithes, in return, took the Opportunity of Philip's Absence in the inland Parts of Thrace, where he was at War with the Odrysians, to invade and plunder the Maritime Parts, which were subject to the King of Macedon; and, before Philip could return, had withdrawn his Forces, and secured himself in the Chersonesus. Philip, not having it in his Power to revenge himself on Diopithes by the way of Arms, wrote Letters to the Athenian Senate, accusing that General of breaking

breaking the Peace, which had been lately concluded between the Athenians and Philip. Hereupon the Orators, who studied to ingratiate themselves with that Prince, declaim'd vehemently against Diopithes, and insisted upon his being severely punish'd. But Demosthenes undertook his Defence; and, in this Oration, shews, first, that his Conduct was strictly justifiable; for, Philip being, in fact, the Aggressor, Diopithes might justly act against him as an Enemy: And, secondly, that it was not for the Interest of the State, to pass any Censure upon that General, who had provided so well for the Defence of the Chersonesus, and kept Philip from possessing himself of that Country. The whole Oration is a bitter Invektive against Philip, and a strong Exhortation to the Athenians to make War against him, as the common Enemy of all Greece, and especially of Athens.

 **T** were greatly to be wish'd, O Men of Athens, that your Orators would divest themselves of all Partiality and Affection, and speak nothing but their

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real Sentiments, especially when Affairs of the greatest Consequence to the Public are the Subject of your Deliberations. But, since the Motives to speaking are various, some arising from Emulation, and others from other Causes, it is your Duty, *Athenians*, in all your Decrees and Actions, to consider only what is most Conducive to the Public Good.

The Business now before us relates to the *Cberfonesus*, and *Philip's* Expedition into *Thrace*, where he has now been eleven Months at the Head of a formidable Army. Nevertheless most of the Speeches, made upon this Occasion, have turn'd upon the Actions and Designs of *Diopithes*. For my own part, I think it a Matter of no Consequence, nor worth disputing, whether you now consider the Accusations brought against those, whom you can at any time punish according to Law, or defer the Consideration of them to another Opportunity. But the Designs of *Philip* against this State admit of no Delay; nor should we suffer our Attention to be diverted, by Clamours or Accusations of another Nature, from that Enemy

of our Country, whose Forces besiege the *Hellefpont*, and threaten to deprive us of those Possessions, which, if the present Opportunity be neglected, we may never have it in our Power to recover.

I have been often surprized at Opinions deliver'd in your Councils, but never more, *Athenians*, than the other Day, when I heard one of your Orators pleading, that you ought either to engage heartily in the War, or inviolably observe the Peace. The Truth of the Case is this. If *Philip* is not in Motion with his Forces; if he does not withhold any of your Possessions, contrary to Treaty; if he is not secretly practising with other States to declare War against you; in God's Name, observe the Peace. But, if the Articles of Peace, which we swore to observe, are notorious, and upon Record; if it is undeniable, that, long before the Departure of *Diopithes* and his Colony (who are now charged with beginning the War,) *Philip* had unjustly invaded your Possessions, (of which the Decrees of the Senate, still extant, are sufficient Vouchers;) if, ever since, with the assistance of the rest of the *Greeks*, and

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even of the Barbarians, he has waged perpetual War against you; what is it these Men mean, when they advise you, either to engage in the War, or observe the Peace? You are not at Liberty to make your Choice: You have nothing left, but that only just and necessary Measure, which they industriously pass over. And what is that? Why, to oppose Force against Force. — Unless they will pretend, that, so long as *Philip* keeps clear of *Attica* and the *Piræus*, he neither insults the State, nor is at War with it. If this be their Rule of judging, whether the Peace is infring'd or not, it is evident, they propose neither justifiable, nor safe Measures.

Besides, the Accusation, they bring against *Diopithes*, destroys itself. For, shall we suffer *Philip* to do what he pleases, provided he meddles not with *Attica*? And shall *Diopithes* not have leave to assist the *Thracians*? And, if he does, shall we charge him with beginning the War? — But, we must not suffer our mercenary Troops to plunder the Countries bordering on the *Hellepont*; and *Diopithes* acts unjustly in intercepting Ships in
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that Sea —— Be it so; I have nothing to say against it. But, if they alledge this sincerely, and out of a Regard to Justice, it is, in my Opinion, incumbent on them, at the same time that they would persuade us to disband our Forces, by calumniating their General, whose Diligence and Care supplies them with Pay and other Necessaries; I say, they ought to make it appear, that, if they carry their Point, *Philip's* Army will likewise be dispers'd. But, if they fail in the Proof of this, be assured, O *Athenians*, their only Aim is to reduce the State to that Condition, which has occasion'd all its Losses.

It is notorious, that nothing has given *Philip* the Ascendant over this State so much, as his early Improvement of all Advantages, his keeping up a standing Force, and the Dispatch with which all his Designs are executed; whereas some Stroke is usually struck before we are in Motion, or make any Preparations for War. Hence it unavoidably comes to pass, that he is enabled to maintain his Conquests; whilst we, by our unseasonable Delays, and neglect of the most favourable Opportunities, involve ourselves in fruit-

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less Expences, and reap nothing but Disappointment and Disgrace. For, whatever your Orators may pretend, O Men of *Athens*, while you sit idle at home, and none of the Forces of this State are in the Field, *Philip* has ample Leisure and Opportunity to put all his Designs in Execution.

Consider the present Posture of Affairs. *Philip* hovers, with a great Army, about *Thrace* and *Thessaly*. In the Spring you will find him laying Siege to *Byzantium*. And can you imagine, the *Byzantines* will not demand Succours from hence? Surely you cannot. On the contrary, rather than submit to *Philip*, they will throw themselves under the Power of any other State, though less confided in than ours; unless he prevents them by a sudden and irresistible Attack. In this Case, as it will be too late for us to assist them with a Naval Force, and no other Power will be at Hand to support them, nothing can possibly save them from Ruin. But, the Folly of the *Byzantines* exceeds all Bounds—True; yet ought we to provide for their Safety, because our own is concerned in it. Besides, we are not sure, *Philip*

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will not invade the *Chersonesus*. On the contrary, if we may judge by his Letter to our Senate, he seems resolved upon that very Expedition. Now, if we keep an Army on Foot, we shall not only be able to defend our own Country, but even to infest his: Whereas, if we disband those Forces we have, what shall we do, if he actually invades the *Chersonesus*? — Call *Diopithes* to an Account, perhaps — And what shall we get by that? — We will immediately dispatch Succours — But what if contrary Winds should prevent their Sailing? — But, *Philip* will not bend his Forces that Way — Who will undertake, that he shall not? Is not the Season of the Year almost come, in which the *Hellepont*, abandon'd by you, its Allies, must inevitably (some think) fall into the Hands of *Philip*? But, supposing he neither attacks the *Chersonesus*, nor *Byzantium*, but, upon quitting *Thrace*, falls directly upon *Chalcis* or *Megara*, as he lately did upon *Oreus*: Wou'd it be best to wait for him there, and suffer the War to approach the Borders of *Attica*, or to find him sufficient Employment where

he now is? I confess, I should choose the latter.

This then being evidently the State of our Affairs, let us not endeavour to weaken or disperse the Army raised by *Diopithes* for the service of the State; but rather add more force to it, by Supplies both of Men and Money. For, shou'd any one put the question to *Philip*; Wou'd you choose, that the Army under *Diopithes* (whether consisting of excellent Soldiers, or not, is another question) shou'd continue powerful, and in Reputation among the *Athenians*, and that its Numbers shou'd be increas'd by the Addition of the Republic's Forces; or that the Calumnies and Accusations of some among them shou'd break and disperse it? I think, he wou'd undoubtedly choose the latter. And are some among us doing the very thing, *Philip* wou'd ask of the immortal Gods? And is it still a question, how our Affairs came into so bad a Situation?

It is my Desire, you wou'd examine freely into the Condition of the State, and consider what measures are proper to be taken in the present Juncture. We are unwilling to

pay our Contributions; we dare not go to war; we misapply the public Revenues *; we refuse payment of the Money assign'd to *Diopithes*, and we are angry at his providing for the Support of the Army by his own Industry, detracting at the same time from his Merit, and keeping a watch over all his Actions; and in the same manner is every thing else conducted among us. In this Disposition, we neglect our Duty; and while, in Words, we extol the Orator, who speaks like a true *Athenian*, in our Actions we join with his Adversaries. Therefore, As, when any one ascends the Pulpit, you presently ask him, What is to be done? Permit me in like manner to ask you, What is to be said? For, if you refuse paying your Contributions; if you decline fighting; if you continue to misapply the public Revenues; if you will neither pay what is assign'd to *Diopithes*, nor suffer him to keep what he has himself provided; in short, if you totally

* Demosthenes means the applying large Sums to the Maintenance of the Theatre. See the Argument of the First Olynthian.

neglect your Duty; I have nothing left to say. If you will indulge Calumniators with such a Licence, as even to accuse a Man of what they pretend he will do, before he has really done it, what can be said?

It may be News to some among you, but I think it my Duty to inform them (and if what I say be false, I acknowledge myself worthy of any Punishment,) that all your Commanders, who have been sent on Expeditions from hence, have taken Money from the *Ghians*, *Erytbreans*, and other Inhabitants of *Asia*, in proportion to the Number and Force of their Ships. Nor are those People such Fools as to give their Money for nothing. It is true, these Exactions go under the specious name of Free-Gifts; but in reality, they are the Price they pay for the Security of their Trade and Navigation. And can it be supposed, *Diopithes* will neglect these Contributions? How shall he maintain his Army, who receives nothing from you, nor has any thing of his own? From the Skies? No, surely, but by what he can collect, beg, or borrow. What then is the Design of his Accusers, but, by cur-

ting off from him all Supplies, to punish him, not only for what he has done, but for what he might have done. They pretend, he exposes the *Greek Colonies* to the Incursions of their Enemies. These Men are grown strangely fond of the *Asiatic Greeks*, and express a warmer Zeal for the Interests of foreign States, than for the Defence of their own Country; as wou'd evidently appear, if they cou'd prevail to have another Commander sent to the *Hellepont*. If *Diopithes's* Conduct is so highly criminal, it is in your power, O Men of *Athens*, by a single *Resolution* of the Senate, to restrain it; and, by our Laws, such Offenders are to be publickly accused, and not (which wou'd be the greatest Madnes) to be opposed with Money and Ships. Against an Enemy, whom our Laws cannot reach, we must necessarily employ our Armies, our Fleets, and our Treasures; but against an offending Citizen we are sufficiently arm'd with Decrees, Accusations, and judicial Proceedings. And to these a wise State will have recourse, and not to the rash Counsels of these insolent Speech-makers.]

But

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But I do not so much wonder at these Men: I am rather surprized to find such a Disposition in your publick Assemblies, that, if any one steps forth, and charges our Misfortunes upon *Diopithes*, or *Chares*, or *Aristophon*, or any other *Athenian*, you immediately assent, and receive his Oration with a Thunder of Applause. But if any one stands up, and speaks the Truth; if he says, You are deceived, O Men of *Athens*, *Philip* is the Source of all these Evils (for had he been quiet, this State wou'd have been so too); tho' you cannot deny the truth of what he says, you hear him with as much Reluctance, as if he was the Messenger of some dreadful Calamity. The reason is—— but, first, in the Name of the Gods, let me freely speak what is for the publick Service—— The reason is; those, who have had the Management of your Affairs for some time past, have render'd you daring and terrible at the Council-board only, but cowardly and contemptible in your warlike Preparations. Hence, if you are told, the Author of these Misfortunes is to be found in the bosom of your own City, and thence liable

liable to its Censures, you readily believe, and are pleas'd that it is so : but if any one points out to you That Man, who can be punish'd only by being conquer'd, you are at a loss how to act, and angry to be undeceived. On the contrary, O Men of *Athens*, your Magistrates shou'd have accustom'd you to a mild and gentle Behaviour in your Assemblies, in which you meet to determine the Rights of your Citizens, and of your Allies; and have made you daring and terrible in War only, in which the Dispute is with your Enemies and Opposers. But now, by a mean compliance with your Humours, and obsequiously courting your Favour, they have so formed and moulded you, that, in your Assemblies, you swell with Pride and Arrogance, and lend a willing Ear to nothing but Complaisance and Flattery; while, at the same time, the very Being and Safety of the State is expos'd to the utmost danger.

But, in the Name of *Jupiter*, O Men of *Athens*, shou'd the *Greeks* expostulate with you for the many Opportunities you have let slip; shou'd they say: " You are perpetu-
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“ ally sending Embassadors to us, to tell us,
 “ that *Philip* has projected the Ruin of all
 “ *Greece*, that we ought to stand upon our
 “ guard against him:” We cannot contra-
 dict it; we have often done it. But, “ O
 “ thoughtless and inconsiderate *Athenians*!”
 (such must be their Language) “ while this
 “ Man was absent from *Macedon* ten whole
 “ Months, prevented by Sicknes, Weather
 “ and War, from returning home, did you
 “ take any measures to restore the Liberty
 “ of *Eubœa*, or to recover your own Pos-
 “ sessions? Did you not sit still at home; did
 “ you not indulge yourselves in full Health
 “ (if the profound Lethargy, in which you
 “ were buried, may be call’d Health) while
 “ he establish’d two Tyrannies in *Eubœa*,
 “ one directly over against *Attica*, to bridge
 “ it, and the other at *Sciathus*; and, by
 “ conniving at his Enterprizes, and suffering
 “ him to invade your Rights, made it
 “ evident to all the World, that you would
 “ not stir a step to procure the Destruction
 “ of ten *Philips*? Why then do you send
 “ Embassadors to us? Why accuse *Philip*?
 “ Why give yourselves this unnecessary
 “ Trouble?

“ Trouble ? ” Shou’d the *Greeks* say all this, what Answer cou’d we return? I profess, I know not.

There are, who think an Orator is sufficiently answer’d by asking him, What then is to be done? To whom I reply, with the utmost Truth and Justice, Not what we are now doing. But I will be more distinct and particular in my Advice, and only desire, these Men wou’d be as ready to act, as they are to question.

In the first place, *Athenians*, you ought to be fully persuaded, that *Philip* has broke the Peace, and is at war with this State; that he is an Enemy to this City, its Territory, and all its Inhabitants, especially those, who think themselves most in his favour. If they think this incredible, let them remember the Fate of *Eutycrates* and *Lasthenes* the *Olynthians*, who, when they had betray’d their City to *Philip*, and were thought his most intimate Friends, were most miserably sacrificed by him. But the principal Object of his Malice is, the Liberty of this State; and he employs his utmost Art and Pains to compass its Destruction. He knows, how
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precarious and insecure all his Conquests must prove, so long as *Athens* is free. For shou'd any reverse of Fortune befall him (as the most prosperous are expos'd to many) all those, whom Force has made his Subjects, wou'd immediately revolt from him and put themselves under the Protection of this State. He knows, *Athens* will never sit down contented with the Enjoyment of her own Liberty, while all the States around her have lost theirs; and that her Arms are never more gloriously and effectually employ'd, than in checking the Ambition of others, in wresting their Power out of the hands of Usurpers, and asserting the Liberties of all Mankind. He is too sensible of this, not to wish so great an Obstacle to his ambitious Designs removed out of the way. In the first place, therefore, you ought to consider him as an irreconcilable Enemy to the Freedom of this State; and nothing but a firm Persuasion of this will rouse you to serious Consideration of the true State of your Affairs.

In the next place, be assured, that all his present Designs are levell'd against this City

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and that all opposition to him tends in some degree to the security of this State. For can any one be so weak as to imagine, that *Philip* wou'd undergo all the Fatigues and Hazards of a Winter Campaign, only to conquer a few paultry Towns of *Thrace*, such as *Drongilus*, *Cabyle*, and *Mastira*; and not rather with an eye to the Harbours, the Docks, the silver Mines *, and the rich Revenues of *Athens*? Will he suffer you long to enjoy these Advantages, and take up his own Quarters in a mere Dungeon †, only to taste the wretched Products of the *Thracian* Soil? No, he endures the one, that he may get possession of the other.

If you are convinced of these Truths, you will think it prudent to shake off this destructive Indolence; you will raise the necessary Supplies; you will concert Measures with your Allies and Confederates; and provide for the Support of a standing Army;

* They were at a place in Attica, call'd Laurium.

† *Εν βαγγοῖς*. It was a kind of Pit, into which the Athenians of the Tribe of Hippothoon used to cast Malefactors sentenced to death. It is used figuratively by our Orator.

that,

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that, as *Philip* has his Legions' in readiness for the Invasion and Conquest of the *Greeks* yours may likewise be ready for their Protection and Defence. Nothing is to be done by sending only auxiliary Forces raised in haste. You must keep on foot a large Army, supply it with all things necessary appoint public Treasurers *, and regulate the Expences in the most frugal manner. When this is done, your Treasurers will be accountable for the Disbursements, and your Generals for the Operations of the War. If you relish this Advice, and take your measures accordingly, you will either procure (what is much to be desired) an honourable Peace, and oblige *Philip* to retire home with his Forces, or you will contend with him upon equal terms. If any one thinks all this cannot be done without great Trouble and Expence, he thinks very rightly for, it must be confess'd, the Inconvenience

* *The Athenians chose certain Magistrates, by Law out of those, whose Estates were valued at Five hundred Medimni, an Attic Measure containing six Bushels. These Officers had the care both of the sacred, and public Money, lodg'd in the Temple of Minerva.*

of War are many and great: but if he reflects on the Dangers, to which the Neglect of these Measures will expose the State, he will see the Expediency of engaging heartily in a business of so much consequence.

Cou'd we be satisfied, upon the word of some God (for no Mortal, in that case, wou'd gain belief) that we might safely neglect all means of Defence, and be under no fear of an Attack from *Philip*; yet, by the immortal Gods, it wou'd sully the Glory of *Athens*, and the Fame of our illustrious Ancestors, for the sake of our own particular Repose, to leave the rest of the *Greeks* exposed to Slavery. I wou'd sooner die than offer you such Advice. If any one else gives it you, and you embrace it, I cannot help it; neglect your own Defence, and abandon the common Cause. But if no one is so rash as to advise such a Conduct; if we are convinced, that the more Conquests we suffer *Philip* to make, the stronger and more powerful Enemy we have to deal with; why all this Reluctance? and when, *Athenians*, shall we begin

gin to take care of our Affairs? — The I suppose, when some urgent Necessity compels us. — But such a Necessity (in the opinion of a Free People) has been long at our Doors; and, surely, we shall not wait for the Necessity of Slaves. For consider the difference: To a Free Man there cannot be a greater Necessity, than to a corrupt and scandalous Administration of Public Affairs; but to a Slave, the most pressing Necessity is, the Smart corporal Punishment — May it never be our own Case!

In representing to you the Conduct of your Leaders for some time past, I have willingly omitted several Particulars. But one thing I must observe. No sooner the least mention made of Affairs relating to *Philip*, but up starts one or other among you, and cries out, “How desirable a thing is Peace! How burthensome the Support of an Army! These Men would plunge us of all our Wealth! And, with Exclamations of this kind, they obstruct all your Measures, and afford *Philip* Leisure and Opportunity to put all his Designs in Execution.

on. And thus you gain present Ease and Quiet, (which, in the Event, I fear, will be found too dear a Purchase;) and these Men, Honours and Rewards. But, why all this pains to persuade you to Peace? Are you not sufficiently inclined to it of yourselves? Let them employ their Eloquence in persuading *Philip* to it, who is actually at War. If they can prevail with him, they are sure of your Concurrence. They complain of Burthen some Expences; but those can never be so, which are incurr'd in providing for our Safety: The greatest Burthen will be, that we must suffer by neglecting to do so. And, as to exhausting the Public Treasure, this is best prevented by a careful and frugal Management of it, not by a total Neglect of applying it to the most useful Purposes. For my own part, O Men of *Athens*, I am highly scandalized, to see you so anxious about the Expences of a War, when it is in your own Power to prevent, as well as to diminish, all Profusion and Misapplication of the Public Money; and at the same time unaffected with the Progress of *Philip's* Arms, who is plundering all the Grecian States

States in their turns, and ultimately contriving the Destruction of this.

But, how comes it to pass, O Men of *Athens*, that, when *Philip* wages open War and lays Siege to the *Grecian* Towns, none of these Men ever pretend, he is committing Acts of Violence and Injustice, but lay the whole blame of the War on those, who wou'd persuade you to resist his Attempts and take up Arms in the Cause of Liberty. The true Reason is: They are sensible, that a War must necessarily be attended with many and great Inconveniences; and therefore would divert the whole Weight of the popular Indignation, which any ill Successes wou'd probably excite, upon those, who give you the most salutary Advice; that whilst the Vengeance of the State falls on these, instead of *Philip*, they may find their Account in turning Accusers, and skreen their own Misconduct from public Censure. This is their real Meaning, when they cry out, "Some among you wou'd plunge the State in a new War:" This is at the bottom of all their Cavilling. But I am persuaded, nothing has encouraged *Philip* to invade

invade our Rights, and at this very time to assist the *Cardians*, so much as the general Aversion of the *Athenians* to War. Whilst we will not acknowledge that he is at War with us, can we expect, he will be so Senseless as to contradict us, and insist upon it that he is? But, shou'd he actually Invade us, what shall we then say? As for *Philip* himself, he will even then deny that he is at War with us; as he did to the *Oritans*, when his Army was in their Country; and to the *Phereans*, before he laid Siege to their City: Nor did he profess himself at War with the *Olynthians*, till he had march'd his Forces into their Territory. Will you, then, lay the blame upon those, who, now, advise you to repel Force with Force? Our becoming Slaves will then be inevitable: for there is no other Mean, if, on the one hand, we will not oppose Force to Force, and, on the other, the Enemy will allow us no Respite.

Nor is the Danger, to which *Athens* is expos'd, the same with that, which threatens other States. It is not merely the Conquest, but the utter Destruction, of this City, which
Philip

Philip aims at. He knows, you neither will, nor can, be Slaves. You are accustom'd to Empire, and can, if you please, give him more Trouble than all the World besides. Let us then be assured, that the very Being of our State is in Danger; and let us not only detest, but severely punish, all those, who wou'd sell both themselves and their Country to *Philip*. We must not expect to get the better of foreign Enemies, till we have censured those domestick ones, who favour their Designs against us. For, so long as you split upon these, as upon so many Rocks, you will never do any thing against those, till it is too late. But, what is it encourages him to insult you, as he now plainly does? Why does he delude others with specious Pretences of Kindness, while he employs open Menaces against you? He bribed the *Thessalians* into their present Subjection; he deceiv'd the unhappy *Olynthians* by giving them *Potidea*, and other Things; and he is now practising the same Arts against the *Thebans*, whom he has put in Possession of *Bæotia*, and deliver'd from a hazardous and expensive war. Thus, while

these several States have had some immediate Advantages in View, some of them have already suffer'd in a manner notorious to the whole World, and others are exposed to the same Danger. As for you, O Men of *Athens*, (not to reckon up all your Losses) in the very Conclusion of the Peace, how were you over-reach'd, and how shamefully plunder'd! *Phocis*! *Thermopylæ*! And, in *Thrace*, *Doriscus*, *Sellium*, and *Chersobleptes* himself! Were they not all lost? Does not *Philip* even now keep Possession of *Cardia*, and openly avow it? And why, think you, does he treat you in so singular a Manner? The Reason is, because, in *Athens* alone, it is lawful to espouse the Interest of an Enemy; and the very Person, who grows rich by betraying his Country, has full Liberty of delivering his treacherous Advice, whilst the Possessions of the State are expos'd a Prey to the Enemy. At *Olynthus*, no one wou'd have dared to plead in favour of *Philip*, had not the People been insatuated by the Surrender of *Potidea*. In *Thessaly*, it wou'd have been unsafe to espouse his Cause, had not the Multitude, by the Expulsion of

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their Tyrants, and the Recovery of their Rank of *Amphictyons* (both the Act of *Philip*) come in for their Share of Advantage. Nor wou'd it have been more safe at *Thebes*, before the Defeat of the *Phoceans*, and the restoring of *Beotia*. In *Athens* alone, tho' *Philip* has not only robb'd us of *Amphipolis* and *Cardia* but fortify'd *Eubæa* so as to be a constant Check upon this State, at *Athens* alone, it is lawful to plead in favour of *Philip*. Nay of those who espouse his Interest, some from being poor, are become rich; others from unknown and obscure, Distinguish'd and Illustrious: While you, on the contrary have exchanged your Glory for Obscurity and your Riches for Poverty. For I reckon the Wealth of a State to consist in its Alliances, and its Credit at home and abroad but in all these you are totally bankrupt. By neglecting these Advantages, and suffering yourselves to be deprived of them, you have render'd *Philip* Great and Successful, and formidable both to the *Greeks* and *Barbarians*; and yourselves despicable and abandoned; distinguish'd, indeed, by an outward Shew of Plenty and Affluence, but, as to

any real Provision for the Strength and Security of the State, contemptible and ridiculous.

I cannot but observe, how inconsistent the Behaviour of some of your Orators is with the Advice they give you. They wou'd persuade you to sit still under the Injuries you suffer; but they will not sit still themselves, tho' no Injury is offer'd them. What! say they, shall we dissemble our Opinions? Shall we be Cowards, and afraid to speak? For my own part, I neither am, nor desire to be thought, a bold, forward, and importunate Speaker. Nevertheless, I cannot but esteem myself more truly brave and courageous, than these rash Counsellors. It is not a Mark of true Courage, to be zealous for Accusations, Prosecutions, and Punishments, to the neglect of the Public Utility. The Confidence of such Men arises from their Safety, which they effectually secure by advising you to such Measures only, as carry no immediate Appearance of Danger to the State. Whereas the Man of true Courage, and real Patriotism, is he, who, for the sake of the Public Good, often opposes

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the general bent of the People ; who gives the most wholesome, tho' not always the most palatable, Advice ; who prefers vigorous Measures, tho' attended with Difficulty and Danger, to timorous, tho' seemingly safer, Counsels ; and who is willing to be accountable to the State for the Success of what he advises or undertakes. This is the truly brave Man ; not those, who, by a temporizing Obsequiousness, have weaken'd the strongest Supports of the State. Men ! whom I am so far from desiring to emulate, and from thinking good Citizens, that shou'd any one ask me, " What Service have you done the " State ? " Instead of reckoning up the Public Offices I have borne, the Gallies I have fitted out, the Contributions I have paid, the Captives I have ransom'd, and other Acts of Humanity done by me, I would acknowledge nothing but my Disapprobation of the present Conduct of Affairs. Tho' I might accuse, prosecute, and punish, as well as others, I was never led to such Practices by Inclination, Avarice, or Ambition. On the contrary, I have sacrificed my own Reputation and Credit with you, by constantly giving

such

such Advice, as, if follow'd, wou'd have advanced the Reputation and Credit of the State. This, perhaps, I may boast of without exciting Envy. But I should have thought I acted the part of a very bad Citizen, had I advised such Measures, as would have aggrandized myself, but have ruin'd the Commonwealth. For I ever look'd upon the Interests of the Government and of the People as inseparable; and think every one ought to propose what is best, rather than what is easiest to be done. We are naturally inclined to take up with the latter; but the Understanding and Eloquence of a good Citizen ought to be employ'd in promoting the former.

I have heard it objected to me, that I do indeed give good Advice, but that the Posture of Affairs requires something more than Words. Upon which I will fairly deliver my Sentiments. I am of Opinion then, that the Duty of a Counsellor is only to propose what is fittest to be done. And this, I think, may be easily proved. You may remember what *Timotheus* once said to you, when he was advising you to assist the

Eubæans against the *Thebans*, who had invaded them: “O *Athenians* (said the Orator) “are you now deliberating what Measures “you shall take, when the Enemy is actually in the Island? Why do you not press “to the Haven, and embark immediately? “Why do you not cover the Sea with “Ships?” This was *Timotheus’s* Advice, and, by following it, you effected the Business. But if, thro’ Indolence, you had neglected it, wou’d the State have reap’d the Advantage it then did? no, certainly. In like manner, whatever is proposed by me, or any one else, at present, as fit to be done, the putting it in Execution depends intirely upon yourselves, the explaining and inforcing the Advice is alone the proper Business of the Orator.

I will briefly recapitulate what I would propose, and have done. My Advice is, that you raise the necessary Supplies of Money; that you recruit and maintain the Army now on Foot; that you look into, and rectify, past Miscarriages, and not give all up for the Cavils of a few Men; that you send Embassadors to the neighbouring States, with proper

proper Instructions for the Management of your Interests abroad; that you severely punish, and hold in utter abhorrence, all corrupt Betrayers of the State at home, that wise and good Men may find their Account in a prudent and virtuous Behaviour. If you follow this Advice, and rouse from your present Thoughtlessness and Inactivity, you may promise yourselves success in all your Undertakings. But if you exert yourselves only in praising and applauding an Oration, and will not stir a Step when any thing is to be done, the Orator may spare his pains; for all the Eloquence in the World will not save a State, which does nothing to prevent its own Ruin.





THE THIRD
P H I L I P P I C.

Translated, in 1702,

By the Honourable Colonel Stanhope.

The A R G U M E N T.

Philip pretending to be at Peace with the Athenians, and yet doing them many Injuries, the Orator here exhorts them to rouse from their Lethargy, and provide against the Dangers, which threatned themselves, and all Greece, from the common Enemy.

 HO' much has been said, Men of Athens, almost in every Assembly, concerning the Injuries, which *Philip* has done, not only to you, but to the other *Greeks*, since he made Peace: And tho' it be agreed by all (I am confident of it) even by those, who do not act as they ought, that it is incumbent on every Man to direct his
Words

Words and Actions towards repressing and chastising this Man's Insolence, I see, notwithstanding, our Affairs brought to such a Pass, by our Mismanagement, that I fear it may be said with Truth, how disagreeably soever it may sound to you, That, should all your Orators, and your selves, have conspired, they to propose, and you to enact, what was most Pernicious, our Condition could not be worse than it now is. This ill State of our Affairs may be ascribed to many Causes, for one or two could never thus have ruined them. But, upon inquiry, you will find a principal one to be, the Corruption of your Speakers, who choose rather to propose what will be most pleasing to you, than useful to the State. Some of them, *Athenians*, if they can but secure to themselves Power and Credit, take no care for the future, nor imagine that you ought to be more careful. Others, by impeaching your Ministers, and charging them with false Crimes, labour only to make one part of your City punish the other, that, while you are thus employed, *Philip* may be at Liberty to say and do whatever he pleases.

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pleases. These are the Measures which you follow; and these are the Causes of your Confusion and your Errors. I intreat you, *Athenians*, to bear with my Freedom of Speech, and not to be angry at the Truths I shall tell you. Consider rather, that, in other things, you think it so necessary to allow Liberty of Speech to all who inhabit your City, that even Strangers, nay your Slaves, share it with you; it being common to see Servants among you speak their Sentiments with greater Freedom than Citizens are allow'd to do in some other States. And yet this Freedom is banished from your Councils: from whence it follows, that, being perpetually cajoled and flattered by Discourses contrived to please your Ears, you live deluded in a mistaken Security, whilst the Publick is really in the utmost danger. If, therefore, you are at present in the same Disposition, I have nothing more to say; but if you are willing to hear, without Disguise or Flattery, what may conduce most to your Welfare, I am then ready to speak: for tho', thro' our Supineness, things are in a very ill Posture, it is

not yet impossible to redress them, provided you resolve to act as you ought. What I am about to say may appear a Paradox, tho' it be most true. It is, that the very fatal Cause of our past Misfortunes proves the greatest Security for our future Success. But what do I mean by this? I mean, that the wretched Condition you are in is to be imputed wholly to your own Neglect, who have not done one single thing, which might prevent it: for if these Misfortunes had come upon us, notwithstanding we had taken prudent Measures, there would then be no hopes left of Amendment; whereas *Philip* can now be said to have overcome only our Sloth and Negligence, but not the State: You cannot have been defeated, who never moved a Step to oppose him.

If we were all agreed, that *Philip* has broken the Peace, and is making War against us, it would only be necessary to consult about the most easy and secure Methods of resisting him: But since there are Men so unreasonable as to hearken to the false Suggestions of some of your Speakers, who, at
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the very time when *Philip* is seizing neighbouring Towns, has possess'd himself of many Places which belong to you, and is unjustly disturbing all Mankind, would yet make us pass for the Aggressors, and charge some of us with being Authors of the War; it is necessary to proceed with Caution, and to rectify such a mistake, lest, if any Man shall, in Speech or Writing, advise how we may best defend ourselves, he may afterwards be impeached and tryed as a Disturber of the Peace. I, therefore, begin by declaring this to be my Opinion, that, if the Choice of War or Peace be left in our power, if it be possible for us to enjoy Peace, we ought certainly to choose it; and whoever is of the same Opinion ought to justify it by Speaking and Voting without Prevarication. But if a Neighbour, powerfully armed, amuses us with the name of Peace, while he is committing Acts of Hostility, what is there left for us to do, but to oppose Force to Force? If, after his Example, you will give to the War, you shall make against him, the name of Peace, I consent; But if any Man can really imagine That to be a Peace,

Peace, by which *Philip*, subduing all our Neighbours, is forcing a Way to attack us, he is certainly not in his right Senses: at best it can be said to be a Peace but on one side, that is, a Peace of the *Athenians* with *Philip*, but not of *Philip* with the *Athenians*. This Advantage he has purchased by so many Bribes, that he can make War upon you, whilst *Athens* most religiously observes Peace with him. We are certainly the most stupid of Men, if we expect that he will ever declare War against us: no, tho' he were in the middle of *Attica*, or in our very Port, he will not own it; his Treatment of others in the like case may sufficiently warn you. He owned not his Design upon *Olynthus*, till he came within five Miles of that unhappy City: he then sent them this Message, that one of these two things were necessary, either that they should quit *Olynthus*, or himself *Macedon*. If, at any time before, the *Olynthians* conceived the least Jealousy of him, he took it very ill, and sent Embassadors to vouch for the Sincerity of his Intentions. When he marched against the *Phocians*, did he not pretend it was to assist them

them as his Friends and Allies? Their Embassadors were attending him in his Camp, and many amongst us thought that Expedition might prove fatal to the *Thebans*. It was under the like pretence of Alliance and Friendship, that he lately entered *Theſſaly*, and ſeized *Pheræ*, which he ſtill keeps; and, laſt of all, he has told the unhappy *Oritans*, that, hearing of the Factions and internal Diſtempers of their City, he had, out of his Affection, ſent Soldiers to viſit them, judging it to be the Duty of a true Friend, and good Ally, not to be wanting on ſuch occaſions. Can you then believe, that, ſince he rather choſe to employ Deceit, than open Force, againſt Enemies, whoſe little Power could not be dangerous to him, and whoſe Reſiſtance, if they had been prepared, could ſcarce have ſecured them; Can you, I ſay, believe, that he will declare open War with you, eſpecially when he finds you ſo willing to be deceived? No, it cannot be; he would be the moſt fooliſh of Men, if, finding you, as he does, diſpoſed to reſent the Injuries, he has done you, not againſt him, but againſt each other, and to vent all

your

your Indignation in impeaching and bringing to trial some of your own Citizens, he should put an end to your Strife and Factions, encourage you to take up arms against himself, and deprive our venal Orators of their most specious Argument for delaying your Resolutions, which is, that *Philip* does not make war upon us.

But is it possible, O ye Gods! that any reasonable Man will judge, whether a Prince makes war, or keeps the Peace, by the names he gives to either, rather than by his Actions? No, there can be no such Man. *Philip*, immediately after the Conclusion of the last Peace, and before *Diopithes* commanded your Armies, or you had sent the Troops which are in the *Chersonesus*, had possess'd himself of *Serrium* and *Doriscus*, and driven out the Garrisons, which our General had placed in *Serrium*, and the holy Mountain. What name then shall we give to such Overt Acts? For, take notice, he had then sworn to observe the Peace. Nor let any Man object, of how little moment these Actions were to our State: for whether these were trifles in themselves, and of

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no consequence to us, is another Question. But that the Transgression of what is just and sacred, whether it be in great or small matters, ought to have the same weight, is certain. But even now that he sends mercenary Soldiers, owns his giving Assistance, and writes such Letters to your Subjects of the *Chersonesus*, which both the King of *Persia* and all the *Greeks* own of right to be yours, how shall we term such Proceedings? For he professes, that he makes no War. For my part, I am so far from allowing, that, whilst he is guilty of such Practices, he does not violate the Peace, that I look on his Attempts upon *Megara*, his Endeavours to establish Tyranny in *Eubœa*, his present Expedition to *Thrace*, his secret Practices in the *Peloponnesus*, and, in short, his doing all this with a high hand, relying on his Force, as so many notorious Acts of Hostility, and direct Breaches of the Peace; unless you will suppose him, who is erecting Machines and Batteries against a Town, to be at Peace with that Town, till the very Instant that his Engines begin to play and shake its Walls. But That no Man will maintain; on the contrary,

contrary, whoever is erecting Works, by which I am to be taken, makes War upon me, tho' a Dart has not been thrown, or an Arrow shot. Reflect then, *Athenians*, to what Dangers you will be exposed, if he effects these Projects, if the People of the *Hellespont* be alienated from you, if your Enemy becomes Master of *Megara* and *Eubæa*, and if he engages the *Peloponnesus* in his Interest. Can you, then, I ask, look on him, who is raising such Engines against your State, to be at Peace with you? You must certainly judge quite otherwise. For from the Day that he ruin'd the *Phoceans*, from that Day, I pronounce, he has made War upon you; and for that reason I affirm, that you ought in prudence immediately to stop his Progress, and that, if you now defer it, it will be out of your power, when you shall hereafter attempt it. I am also of an opinion far different from others, who have advised you: They are for deliberating and debating, what is fit to be done concerning *Byzantium* and the *Chersonesus*, whereas I think you ought to assist them, without any delay, to take the utmost care
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lest any Ill befall them, and to send forth-
with whatever is wanting to the Generals
you have there. You ought next to deli-
berate about the State of all *Greece*, as being
exposed to the greatest danger. I shall lay
before you the Reasons I have to be thus
apprehensive, that, if my Fears be well
founded, you may become sensible of your
Danger, and take some care for your own
Security, tho' you neglect that of others.
If, on the contrary, they appear chimeri-
cal, and that you judge me struck with a
panick Terror, I am willing, both now and
ever after, to forfeit your Attention, and to
be accounted guilty of the greatest Extrava-
gance.

To convince you, then, with how much
reason I am alarm'd for you, I might offer
to your Reflexions, from how small a Be-
ginning and low State *Philip* is arrived to
his present Grandeur: I might next describe
the miserable State of *Greece*, torn and dis-
vided by the Rage of Faction, and the im-
placable Animosities of contending Parties.
Which Posture of Affairs at home duly con-
sider'd, we ought not so much to wonder

at the prodigious growth of *Philip's* power, from the time past to this Day, as we should have reason to do, if, after having gained so much upon us, he should not proceed and subdue the whole. But these, and many other Considerations of this kind, I shall wave at present, and insist on this chiefly, that he has obtained one Point by the Concession of all the *Greeks*, beginning with yourselves, which was ever contested heretofore, and which produced all the Wars we ever had in *Greece*. What is, then, this mighty Advantage we allow him to usurp? It is no less, *Athenians*, than the Privilege of doing in *Greece* whatever he pleases, of destroying singly whomsoever he thinks fit, of ravaging Provinces, and reducing Towns to Slavery. You were formerly the *Umbilions* of *Greece*, and held the Reins during Seventy-three Years. The *Spartans* enjoy'd the same Rank Twenty-nine. And, of late, the *Thebans* make a considerable Figure, since the Battle of *Leuctra*. But neither you, nor the *Thebans*, nor *Sparta*, were ever suffered, by the other *Greeks*, to exercise an arbitrary Power over them. Quite contrary,
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Athenians: when you, or rather your Ancestors, were thought to want Moderation towards some of your Neighbours, it was universally agreed to make War upon you, and those, who had no reason to complain of you on their own account, appear'd as forward in the Quarrel, as those who had been injured. Again, when the *Lacedemonians* succeeded you in Power, they no sooner began to carry themselves with Insolence, and with a high hand to make changes in several Governments, but all *Greece* joined in a War against them, not excepting those, who had been well treated under their Government. But it is needless to urge other Examples; have not we ourselves, and the *Spartans*, been engaged in Wars undertaken purely in the Defence of others, whom we saw injured, when not the least Injury had been offer'd to either of us by the other? But *Philip* has, in not full thirteen Years that he has appeared upon the Stage, done more Injuries to *Greece*, than could ever be laid to the charge, either of the *Spartans* during their Thirty, or of your Ancestors during their Seventy Years Administration.

nistraton. Yes, *Athenians*, all the injurious Proceedings, that can be imputed to either of these States, during so long a Tract of Time, put together, equal not the smallest part of his. Nor will what I here advance require far-fetch'd Proofs; for, to say nothing of *Olynthus*, *Metbone*, *Apollonia*, and two and thirty Towns in *Thrace*, all of which are so miserably destroy'd, that a Traveller will not discover the least Trace or Footstep, that ever they were inhabited; and to pass over so great a People as the *Phoceans*, who are wholly cut off; let us reflect on the present State of the *Thessalians*. Has not *Philip* destroyed their Towns, subverted their Government, and divided their Country into four Districts, subject to as many Tetrarchs: so that, instead of some Towns, which were before oppress'd by particular Tyrants, the whole Country is now enslaved by his Viceroys. Do not the Towns of *Euboea* labour under the Yoke of Tyrants, and this at the Gates, as it were, of *Thebes* and *Athens*? Does he not write plainly in his Epistles, *I profess to be in Peace with all who will obey me*? nor does he only write so, but confirms

confirms his Words by Actions. He is rendering himself Master of the *Hellespont*, having before attacked *Ambracia*: *Elis*, a Town so considerable in the *Peloponnesus*, is become subject to him; and, not long since, he attempted to surprize *Megara*. Neither *Greece*, nor the Country of the Barbarians, can contain his Ambition. Yet we, who are *Grecians*, see and hear all this, without Emotion. We think not of sending Embassies to awaken each other, and to rouse up our Indignation. We seem rather plunged in a profound Lethargy; and, as if the Ramparts of each Town were an impenetrable Barrier that divided it from all Mankind, we have not, to this Hour, done the least thing which we might or ought to have done; not taken the least step towards uniting in our common Defence, towards contracting Friendships and Alliances for our mutual Security. We neglect and overlook the growing Power of our Enemy, and each of us thinks, that he gains so much time for himself, as *Philip* is employing to the Destruction of his Neighbour; but how to secure the common Liberty of *Greece*, n

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Scheme, no Measures are so much as thought of; and yet no Man can be ignorant, that *Philip*, like a Fever, or any other periodical Distemper, the Return of whose Fits is certain, is making a sure Progress towards him, who thinks himself farthest from danger.

It is true, *Athens* and *Sparta* have formerly committed Acts of Injustice: But the *Greeks*, who were then oppressed, were at least oppressed by *Greeks*, and became subject to their Brethren and Countrymen. Their Transgression might be compared to the Extravagance of a Son, born Heir to a great Estate, which if he mismanages and squanders, he deserves indeed Reproof and Blame, yet can it not be said of him, that he is a Stranger, nor will he be thought to have forfeited his Right of Inheritance: But if a Slave, or supposititious Son, should waste and destroy what he is no way related to, all Men would agree, that such an Ingratitude is far more grievous, and deserves the utmost Resentment. Why then do not Men reason thus in relation to *Philip*, who is far from being a *Greek*, or having any Relation to *Greece*, that few, even among
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the Barbarians, would own the Place of his Extraction? A vile *Macedonian*! sprung from a Country, which formerly did not afford a good Slave! And with what Indignity does this Man treat us all! After so many *Greek Towns* destroyed by him, does he not preside at the *Pythian Games*, the general Entertainments of all *Greece*? and if he does not vouchsafe to assist in Person, he sends his Slaves thither to have the Direction of them. He is Master of *Thermopyle*, and the Passages into *Greece*; he guards them with foreign Soldiers; he has assumed the Privilege of being first admitted to consult the *Delphic Oracle*, contrary to your Right, to that of the *Thessalians*, the *Dorians*, and of all the *Amphictyons*, to whose Assembly not all, even *Greeks*, are allowed to send Representatives. He prescribes to the *Thessalians* how they are to be govern'd; he sends his mercenary Soldiers, some to *Porthmus*, to drive out the *Eretrians*; others to *Oreum*, to set up there the Tyrant *Phili- stides*. All this the *Greeks* see, and bear patiently: They look on it as on a Storm of Hail, which every Man prays may not
light

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light upon his own Grounds, but no body goes about to fence against.

Nor do we suffer only the Injuries and Affronts, offer'd to *Greece* in general, to pass unpunish'd: our Insensibility goes yet farther, and is carried to the highest pitch, since no one thinks of revenging his own Wrongs. Has not *Philip* invaded *Ambracia* and *Leucas*, both Towns subject to *Corinth*? Has he not forced *Naupactus* from the *Achaians*, and sworn to deliver it to the *Ætolians*? Has he not taken *Echinus* from the *Thebans*? Is he not marching against the *Byzantines* your Confederates? And, to say no more, is he not now in possession of *Cardia*, the greatest Town of the *Chersonesus*? Thus insulted, thus notoriously injured, we are all of us irresolute and indolent; we only look at one another, and mistrust one another. Now, if he treats, with such Insolence, the whole Body of *Greece*, what think you will be his Carriage, when he shall have successively subdued each of us? What then can be the Reason of our present passive Disposition? For there must be some Reason assignable, why the *Greeks*, who

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have

have been so zealous heretofore in defence of Liberty, are now so prone to Slavery. There was then, *Athenians*, a Principle fix'd in the Minds of all Men, which is no more. That Principle overcame the *Persian* Wealth, preserved the Freedom of *Greece*, and never failed to make us Conquerors both by Sea and Land. But, now that it is worn out, all goes to ruin amongst us. And what was this Principle? It was somewhat very plain and simple; it was an implacable Hatred against all who suffered themselves to be bribed by Men ambitious of Power, or by the Enemies of *Greece*. To have been convicted of Bribery was, then, accounted the highest Guilt; it was punished with the utmost Severity; no Mercy, no Remission was to be expected. It was not, then, possible to purchase of your Orators, or Generals, with ready Money, those critical Occasions, those favourable Opportunities, which Fortune sometimes offers to the Inactive and Careless against the most Vigorous and Diligent. No Gold could, then, weaken our firm Concord at home, our Hatred and Distrust of Tyrants and Barbarians.

or any of our other virtuous Dispositions. But all these are now bought and sold publickly as in a Market. Corruption has now introduced Manners quite opposite, which have proved the Bane and Destruction of our Country. If Men are angry now, it is with those, who detect and reprove such Villainy. Is a Man known to have received foreign Money? People envy him. Does he own it? They laugh. Is he formally convicted? They pardon him. Thus universally has this Contagion spread amongst us.

We are now stronger in Shipping, and Numbers of Men; have larger Revenues; and abound in all Things, which are thought to make the Strength of a Government, more than ever our Ancestors did. But all these Advantages are rendered useless to us by the Practices of those, who traffick for the Publick. The Truth of all I here advance, concerning your present Dispositions, you are but too sensible of: I need not undertake to prove it. But that, in former times, you were quite otherwise affected, I shall prove, not by Arguments

of my own, but by an Inscription of your Ancestors: they ordered it to be engraven on a Pillar of Brass, and to be preserved in our Citadel, not for their own use (they needed not Inscriptions to remind them of their Duty to the Publick) but that you might have an everlasting Monument and Example of the Necessity you lie under to guard, with the utmost care, against Corruption. The Inscription is this; *Be Arthmius the Zelite, Son of Pythonax, infamous, and an Enemy to the People of Athens, and their Confederates, he and his Posterity.* — The Reason follows, why this was done. — *Because he brought Gold from Media into Peloponnesus: it is not said, to Athens.* This is the Inscription. Consider now, in the Name of *Jupiter*, and all the Gods, and reflect with yourselves, how the *Athenians* of that Age reasoned, and how much Dignity they expressed by this Action. They declare this *Arthmius* an Enemy to their State and Allies, and that he shall ever be infamous, with his Posterity, for having, as a Slave, in obedience to his Master the King of *Persia's* Command, (*Zelea* being in that
King's

King's Dominions) brought his Gold, not into *Athens*, but only into *Greece*. Nor by this was meant Infamy alone: For what did it import a *Zelite* to be debarred from all Honour and Privilege, or to be shut out from all Society, at *Athens*? This therefore is not the Sense of the Inscription; but it implies a capital Punishment: As when, in Cases of Murder, a Man flies from Justice, let such an Offender, says our Law, die infamous: And whoever kills him, let him be accounted guiltless.

Our Ancestors thought it was incumbent on them to watch for the Security of all *Greece*: otherwise they would not have concern'd themselves at what pernicious Bargains were driving in the *Peloponnesus*; nor would they have inflicted so severe a Punishment, as the Proscription above-mention'd, on such as were distributing Bribes there. When they follow'd such measures, it is no wonder that *Greece* was formidable to the Barbarians, who are now become terrible to us; for you observe not the same Conduct, either in this, or any other thing. You are conscious of the Truths I tell you;

it is therefore needless for me to spend more time in accusing all the *Greeks*; for I do that sufficiently in censuring you. They are all equally blameable; none are less in fault than yourselves. I therefore pronounce, that, in order to retrieve the wretched Condition, to which your Mismanagement has reduced you, you must use your utmost Application, exert the greatest Vigour, and attend to wholesome Advice. But who shall give it? Do you command me to speak, and will you calmly hear it? — Let the Clerk read.

Here the Clerk reads, after which Demosthenes proceeds.

I find this frivolous Argument, made use of by some, to comfort and flatter us, That *Philip* is yet far from being so powerful as were formerly the *Lacedemonians*: they were Masters of the Sea and Land; they had for Confederate the great King; in short their Power seemed irresistible. *Athens* notwithstanding (say they) coped with this formidable Power, and is still a City. In answer to this, I shall observe, that, amongst the many Changes and Improvements, which
have

have been made of late, nothing seems to have received a greater Alteration, or to have been brought to so great a degree of Perfection, as the Art of War. For we are told, that not only the *Lacedemonians*, but all the other *Greeks*, made Expeditions formerly, which lasted only the four or five Summer Months: during which time they infested their Enemy's Country with Troops composed of their own Citizens heavily armed; and at the end of that Season every Man returned to his own home. Besides, their Simplicity and Plain-dealing, at that time, was such, that Gold and Silver were never made use of to procure Advantages in War, which was then subject to certain Laws of Probity; whereas, now, you see that Traitors have almost ruin'd us, and that nothing is decided in the Field by open Force, or fair fighting. You hear of the many sudden Expeditions, which *Philip* makes without opposition; the Success of them is owing, not to his Phalanx or heavy armed Troops, but to his Light Horse and foreign Archers; with these he is always in motion, and ready to lay hold on every

Advantage, which the Discord and mutual Jealousies, raised by his Emissaries, give him over a City. He has no Sallies to fear from a Place, where each Man's Diffidence, and Apprehension of Treachery, makes him backward to hazard any thing. Unmolested, he is suffered to wait for his Engines, and whatever is necessary to form a regular Siege. I may add, that he knows no difference of Summer and Winter; no Season is to him improper for Action. Since you know all this, does it not behove you to keep the War out of your own Country? For if you compare this Man's way of making War with the Simplicity of your ancient Enemies the *Lacedemonians*, and take your measures upon that foot, you will certainly be undone. Your chief care therefore must be, by early Preparations, and by finding work for him at home, to prevent his invading you. Nor is it your business to engage him in pitched Battles; the Experience of his Troops may there give him a Superiority over you. But, as to the main of the War, we have by Nature a thousand Advantages over him; amongst others, the
Situation

Situation of his Country, which lies extremely exposed to be infested and harassed by our Fleets and Armies. But there will be wanting, besides Fleets, or Armies, or military Prowess, some other things to make us victorious. Wisdom, and Steadiness in our Counsels, and a just Resentment against those, who take his part amongst us. You ought to be fully persuaded, that it will be impossible to get the better of your Enemies without Doors, 'till you have punished those, who are doing his business in the midst of your City. But, O prodigious! you neither can, nor will, inflict such necessary Punishment; you seem infatuated, or rather possessed and instigated by some evil *Demon*, to such a degree, that you applaud these Mercenaries: be the Motive what it will, be it Envy, or the Pleasure you take in hearing Railing, and ill-natured Jest, yourselves call up these Hirelings to speak. That they are hired, and have received Bribes, some of them cannot deny: nevertheless you laugh, and are pleased, when they abuse some honest Patriot. Nor is this, tho' bad enough, the worst Mischief you have

drawn on yourselves; these Wretches are intrusted with the Administration, and you have made it safer for them to betray the Publick, than for honest Men to defend it. That you may be warned of the Calamities, to which the Deference you have for these Men will expose you, I will instance to you some known Examples. There were, in *Olynthus*, amongst the principal Citizens, two Factions, the one devoted to *Philip*, and absolutely govern'd by him; the other zealous for their true Interest, and using their utmost Endeavours to preserve their Country from Slavery: now which of these two, think ye, were the Authors of its Ruin? Which of them betray'd the Body of Horse, whose loss proved fatal to that City? *Philip's* Partizans were guilty of this Treachery. Whilst *Olynthus* was in being, they so blackened the Reputation of virtuous Men by Calumnies and the Imputation of forged Crimes, that the deluded People banish'd *Apollonides*. Nor is *Olynthus* the only Example of a People undone by such Practices. The same Disorder has, in other Places, been attended with the same Consequences.

sequences. When the People of *Eretria* had, by driving out *Plutarch* and his foreign Soldiers, made themselves a free State, and were Masters of *Portimus*, some of them inclin'd to us, and some to *Philip*; the latter prevailed, and the unhappy *Eretrians* were at length persuaded by them to banish their Defenders; the Consequence of which was, that *Philip*, their Friend and Ally, sent into their Town *Hipponicus*, with a thousand Soldiers, who razed the Walls of *Portimus*, and establish'd over them three Tyrants, *Hipparchus*, *Automedon*, and *Clitarchus*. Not satisfied with this, he has, twice since, driven them out of their Country, when, recover'd from their past Errors, they aspired to become free. *Eurylochus* and *Parmenion* were severally the Ministers of his harsh Commands. But to what purpose should I dwell longer on this Subject? Are not *Philistides*, *Menippus*, *Socrates*, *Thoas*, and *Agapæus*, become Tyrants of *Oreum*? and were they not lately corrupt Citizens of that Town, wholly devoted to *Philip's* Interest? This is publickly known, and that *Euphræus*, a Man,

Man, who for some time resided in your City, and who, to the utmost of his power, struggled to preserve his Country from Tyranny, was by his Fellow-Citizens treated with such Scorn and Indignity, as would be tedious to relate. For, the Year which preceded the Ruin of *Oreum*, he, having observ'd the Practices of *Philistides* and his Associates, accus'd them of Treason, when a Faction, supported and encourag'd by *Philip*, laid hold on him, and hurried him to Goal, as a Disturber of the Publick Tranquillity. The People, who saw this Violence, instead of supporting the innocent Man, and punishing the Authors of his Oppression, sided with them, insulting over the Patriot; said he had nothing but what he deserved, and rejoiced at his Sufferings. The Traitors by these means became sole Masters, and, acting without controll, easily compassed their pernicious Design of delivering up the City to their Patron. For if any were apprehensive of their treacherous Practices, the Example of *Euphraeus* struck such an Awe and Terror into them, that not a Man durst warn them

of

of their approaching Calamity, till the Enemy appear'd under their Walls; and whilst, in that Confusion, some defended themselves, others let in the Enemy. The Town being thus treacherously taken, these Men lord it, and are become Tyrants; they have banish'd, or put to Death, all such as had appear'd forward to defend themselves, and to deliver *Euphræus*. That generous Citizen kill'd himself, to give a last convincing Proof, that his opposing *Philip* proceeded from a strict Regard to Justice, and a sincere Love to his Country. You may, perhaps, wonder, what Motive could induce the *Olynthians*, the *Eretrians*, and the *Oritans*, to be thus byass'd towards the Partizans of *Philip*, preferably to those who advised them to pursue only their true Interest. It was the same, which prevails with you, *Athenians*; it was, that whoever will give salutary Advice can never be guilty of Flattery, nor affect Popularity at the Expence of Truth: His only Aim is to save the Public. The corrupt Minister, on the contrary, does the greatest Service to *Philip*, by soothing and flattering the Multitude. Did an honest Citizen,

Citizen, at *Olynthus*, or elsewhere, propose a Tax? The Hirelings opposed it. Did one say, a War was necessary, and that *Philip* was not to be trusted? The others were for Peace, and for lulling them into a Security, which lasted till it was too late to prevent their Ruin. You will easily imagine, they did not agree better in other things; which makes it needless for me to go through more Particulars. The Pensioners ever studied to propose what would be most grateful at the present time. The well-meaning Citizen never feared to utter what was necessary for the Public Safety, how disagreeable soever. When, at length, the People became sensible of their Condition, and were no longer to be deluded by Flatteries, despair of Success made them negligent; they gave way to the Times, and thought it was in vain to struggle with an Enemy, whom their own Negligence had raised to be an Overmatch for them. I call the Gods to witness, *Athenians*, that I tremble, least this prove to be one Day your Case; least such a Despair may seize you, when the late Reflexions you shall make will be found to be

of no use. I therefore do not barely hate, I abhor and detest those, who are bringing such Mischiefs upon you: Whether thro' Design, or thro' Ignorance, they ruin you, what imports it? But why talk I of Ruin, *Athenians*? Heaven avert such a Calamity. It is better a thousand times to die, than, by a base Complaisance for Flatterers, to strengthen our Enemy, and to sacrifice any of those, who, in their Speeches and Counsels, have endeavour'd to assert your Liberty. Have not the *Oritans* been egregiously Rewarded for the Confidence they placed in *Philip's* Emissaries, and their Expulsion of *Euphræus*? Or let the *Eretrians* boast of the kind Return made them for having dismiss'd your Embassadors, and surrender'd themselves to *Clitarchus*: They are now Slaves, are whip'd and tortur'd. Nor has he spared the *Olynthians*, who made *Lasthenes*, his Creature, General of their Horse, and banish'd *Apollonides*. It is Folly, it is Stupidity, when we foresee these Evils, instead of arming ourselves, and taking the wisest Precautions against them, to be amused by the Discourses of our Enemies, and to believe, upon their
Credit,

Credit, that our State is so powerful, that we can have no Reason to fear. For can any thing be more wretched, than, after an unfortunate Event, to say, who could have thought it? We ought to have done thus and thus, and to have avoided such and such Measures. The *Olynthians* may now talk of proper Measures, which if they had taken would have prevented their Ruin. The *Oritans* may do the like; the *Phoceans*, and, in short, all those, who have been ruin'd, may now hold the same Discourses: But what will they now avail them? It is the Duty of the Pilot, Mariners, and every Man on board a Ship, be she great or small, to be watchful and diligent while she is in good Condition; for if, thro' their Carelessness or Unskilfulness, she be surpriz'd by a sudden Storm, if their Prudence do not obviate the Danger, and her Sails be not taken in, they will in vain struggle when she is founde'r'd, or the Sea has broken in upon her. Thus ought we, *Athenians*, whilst we continue a great State, enjoy great Power, and have a great Name ——— What ought we to do? I will tell you freely, and propose
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my Opinion, that you may approve or reject it.

To put yourselves in a Posture, you must begin by equipping a Fleet, finding necessary Funds for the War, and raising Soldiers; for, should the rest of *Greece* be willing to be Slaves, it will nevertheless be your Duty to appear as the Assertors of its Liberty. When your Preparations are made, and *Greece* is acquainted with them, let us invite other Nations to join with us. Let us send Embassies for this Purpose to the *Peloponnesus*, *Rhodes*, *Scio*, and even to the King of *Persia*; for that Prince seems not to be unconcerned, least this Upstart bring all to Confusion. If your Negotiations prove successful, you will have Confederates to share with you the Dangers, and to bear part of the necessary Expences: If they should not succeed to your Wish, you will still gain time upon your Adversary; Nor is gaining of time an Advantage to be slighted, when you have for Enemy an absolute Prince, whose Councils are not subject to the Delays, which are unavoidable in popular Governments. That Embassies are not useless,
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
you may gather from what happen'd last Year, when, in Company with that excellent Man *Polieuētus*, *Hegesippus*, *Clitomachus*, *Lycurgus*, their other Collegues, and myself, went from Town to Town, in the *Peloponnesus*, aggravating the Injuries of our Enemy; for by this means we stopp'd his Progress, saved *Ambracia*, and prevented his Irruption into the *Peloponnesus*. I shall not indeed advise you to encourage and rouse up other People, if yourselves persevere to neglect every thing which is necessary. It would be ridiculous for Men, so Indolent in their own Affairs, to affect a Concern for others, and to stir up in others an Apprehension of future Dangers, when themselves have no Sense of those that are present. I do not advise you to take Measures thus inconsistent; but I propose that we immediately send Money, and whatever else is desired, to our Troops in the *Cbersonesus*: That we begin to put ourselves in a good Posture; and when we shall thus have set an Example to others of what is fit to be done, that we then invite, assemble, instruct, and encourage the other *Greeks*.

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Such Measures will besit the Dignity of your State. But if you expect, that the People of *Chalcis*, or *Megara*, will save *Greece*, whilst you sit idle, you are strangely mistaken. It will be happy for those petty States, if each of them can preserve itself. But to protect the Honour and Safety of *Greece* belongs of right to you. It is a Right your Ancestors purchased at the Expence of great Labour and many Hazards; and they have bequeathed this glorious Task, as an Inheritance, to you. But if each Man will sit with his Arms a-cross, expecting every thing from Fortune, and seek only to avoid present Trouble; in the first place, he will certainly find no Body to do what himself neglects; and I fear moreover, least we may all be forced to do what we would not. For if there were any such as would officiously supply your Inactivity, they would have been found long since; but there are none such.

You have my Opinion, *Athenians*: I have proposed Measures, which if follow'd will, I believe, still retrieve your sinking Reputation.

tation. If any Man has any thing better to offer, let him speak, and propose it; and may the Resolutions, you shall take, (I beg of all the Gods,) prove successful to the State !





THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.

Translated, in 1702,

By Mr. T O P H A M.

The A R G U M E N T.

The Subject of this Oration is, in general, the same with that of the preceding. What is peculiar to it, is, principally, that Demosthenes here advises the Athenians to send an Embassy, and make an Alliance with the King of Persia; and endeavours to bring about an Agreement and Harmony between the Rich and Poor, by persuading the Poor not to aim at levelling the Riches of the Republic, and depriving the Wealthy of their Estates; and the Rich, not to envy the Poor the little Advantages they received out of the Public Stock.

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It seems to have been spoken in haste, on the receipt of some, sudden, bad News from Theffaly, in relation to the Progress of Philip's Arms; which may, in some measure, account for the Orator's recurring to many of the same Arguments, and in almost the same Words, he had used in the foregoing Orations, particularly that Concerning the Chersonesus.



S I believe, O Men of *Athens*, that those things, about which you now consult, are not only of Consequence to you, but even necessary to the very Being of your Commonwealth; so I shall endeavour to speak, concerning them, what I believe to be for your Interest. Now, in the number of Disorders, under which the State labours (which are great, and have gain'd Strength by time) there is not one, O Men of *Athens*, more fatal in your present Circumstances, than that you are gone off from the Consideration of Public Affairs, and, so long as you continue sitting, attend only to News; and then each of you, returning home, is so far from employing his Thoughts
about

about the matter, that he does not so much as remember it. It is true, the Insolence and Encroachments of *Philip* upon all Mankind are as great and frequent as you are told. But, that it is impossible* by Words and Harangues to restrain him from them, no Body sure is ignorant. If any one is not able to discover this some other way, let him reason thus. We never lost our Cause, when the Justice of it was the matter in Dispute, and, upon all Occasions, as far as Words go, have maintain'd the Superiority. Are then his Affairs, by virtue of this, in an ill Condition, and those of our State in a good? Surely, far otherwise. For why! He presently arms, he marches, he makes brisk Attempts with all his Forces; while we sit still, some speaking, and others attending to the justice of the Cause. Thus, of course, Deeds get the better of Words; and all Men attend, not to our former or present Arguments about Right and Justice, but to our Actions: And they, at present, are such as are unable to protect those, who are oppress'd by him. For, more I must not say.

To

To proceed: The People, in every State about us, being divided into two sorts; the one, neither for governing others by force, nor for being enslaved to any one, but for enjoying quietly their Constitution, Laws, and Liberties; the other, ambitious to lord it over their Countrymen, and not refusing Subjection to any, by whose Assistance they may compass that End: Those of this Disposition, who affect Tyranny and arbitrary Power, have every where prevail'd; and I know not whether there be one State left, your own excepted, in which the Authority of the People is firmly preserved. Those Modellers of Government, by his Assistance, have prevailed by every Method, by which Actions of Consequence are perform'd. The first and most universal of which is, that those, who are willing to be bribed over to their Interest, know where to apply, and who will disburse the proper Sums: And a second, not a whit less effectual than the other, that they have a Force ready to crush all those, who oppose them, whenever they shall think fit to call for it. But we, O Men of *Athens*, are not only deficient in these things,

things, but cannot be awaken'd, and are stupified like those who have taken Mandrake, or some such Potion. Consequently (for Truth must be spoken) we are so vilified and despised, that, among those concern'd in the same Dangers with ourselves, some dispute with us the Command, and others the place of Congress; whilst others resolve to depend upon their own Strength alone, rather than defend themselves by an Alliance with us. But why do I recall to your Mind these Miscarriages? I call *Jupiter* and all the Gods to witness, it is not my Desire to incur your Displeasure, but to convince every one of you, O Men of *Athens*, that, as in private Affairs, so in the Public, tho' each Day's Sloth and Indolence does not immediately shew the Consequences of every Neglect, yet they will notoriously appear at the Foot of the Account.

You now see the Importance of those Places, which you disregarded at the Conclusion of the Peace; as, *Serrium* and *Dorisus*; Names hardly heard of by many among you. These, however, being slighted

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were the ruin of *Thrace* and *Cersobleptes* your Allies. *Philip* then, perceiving your Neglect of these Places, and that you sent them no Assistance, demolish'd *Portimus*, and, by establishing a Tyranny in *Eubæa*, in the very face of *Attica*, has begun, as it were, the Blockade of this City. This likewise being not worth your Care, he almost took *Megara*. You took no Notice of, nor stirr'd a Foot at any one of these Actions, nor so much as gave him to understand, you wou'd not suffer him to go on in this manner. *Antroæ* he bought, and soon after made himself Master of *Oreus*. Many things I omit; as *Pheræ*, his Inroad upon *Ambracia*, his Cruelties in *Elis*, and many more. For it is not to enumerate all who have been oppress'd and mal-treated by *Philip*, that I have recited these, but to demonstrate to you, that *Philip* will never cease oppressing all Mankind, and subduing whom he pleases, if he meets with no Opposition.

There are some among you, who, before they hear the State of your Affairs, are ready to ask, What then must we do? Not that they design to do it, when they are told,

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(for then they wou'd be most serviceable to the State) but only to interrupt what we have to say. Nevertheless I must tell you what you ought to do. In the first place, O Men of *Athens*, you must be firmly persuaded, that *Philip* is at War with this Republic, and has broke the Peace; that he hates this City, and the very Foundations on which it stands; let me add, its Religion, and its Gods, who, I pray, confound him! But especially, that he is an Enemy to its free Constitution, and is perpetually laying Schemes for its Destruction. And this Disposition towards us is become almost necessary to him. For, do but reflect: He aims at universal Monarchy, and he considers you as the only Opposers of his Views. He has long injur'd you, and is conscious he has so done. By what he has usurp'd from you he secures to himself the Enjoyment of all his other Acquisitions. For, had he given up *Amphipolis* and *Potidea*, he would not have thought himself safe in *Macedon*, his own Country. He is, therefore, sure of these two things, that he has treacherous Designs against you, and that you are aware of it.

✓ If then he thinks you in your Senses, he must think you have just Cause to hate him. And, besides these things, which are so very considerable, he is convinced, that, tho' he were Master of all the World besides, he could possess nothing securely, so long as you preserve your Liberty. But, should any Miscarriage befall him (and all human Affairs are subject to many) all those, whom he now keeps under by Force, would revolt from him, and fly to you for Protection. For, you are not so much qualified for gaining Empire over your Neighbours, as for preventing others from obtaining it, and wresting it out of the Hands of those who have usurp'd it; in a word, for breaking the Measures of those, who aim at universal Monarchy, and asserting the Liberties of all Mankind. For this Reason, he is unwilling your Liberty should maintain its ground against his Advantages; and in this he reasons upon just and true Principles. Upon these Accounts then you ought, in the first Place, to esteem him the irreconcilable Enemy of your Constitution and Liberty.

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In the next place, be perfectly assured, that all his present Intrigues and Preparations are design'd against our Republic. For there is no one among you so weak, as to imagine *Philip* can set any Value on those wretched Places in *Thrace*, (for by what other Name can we call *Drongilus*, *Cabyle*, *Mastira*, and other Places he has taken in that Country?) or that, for the sake of getting these, he undergoes the Fatigues and extreme Dangers of Winter-Campaigns; that, as for the Ports of *Athens*, its Docks, its Naval Strength, its Silver-Mines, its great Revenues, its Situation, and its Glory, (all which may neither he, nor any other, by subduing our State, ever be Master of!) for all these he has no Desire, but will leave you the peaceable Enjoyment of them; while, for the sake of a little wretched Corn laid up in the *Thracian* Granaries, he himself takes up his Winter-Quarters in Dens and Caverns. No, it cannot be: but it is in order to be Master of what we possess here, that he is employ'd both there and every where else. Being therefore fully persuaded of these things, you ought not to call upon him,

who, in every Question of State, is your faithful Adviser, to bring in a Decree of War. For this is not to do what is expedient for your Country, but to provide a Person, who may bear the weight of your Indignation. For you now see plainly, that, if any one had brought in a Decree of War, upon *Philip's* first, second, or third breach of the Peace, (for there are many successive ones) and he had, after that, assisted the *Cardians* (as he now does, tho' no *Athenian* has yet proposed any Decree of War against him) such your Adviser would have been torn to Pieces, as the Cause of *Philip's* sending Assistance to the *Cardians*. Seek not, therefore, an Object of your Hatred upon *Philip's* Account, nor expose any one to be torn to Pieces by his Pensioners: Nor give your Votes for a War, and then quarrel among yourselves, whether it was requisite or not: But rather use the same Methods in defending yourselves, that he employs in attacking you. Supply those, who are now at War with him in their own Defence, with Money and other Necessaries; and to this Purpose, pay your Contributions readily,

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prepare a good Force both by Sea and Land, and provide Horses, Transports, and every thing necessary for War.

The present Management of our Affairs is quite ridiculous: Nay, I solemnly declare it to be my Opinion, that *Philip* himself would not wish us to alter our Conduct in any one Instance. You assemble after the Business is done; you waste your Money in fruitless Expences; you quarrel who shall have the Management of your Affairs; you grow angry, and accuse one another. I will tell you whence all this proceeds, and point out to you the Remedy. Your Affairs, O Men of *Athens*, are never begun, and establish'd at first, upon a right Foundation. If some business arises, you begin to apply yourselves to it; if another starts up, you quit the first, and pursue the second. But this will not do now. Nothing of consequence can be affected by occasional Armaments. You must set on foot a considerable Force, establish Funds for its Maintenance, and appoint Treasurers for the Management of them; you must use all possible Cautions to prevent any Embezzlement of the Public

Money; and when all this is done, your Treasurers will be accountable for your Expences, and your Generals for Services perform'd: Nor must you leave it in the Power of your General to sail wherever he pleases, or to act in any thing contrary to his Orders. If you will follow this Advice, you will either oblige *Philip* strictly to observe the Peace, and contain himself within the bounds of his own Country, or you will contend with him upon equal Terms. And, perhaps, O Men of *Athens*, as you are now inquisitive after all *Philip's* Motions, he will then be as solicitous to know, upon what Expedition the Forces of this Republic are gone, and where they will make a Descent.

If any one thinks, what I have advised will be attended with great Expence and Difficulty, he thinks very rightly; but let him reckon what will be the Consequence to the State, if we do not readily set about it, and he will see it is for our Advantage to do willingly what must be done. For even should one of the Gods engage (and no Mortal can be security in
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this Case) that, tho' you sit still, and suffer things to take their course, *Philip* will not attack you, yet, I call *Jupiter* and all the Gods to witness, it wou'd be infamous and base, and unworthy of the *Athenian* Power, and the glorious Actions of your Ancestors, for the sake of your own Ease and Quiet, to suffer all *Greece* to be expos'd to Slavery. For my own part, I had rather die, than give such Advice: If any one else will give it, and you are disposed to follow it, be it so, sit still, and suffer things to take their course. But if no one is of this Opinion, and we are all convinced, that, the more we suffer *Philip* to be Master of, the more dangerous and formidable Enemy we shall find him, Why do we delay? Why do we procrastinate? When shall we be in a Humour to do our Duty? Then, perhaps, when some Necessity obliges us. But the Necessity of free Men, and a free State, is not only come, but already past; and, for the Necessity of Slaves, we have great reason to pray it may never come upon us. For, here lies the difference: to a free Man the

highest Necessity is a dishonourable Situation of Affairs: but that of Slaves is Stripes and Tortures; things not fit to be mention'd here, and which Heaven avert!

It is therefore highly blameable in you, O Men of *Athens*, to pay so slight a Regard to things, to which you ought to sacrifice your Lives and Fortunes. Whatever Excuse may be alledg'd in behalf of this Conduct, you deserve, surely, extreme Reproach for being so unwilling to hear what you ought not only to hear, but to consult about. It is usual with you, when things are quiet, not so much as to hear or consult about the least Affair, till Necessity, as at present, calls loudly upon you. While *Philip* is making Preparations against you, you live at your ease, and neglect to provide in like manner against him; and if any one says any thing tending that way, you presently explode it. But, when you hear of some Town lost or besieged, then you give Attention, and begin to prepare; whereas it was then the time to listen to your Advisers, and consult what was to be done, when you were

were averſe to it, and now is the time to act, and make uſe of Preparations already made, when you are ſitting and hearing Advice. It is owing to this Diſpoſition, that you act ſo contrary to all Mankind: All other People conſult before Action, but you after.

I ſhall now mention what was long ſince requiſite, and is ſtill ſo. Money, in the preſent Circumſtances, is the thing moſt wanting to this State; and ſome lucky Accidents have fallen out, without our ſeeking, which if we make a right uſe of, perhaps this Point may be gained. For, in the firſt place, thoſe, whom the Great King * conſides in, and takes to be in his Intereſt, hate *Philip*, and are at War with him. In the next place, the Man, who is *Philip's* chief Agent, and privy to his Preparations againſt the King, has been ſpirited away; and the King will be inform'd of theſe Practices, not by us (for he might think we ſpoke

* *The King of Perſia, ſo called by the Greeks.*

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with a view to our own particular Interest) but by the very Actor and Manager of them. So that the Information will obtain Credit, and your Embassadors will have occasion to say nothing but what the King wou'd gladly hear; that is, that we ought jointly to revenge our common Injuries, and that *Philip*, by attacking us first, will become more formidable to the King: for if he succeeds against us, being deserted, he will march against him without any fear.

To this purpose, it is my Opinion, you ought to send an Embassy to the King, without regard to that foolish Prejudice, by which you have so often suffer'd, that he is a Barbarian, and a common Enemy of all *Greece*. For my own part, when I see any one afraid of a Man at *Susa* or *Ecbatana*, and talking of his Ill-will towards this Republic; (tho' he formerly assisted to restore our Affairs, and has now offer'd to do the same; and surely it is not his Fault, if you reject his Offers;) but, with regard to the Man, who is just entring our Doors, the growing Robber of the *Greeks* in the Heart
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of Greece, telling quite another Story; I am struck with wonder, and fear for that Man, who is not afraid of *Philip*.

But there is another thing, which hurts the Public Service, and that is, those injurious, railing, and indecent Speeches, which furnish a Pretence to those, who are unwilling to discharge their Duty to the Publick: for, in every Defect, where somebody ought to have seen the thing done, you will find the blame laid upon this. Tho' it is with reluctance I mention this, I am resolved not to dissemble it. For I am persuaded, I shall offer something to the Rich in behalf of the Poor, and to the Needy in behalf of money'd Men, which will tend to the service of the Publick. If we cou'd remove from among us those Railings, which some Persons make about the Money appropriated to the Theatre, and the apprehension that that Matter will never be determin'd without some great Inconvenience, nothing wou'd tend more to the bettering our present Circumstances, and strengthening every part of the Republic. Consider the thing in this light.

light. - First, with respect to those, who seem to be in want: There was a time, when the public Revenues of this State did not exceed One hundred and thirty Talents; nor was there one, among those able to equip a Galley, or advance to the Exchequer, who refused doing his Duty because the public Money was deficient; but the Gallies failed, Money was raised, and we did every thing that became us to do. By the favour of Fortune, our publick Revenues increased, and our Income now is Four hundred Talents, without any Detriment to the Men of Estates, but rather to their Advantage: for all the Men of Wealth share in the Management of it, and with good reason. Why then do we reproach one another upon this account, and make it a Pretence for not doing our Duty? unless it be, that we envy this assistance of Fortune, which has befall'n the Poor, whom I can never envy myself, nor approve that others shou'd. In private Families, I never observed any young Man behave himself so foolishly and perversely towards his Elders, as to say, he will

will do nothing, unless every one does as much as himself: this wou'd be breaking the Laws of Good-behaviour; for surely he is bound by Nature, and by the Laws, to perform those Offices, which his Parents require of him, readily and chearfully. As therefore each of us, in our private Capacity, has a Parent, so we ought to esteem the whole People the common Parents of the State, and that it is not only right not to deprive them of any thing, which the Constitution gives them, but even, if no such Provision were made, that the Defect shou'd be supply'd some other way. If the Rich will come into this Notion, they will not only be true to Justice, but to their own Interest likewise.

As to the Poor and Neceffitous, I wou'd advise them likewise to remove the Cause of Discontent and Complaint, which the Rich have against them: For I proceed as before, not being backward to speak the truth in behalf also of the Wealthy. For my own part, I cannot believe there is any one, of any Nation whatever, especially an
Athenian,

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Athenian, of so barbarous and unnatural a Disposition, as to repine at the Advantages of the Poor. Where then lies the Cause of Complaint? Why, in this; that they see many Persons transferring this Practice from the public Revenues to private Estates, and the Promoters of it becoming thereby considerable among you, and, as far as Safety can make them so, immortal; and, at the same time, their private Suffrage at variance with their public Clamour. This is the occasion of Distrust and ill Blood. For you ought, O Men of *Athens*, fairly to communicate to each other the benefits of your Constitution; the Rich, who are under no Difficulties or Apprehensions about their Subsistence, employing part of their Wealth, in times of Danger, for the public Safety; and the bulk of the People depending upon the publick Stock, and receiving their respective Shares, but considering private Estates as peculiar to the Owners. Thus a small State may become Great, and a great one continue so.

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These then seem to be the respective Duties on either part: but it is necessary to demonstrate to you how they may be regularly perform'd. For many of the Causes of your present Circumstances and Confusion are of long standing; which if you are willing to hear, I am ready to recite. The Basis, O Men of *Athens*, upon which your Ancestors left you, is removed. You have been led to esteem it an impertinent and a vain Expence, to be the Sovereigns of *Greece*, to maintain a large Force, and to protect the Injur'd and Oppress'd; but to think it a wonderful Happiness and Security, to live at Peace, to neglect Opportunities, and suffer one Loss after another, till you have scarce any thing left. In consequence of this, another, stepping into the Post you ought to have maintain'd, is become Great and Powerful, and Master of almost All. This rich, this great, this glorious thing, for which the mightiest States have ever contended (while the *Spartans* were disabled, the *Thebans* taken up with the *Phocean* War, and we regardless of it) hath he borne away without a Competitor. And thus hath he establish'd

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a formidable Power, and numerous Alliances; and all *Greece* has been involved in so many and great Difficulties, that it is not easy to advise what Measures ought to be taken.

But, amidst all the States, which are threatned by the present calamitous Circumstances, none, in my Judgment, are in greater danger than yourselves; not only because *Philip's* Designs are chiefly levell'd against you, but because you are, of all, the least careful to provide against them. If you flatter yourselves, from the flourishing State of your Commerce, and a throng'd Exchange, that the Commonwealth is in no danger, you form a wrong Judgment of things. For this is, indeed, the way to judge, whether the Markets are well or ill supply'd; but with respect to that State, which, whoever aims at the Dominion of all *Greece*, must know, will alone oppose him, and appear at the head of the Common Liberty; for that State, Trade can never be the Test, whether its Condition be flourishing or otherwise: it must be consider'd, whether it can depend upon the Friendship of its Allies, or whether it can raise a powerful

ful military Force; in both which, you are far from being in a good Condition. This you will be convinced of, if you reflect in this manner. When were the Affairs of *Greece* in the greatest Disorder? No Man can assign any other Period of Time than the present. In all former Times, the *Grecian* Affairs were divided between two Interests, the *Lacedemonian* and ours: of the rest of the *Greeks*, some follow'd us, and some the *Lacedemonians*. The *Persian* was equally suspected by all, and, taking part with the weaker side, was only so far trusted, till he had restored the Balance of Power; which done, he was as odious to those he had saved, as their original Enemies. But now, first of all, that Monarch is in Friendship with all the *Greeks*; tho', indeed, least of all with us, unless we now settle that matter upon a better Foundation. In the next place, we have many Pretences to be at the head of the League. All, indeed, claim the Precedence, and are full of Envy and Jealousy against each other: from whence arise great Inconveniences. Each stands upon a separate bottom; the *Argives*, the *Thebans*,

bans, the *Corinthians*, the *Lacedemonians*, the *Arcadians*, and ourselves.

But, notwithstanding the *Grecian* Affairs are divided into so many Parts, and distinct Governments, it is remarkable (if I must speak the truth boldly) that none of the *Greek* Senates or Councils are less busied about Affairs relating to the common Interest, than our own. No State enters into Negotiations with us, thro' Love, Confidence, or Fear. And this, O Men of *Athens*, is owing, not to a single Cause (for then we might easily set it right) but to various and continual Miscarriages. The Particulars I omit, but will point out one, in which all the rest center; first intreating a favourable Hearing of the Truths I shall freely utter.

The Opportunities, which might be improved to your Advantage, are bought and sold: you partake, indeed, of Peace and Quiet, and, charmed therewith, shew no Resentment against those who deceive you, but suffer them to pocket the Purchase-Money. As to the other Matters, it is not my Design to examine into them at present.

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But I must observe, that, when any thing relating to *Philip* is brought before you, somebody starts up, and persuades you not to be so mad as to declare War, telling you, how desirable a thing it is to live in Peace, how burthenfome to maintain an Army, and that some Men wou'd fain be plundering the public Treasure. In this manner they talk, pretending to tell you nothing but the Truth. But, in my opinion, it is not a time to persuade you to live in Peace, who are so well inclined to do so, but rather Him, who is so intent upon making War: for if once he be persuaded, the Work is done with respect to you. Nor ought we to grudge those Expences, which the care of our Safety renders necessary, but rather what we must suffer if we spare them: Nor, in order to prevent the Plunder which is apprehended of the public Treasure, ought we to desert the Necessities of the State, but rather find out a Method for its safe and frugal Application. I must confess, I am greatly scandalized, to see some among you so solicitous about the public Treasure, which it is in your own power to secure,
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and even to punish any Attempts against it; and, at the same time, so unconcern'd at *Philip's* plundering all *Greece* without Distinction, and that in the direct Road to you.

Whence, then, is it, O Men of *Athens*, that no one has ever told you, that he, who so manifestly violates the Laws of Justice, and usurps the Sovereignty over whole Nations, is the guilty Person, and actually at War; but many pretend, they are the Authors of the War, who wou'd persuade you to oppose him, and stand up in defence of your own Rights? The Reason is, because they wou'd lay the blame of all those Difficulties, which shall be occasion'd by the War (and many Difficulties must unavoidably happen in War) upon those, who sincerely advise you for your true Interest. For they well know, if, with general Consent, and one Spirit, you return Hostilities, both that you will overcome *Philip*, and that there will be an end of the Pensions they receive from him: but that, if, upon the first piece of Ill-success, you lay the blame of it upon Particulars, and turn from Fighting

ing to Impeaching, they, by managing the Prosecutions, shall secure two Points, a high Reputation with you, and considerable Sums from him; and that the Vengeance of the State, which ought to fall upon themselves, will by this means light upon those, who have advised you for the best. This is their Aim, and the true ground of their Accusations, that some Persons are fond of beginning a War. This, however, I may venture to affirm, that, tho' no *Athenian* hath as yet proposed a decree, of War, *Philip* is in possession of many things belonging to this State, and at this very time assists the *Cardians* against us. But he wou'd be void of all Sense and Discretion, if, when we assert that he is not at War with us, he shou'd endeavour to confute us in this point. For, if those, who suffer Injuries, dissemble them, why need he be concern'd, who offers them? But, when he actually invades us, what shall we then say? He will, even then, tell us, he is not at War with us; as he told the *Oritæ*, when his Army was in their Country; and the *Phe-reans*, before he assaulted their Walls; and
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the *Olyntians*, before he had march'd into their Territory. Shall we, then, pretend, that those, who exhort us to defend ourselves, make the War? Will any thing, then, remain for us, but Slavery?

Nor is our Danger the same with that of other States. It is not *Philip's* Design, merely to subdue our Republic, but utterly to extirpate it. For he knows, you neither will, nor can, be Slaves: You have been used to command; and you have it in your power, if occasion offers, to give him more Disturbance than all the World be-fides. For which reason you must expect no Mercy, if he gets you in his power. Be assured therefore, the Contest will be of the last Importance; and let those, who have sold themselves to *Philip*, feel the weight of your immediate Indignation. You can never subdue your Enemies abroad, till you have punish'd those at home: for it is through these you must make your way to come at those.

Whence is it that *Philip* uses Insults and Menaces towards you, while he deludes others with offers of Kindness? He reduced the

Thessalians

Theſſalians to their preſent Slavery, by giving them many Advantages: The Artifices, by which he deceived the poor *Olynthians*, are innumerable; as the giving them *Potidea*, and other things. At this very time, he is conquering the *Thebans*, by yielding to them *Boeotia*, and freeing them from a long and heavy War. All theſe States, having firſt reap'd ſome Advantage, either already ſuffer in the manner we all know, or muſt ſuffer in their turn. As for you, *Athenians*, (what he has taken from you in War I paſs by) in the very Treaty of Peace, how many ways were you deceived? Of how many things deprived? Did he not ſecure to himſelf the *Phoceans*, *Thermopylae*, and, in *Thrace*, *Doriscus*, *Serrium*, and *Cherſobleptes* himſelf? Is he not, at this time, avowedly, depriving you of *Cardia*? How comes it to paſs, that he treats you, and others, in ſo different a manner? The reaſon is, becauſe, in this State alone, Liberty is given to ſpeak for the Intereſt of the Enemy; and the very Perſon, who betrays you for Money, may ſpeak freely before you, at the very time your Poſſeſſions are taken from you. It

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wou'd not have been safe, at *Olynthus*, to have pleaded in behalf of *Philip*, if the People themselves had not shared in the Advantage, by gaining *Potidea*. It would not have been safe, in *Thessaly*, to have espoused the Interest of *Philip*, if the *Thessalians* had not shared in the Advantage, by *Philip's* expelling their Tyrants, and restoring to them the Privileges of the *Amphictyons*. Nor would the same thing have been allowed at *Thebes*, before he gave them up *Bæotia*, and destroy'd the *Phoceans*. But at *Athens*, after *Philip* has not only taken from us *Amphipolis*, and the Country of the *Cardians*, but is even blocking up this City on the side of *Eubæa*, and at this very time marching towards *Byzantium*, at *Athens*, it is safe to speak for the Interest of *Philip*. Nay, of the Speakers, some, from meer Beggars, are become on a sudden rich, and, from Men of no Name or Repute, eminent and honourable; whilst you, on the contrary, from honourable are become inglorious, and, from wealthy, indigent. For I esteem the Riches of a State to be, its Allies, its Credit, and the Good-will of its Neighbours; in all which you are poor and

unprovided: And, ever since you are become regardless of these things, and have suffer'd your Affairs to go on in this manner, he has been growing rich, great, and formidable both to the *Greeks* and *Barbarians*; and you yourselves have fallen into Neglect and Contempt: Flourishing, indeed, in an outside Shew of Plenty, but, in real Provision of things necessary for such times, ridiculous.

Your Advisers seem to me to consult their own Interest, and that of the State, in a very different manner. They tell you, you ought to sit still, even tho' you are injur'd; whereas they themselves cannot be quiet, tho' injur'd by no Body. But, hard Words apart, should any one say, Tell me, *Aristodemus*, why do you, who very well know (and no one can be ignorant in this Case) that a private Life is secure, and free from Danger and Trouble, but That of the Dealers in Public Affairs expos'd to Strife, Uncertainty, Fatigue, and great Inconveniences; why do you, I say, decline that which is quiet and easy, and choose that which is surrounded with Difficulties and Dangers? What wou'd

you reply? For, shou'd we allow that to be true, which is the best thing you can say, that you are acted by the Motive of Glory and Honour, I wonder how possibly you can think, that, for the sake of these, it is fit you yourself shou'd undergo such Toil, and hazard every thing, and yet advise the Public lazily to give every thing up. You will not pretend, it is necessary you should make a Figure in the State, but the State itself, none among the rest of *Greece*. Nor can I see, why it is for the Safety of the State to meddle only with what immediately concerns itself, but dangerous for you not to be busier than the rest of the World. On the contrary, you, by being over-busy, and the State, by sitting still, are expos'd to the last of Dangers. But, perhaps, you have a Stock of Reputation from your Father and Grandfather, which you ought to keep up; but the State derives nothing from our Ancestors - but what is low and obscure. Is this the Case? By no means. Your Father, if like you, was no better than a Pick-pocket; but the Ancestors of this Commonwealth such as all
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the *Greeks* experienced in a double Deliverance by their Hands from the greatest Dangers.

But some of your Statesmen do not manage their own, and the Affairs of the Public, equally and impartially. For how is it equal, that some of them, from a Goal, should have raised themselves to such a height as to forget their Origin, while they have reduced their Country, which stood the Protector of all the rest of *Greece*, and held the first Rank, to the lowest degree of Ignominy and Contempt?

Tho' I have still much to say, I forbear: for it is not for want of Words, at this or any former time, that your Affairs have been brought into Disorder; but, tho' you hear what is for your Interest: and are convinced that right Advice is given you, you listen with the same Attention to those, who wou'd poison and pervert all things: not that you are ignorant of their Motives; for you distinguish at first Sight, who speaks for his Pension, and manages for *Philip*, and who speaks honestly, and with a View to our real Good: But, by impeaching the
latter,

latter, and turning the Business into Railing or Ridicule, you furnish yourselves with an Excuse for not doing what is necessary to be done.

This is the Truth, told you, for your best Advantage, with Plainness and Freedom, and out of a sincere Affection: Not a Speech, filled with Flattery, Mischief, and Deceit; such as would put Money into the Speaker's Pocket, and the Affairs of the Commonwealth into the Hands of its Enemies. Either, therefore, you must alter your Conduct, or blame no Body but yourselves for the bad Situation of your Affairs.

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